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This research considers three main themes: disaster management and emergency 
planning; responses by governments and NGOs to disasters; and the humanitarian 
supply chain in the context of a disaster response. The aim of this study was to examine 
and explore how these three elements are brought together in order to enhance the 
effectiveness and efficiency of a disaster response. In particular, in the face of an 
increasing number of disasters, a speedily driven disaster response has becoming 
increasingly relevant in today’s modern world. Emergency planning is an essential and 
fundamental framework for conducting a disaster response which is mainly carried out 
by governments and NGOs. Moreover, the humanitarian supply chain is crucial to 
enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of a disaster response due to its function of 
managing and delivering relief goods and equipment to a disaster spot. In addition, 
through the use of two case studies, this research also examined the response by 
governments and NGOs to two significant natural disasters: the Wenchuan Earthquake 
and Typhoon Morakot.  
 
The methods adopted in this research were semi-structured face-to-face interviews and 
case studies. In order to accomplish the research aim, interviews were conducted with 
key personnel drawn from the emergency and disaster management industries in China 
and Taiwan. The study participants were chosen because of their expertise in this area. 
In addition, two cases were analysed in-depth in order to provide a rich understanding 
of the context of the disaster response for both governments and NGOs. 
 
This research found that both emergency planning and the humanitarian supply chain 
are crucial to enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of a disaster response and will 
be so for many years to come. The key conclusion for this research is that enhancing a 
disaster response by including the humanitarian supply chain in an emergency plan is 
crucial, not only to enhance the disaster response stage but also to contribute to 
humanitarian relief. The findings from this research are not only applicable to China and 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Importance of study 
 
Over the past few decades, the threats posed by natural disasters have constantly grown, 
and these can affect human safety and social stability depending on the scale of the 
disaster (Blaikie et al 2014). The increasing number of disasters and the need for 
humanitarian support in recent years has raised the importance and urgency for serious 
research. According to current statistics, around 500 disasters occur every year, killing 
approximately 75,000 people and affecting over 200 million people, and that number is 
constantly increasing (Montz et al 2017). To reduce the size of the impacted population, 
it is necessary to develop a more effective and efficient response mechanism. This is 
because disaster response is the only phase of the disaster cycle that directly impacts on 
life or death. It is necessary to explore how to improve the effectiveness and efficiency 
of disaster response, and thus, this explains why this research is so important.  
 
Disaster response is complex because various public and private sectors from the local 
to national and domestic to international can be involved (Coppola 2011; Haddow, 
Bullock, and Coppola 2017). In addition, the extent to which the economic development 
level of a given country and the capability and capacity of a state to quickly mobilize 
resources also challenges the effectiveness and efficiency of disaster response actions.  
 
Furthermore, an effective disaster response is often limited by many factors which 
include economic, infrastructural, collaboration, the organizational perspective, 
information sharing, and personnel skills (Fischer 1996; Haddow at.al 2017; Waugh and 
Streib 2006; Manoj and Alexandra 2007; Bharosa, Lee and Janssen 2010; Edwards 
2009, Yi and Özdamar 2007). Yet emergency planning is the most important 




This research examines the Wenchuan Earthquake (China) and Typhoon Morakot 
(Taiwan). The Wenchuan Earthquake caused enormous casualties and economic losses, 
with a total of 51 counties and 50,193 square miles in China being affected (Ellsworth 
2013). In addition, it was the biggest earthquake since the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China. More significantly, for the first time, the Chinese government 
publicly acknowledged the positive response by NGOs to the disaster relief. 
 
Typhoon Moroak also contributed to the Chinese government revising the regulations 
and acts related to disaster response. Given that 70% of Taiwan’s natural disasters have 
led to human casualties and economic losses, Morakot was the largest over the past 55 
years (Teng 2006).  
 
These two milestone case studies highlight the importance of holistic emergency 
planning and the collaboration between government and NGOs. Yet lessons can still be 
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1.2.1 Disaster management cycle and Emergency Plan 
 
The flowchart above showing the disaster management (DM) cycle illustrates the DM 
process and conceptually distinguishes the various phases of the DM cycle, which are 
the mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery phases.  
 
The DM activities in the mitigation and preparedness phases are aimed at initiating and 
strengthening the resilience and the capacities of those affected by a disaster and 
protecting their lives and livelihoods (Coppola 2015). The measures implemented 
during this phase are aimed at preventing or reducing the adverse impacts of disaster. In 
the response phase, on the other hand, the focus is on saving lives and preventing loss of 
property; whereas, in the recovery phase, the focus is essentially on recuperation and 
rehabilitation (Coppola 2015).  
 
In fact, all the activities have to be carried out under the Emergency Plan (Alexander 
2003) which is the essential guidance that the relevant authorities/ participants are 
required to follow. Therefore, it is vital to have a holistic emergency plan before the 
government and NGOs carry out their response, in order to enhance the collaboration 
and information flow between the government and NGOs. 
 
In addition, the response phase, which is the only phase which is directly related to the 
survivors or the victims of a disaster, is the most complex among all the phases of DM. 
Therefore, it is important to enhance the effectiveness and efficacy of the disaster 








1.2.2 Effectiveness and efficiency in disaster response  
 
Efficiency is defined as using a variety of parameters which include improving output 
while minimising input (Zokaei and Simons 2006). This can be defined as the ratio 
between the level of inputs and the level of outputs (Fugate et al. 2010), the ratio of the 
resources utilised to the results achieved (Mentzer and Konrad 1991), or the ability to 
provide the desired product/service mix at a level of cost that is acceptable to the 
customer (Langley and Holcomb 1992).  
 
In other words, efficiency is focused on the ratio between the output and input. The 
output in a disaster response is the primary goal of the disaster response to rescue the 
dying and limit any injuries (Coppola 2011). Once a disaster has occurred, in order to 
achieve this primary goal, the participant authorities have to carry out a search and 
rescue response immediately using a ‘cost-is-no-objective approach’ during the first 
‘golden 72 hours’ (Kelly 1995). However, practically, the cost-is-no-object method to 
disaster response is unrealistic. The logic of this theory ignores that the economic 
sources of an organisation are finite. At the same time, while the price may not be seen 
as an aspect throughout an operation, the bills in the end will have to be paid via higher 
costs, a decrease in income, taxation, borrowing or printing extra money (McEntire 
2014). Moreover, the expectations of a no-cost-limit disaster operation encourages 
several dysfunctional disaster management strategies. These include poor preparation 
resulting in a lack of resources when needed, under investment before a disaster because 
purchases can be made when needed, and in contrast, expensive or unnecessary 
procurement during a disaster (Kelly 1995). 
 
Effectiveness is defined as the value proposition of the supply chain to the end 
customers (Zokaei and Simons 2006), the degree to which a goal is achieved (Mentzer 
and Konrad 1991), the ratio between the real output and the expected output, and the 
ability to achieve pre-identified objectives (Fugate et al. 2010). Whilst Davis and Pett 
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(2002) argue that there is no clarity in developing the performance constructs and the 
existence of trade-offs between efficiency and effectiveness as performance dimensions, 
other researchers, for example Mentzer and Konrad (1991) and Fugate et al (2010) point 
out that effectiveness and efficiency should not be two contradictory outcomes. On the 
contrary, improving operational efficiency can lead to better overall effectiveness and 
customer satisfaction. 
 
Improving the match between resources and needs requires positive management in the 
procurement (i.e. cost) aspects when responding to disasters (Fawcett 2013). The 
disaster management structure needs to manage the disaster rather than operate 
reactively (Epstein and Buhovac 2014). Planning provides guidance specific to a 
possible disaster situation, reduces uncertainties in mounting a response, permits the 
identification (and prepositioning) of possible resource requirements, and provides data 
from which to formulate the response-funding requirements. During a disaster response, 
detailed plans may be less important than an organizational capacity to adapt to 
changing conditions and a flexibility in the implementation of policies, plans, and 
procedures (Shah et al. 2017). At the same time, the organizational ability to modify and 
update response plans and revise the resource needs and procurements plans is critical 
to a flexible and adaptive operation (Maghsoudi and Pazirandeh 2016). 
 
1.2.3 Humanitarian supply chain 
 
In the literature review chapter, it was found that humanitarian supply is involved in 80% 
of all response activities (Wassenhove 2010), which involves relief goods and 
equipment procurement and distribution. During the disaster response phase, a well-
structured humanitarian supply chain can not only mobilize response resources, but can 
also enhance the speed of the disaster response along with the information flow between 
the government and the NGOs. Therefore, it is important to have a well-structured 




Another interesting component of the conceptual framework is the relationship between 
NGOs and the government, with both agencies performing coordinated activities such 
as search and rescue, first aid, public preparedness, and public education in disaster 
management. In between are the human supply chain and the emergency planning 
components, whose successes greatly rely upon enhanced efficiency and effectiveness 
during a disaster response. 
 
The conceptual framework above illustrates the knowledge gap that will be closed in 
this thesis which examines the linkage between the humanitarian supply chain and the 
emergency plan in order to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of a disaster 
response. 
 
1.3 Research aim and objectives 
 
The aim of this research is to investigate the methods to enhance the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the response by the government and NGOs to a disaster, by using the case 
studies of the Wenchuan Earthquake and Typhoon Morakot. This research has several 
objectives: firstly, provide definitions and critically examine the DM framework, 
emergency planning, and emergency plan; secondly, explore the key factors and 
challenges in humanitarian supply chain management; thirdly, compare the government 
emergency planning, the government’s and NGOs’ humanitarian supply chain 
management between the cases of the Wenchuan earthquake (China) and typhoon 
Morakot (Taiwan); and finally, to provide recommendations to enhance the 






1.4 Structure of the thesis 
 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 provides a detailed review of the existing 
theoretical concepts of DM and the disaster cycle which include the mitigation, 
preparedness, response and recovery phases.  
 
Chapter 3 provides a more thorough outline of the current knowledge of emergency 
planning and summarises the principles of emergency planning. Furthermore, this 
chapter also highlights and analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the all-hazard 
approach. 
 
Chapter 4 critically examines the relationship between the business supply chain and the 
humanitarian supply chain; discusses the relevant issues and the challenges facing the 
humanitarian supply chain and explores its importance. 
 
Chapter 5 presents a broad literature review on the relevant theories and challenges 
facing NGOs; and critically analyses the responses by NGOs’ in the DM cycle.  
 
Chapter 6 establishes the research methodology. It begins with an introduction to the 
conceptual frameworks of research and then proceeds to explain the research 
philosophy. It evaluates the strengths and limitations of the different research 
approaches in order to justify the choice of the research strategies (semi-structured 
interviews and case studies) used in this study. It also defines the data collection 
methods used (primary and secondary), their sources, strengths and drawbacks, and 




Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 describe the China and Taiwan case studies. The chapters 
critically examine and evaluate the responses by the governments and NGOs to the 
disasters and provides a discussion of the key challenges and recommendations. 
 
Chapter 9 provides a comparative analysis of the two disasters; and then the discussion 
and recommendations from this research are given in Chapter 10.  
 
Chapter 11 is the conclusion in which the research results are discussed with the 
identification of the main outcomes in relation to the research objectives. Finally, it 
concludes with a discussion of the limitations of the research and suggestions for further 








Broadly speaking, it can be said that a disaster is any occurrence that can cause 
tremendous damage, loss of human life, ecological disruption, or deterioration of health 
and health services on a scale that is sufficient to warrant an extra-ordinary response 
from within and outside the affected community. According to Coppola (2015), a 
catastrophe causing illness or injury qualifies as a disaster when the number of people 
affected surpasses 30, and thus require a hospital emergency response. There are two 
important phases in the disaster management cycle, the risk reduction phase and the 
recovery phase. Disaster response, rehabilitation and reconstruction are recovery 
measures that follow the occurrence of a disaster, while mitigation and preparedness are 
risk reduction measures that are undertaken before any such phenomena can occur. 
Disasters can occur naturally or through means which are human engineered. Natural 
disasters are the most common and cannot be prevented, and people can only take 
precautions in the face of their imminent occurrence. These can include tsunamis, floods, 
volcanos, earthquakes, droughts, and hurricanes. This chapter reviews the historical and 
existing theoretical concepts associated with disaster management and the disaster cycle. 
 
It is noted that, academics have clear definitions for emergencies and disasters, but this 
is not the case for practitioners who tend to see anything as an emergency, because 
emergency situations can be planned for, whereas disasters cannot (Alexander 2016). 
This leads to the problem that if disasters and emergency situations are categorized as 
one using the same standards, when a disaster or emergency occurs, this can lead to 
emergency plans that are rigid and which lack flexibility when providing disaster and 





2.2 Disaster Management 
 
2.2.1 Differentiating between the disaster and emergency 
 
The definitions of the emergency and disaster have long been debated in academia 
(Alexander 2003). The emergency has been defined as an out of the ordinary situation 
that must be managed by urgent procedures in order to stop it escalating, thus having 
consequences that are more serious and damaging. Thus it can be said that an 
emergency requires a timely response with a high degree of organization (Alexander 
2016). An alternative definition has also been put forward by Lindell et al. (2006) who 
have argued that the emergency can be defined as a minor event that causes a few 
casualties and a limited amount of property damage. Yet another definition argues that 
the emergency is a serious, unexpected, and often dangerous situation requiring 
immediate action (Moore et al. 2007). In the UK, the Civil Contingency Act 2004 
defines an emergency as: “(a) an event or situation which threatens serious damage to 
human welfare in a place in the United Kingdom; (b) an event or situation which 
threatens serious damage to the environment of a place in the United Kingdom, or (c) 
war, or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the security of the United 
Kingdom”. This specifically identifies that in the case of an emergency it is possible to 
manage through a certain pre-planned procedure.  
 
In contrast, the disaster can be defined as an event that has a substantial negative impact 
on human lives and activities and on the built or natural environment. Commonly it will 
be marked by mortality and morbidity, destruction and damage, interruption of normal 
activities and economic losses (Alexander 2016; Perry and Lindell 2007; Lakha 2004; 
Coppola 2011; Coppola 2015; Fagel 2013; Dillon et al. 2009). UNISDR share a similar 
view, and determine that a disaster is a serious disruption of the functioning of a 
community or society involving widespread human, material, economic or 
environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community 
or society to cope using its own resources (UNISDR 2007). 
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Some scholars tend to define an emergency, crisis, or disaster according to the 
complexity and uncertainty of the situation. When an event requires a standard 
procedure in response, this is called an emergency. However, when the event becomes 
more complex and requires a rapid response, this emergency becomes a crisis event. If 
decision makers do not respond to the crisis effectively, then the event will turn into a 
disaster, where “a disaster is distinct from both emergencies and crises only in that 
physically it represents the product of the former. Disasters then, are the irreversible and 
typically overwhelming result of ill handling of emergencies and crises” (Borodzicz 
2005). 
 
Nevertheless, many scholars and official government departments refer to emergency 
management and disaster managements in the same way, and use the phrases 
emergency and disaster management interchangeably (Laine 2016). Coppola (20015) 
believes that this depends on the perspective from which disasters and emergencies are 
considered. For example, from the perspective of emergency management professionals, 
emergency operations focus on all types of disasters and emergencies. Disaster 
management personnel believe that emergency management is just a part of disaster 
management, and from the perspective of crisis management, both emergency and 
disaster situations are included in crisis management. 
 
Having examining the differences between a disaster and an emergency, in 
consideration that there were less than 90 natural disasters that took place in the last 
century (Bullock et al., 2006); and given that this thesis is focused on the management 
and organisation of disaster responses, the first group of definitions seems better suited 





2.2.2 Historical Development 
 
The idea of disaster management was first coined in the United States, but was 
originally referred to as emergency management (Bullock 2006; McElreath et al. 2013). 
The United States suffered several major disasters in the 1960s, including the Alaska 
Earthquake in 1964, Hurricane Betsy in 1965, and Hurricane Camille in 1969. These 
natural disasters in the 1960s and 1970s ultimately lead to the creation of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 1979. This subsequently drew the 
attention of some public administration researchers, and became the focus of 
organizational and administrative study (Public Administration Review 1985). However, 
the policy problems associated with major natural disasters became the focus of those 
interested in policy design, policy implementation, and policy and program evaluation 
(Sabatier and Weible 2014). 
 
The watershed for public administration research in emergency management was a 1984 
workshop sponsored by FEMA and the National Association of Schools of Public 
Affairs and Administration. This expanded the community of public administration 
researchers and led to the publication of a 1985 special issue of Public Administration 
Review, the preeminent journal in the discipline on emergency management (Waugh 
2005). FEMA and the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and 
Administration (NASPAA) recognized the need for greater focus on scholarship and 
professional practice in emergency management (Comfort Waugh and Cigler 2012). 
The two organizations entered into an agreement to cultivate the interest in emergency 
management among public administration scholars. Their goals were to develop a 
strong disaster research community and to foster a heightened standard of professional 
practice among public administrators in managing emergencies. 
 
The disaster events that occurred in 2004, which were principally the Indian Ocean or 
“Christmas” earthquake and tsunami, and the four hurricanes that struck central Florida, 
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gave the field of emergency management even greater visibility and raised more 
questions about preparedness and response, especially alert and warning systems and 
evacuation, and social and economic recovery (McEntire 2007; Zakour 2012). Since 
that time, administrative imperatives, often driven by disaster events, have provided 
impetus for scholarship and have encouraged the development of academic programs in 
emergency management and related professional fields. These also addressed the policy 
implications of decisions made in the months following the attack on American 
democracy and subsequent decisions, such as the creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security (McEntire 2007). 
 
2.3 Disaster Management cycle 
 
The number of natural disasters taking place each year is noticeably increasing and 
these frequently bring a loss of lives and damage to economies (Less 2012). However, a 
report from UNISDR (2016) has stated that while the number of disasters has increased 
and the subsequent monetary loss is also increasing, the loss of life has actually reduced. 
This is supported by disaster impact statistics which show that while more disasters 
occur with larger populations being affected, fewer people are dying, even though 
economic losses are increasing (IFRC 2000). 
 
Due to the increasing number of disasters that are occurring, it is clearly necessary to 
identify and implement measures in order to reduce their occurrence or impact. Ergun et 
al. (2005) have stated that the occurrence of such events cannot be controlled, but their 
impact can be reduced by using different means including disaster management. In this 
context, UNISDR (2015) use the phrase disaster risk reduction to refer to using 





To mitigate and intervene to reduce the impact of disasters, the disaster management 
cycle has been proposed. There are several models that describe the disaster 
management cycle, these consisting of either four phases (Coppola 2015; Alexandra 
2002; Ergun et al. 2005; Cozzolino 2012; Van, 2006) or five phases (Lin and 
Pathranarakul 2006; UNSIDR 2015a). However, the four-phase cycle is generally the 
preferred model, for example by the Public Administration Review (1995), Alexander 
(2002) and Coppola (2010), as it recognised that the four phases capture most of the 
essences of disaster management (Public Administration, 1995). Disaster management 
can be divided into mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery (Coppola 2015; 
Alexandra 2002; Ergun et al. 2005; Cozzolino 2012; Van 2006), with the most 
recognised four phase cycle shown in Figure 2.1 below, created by Alexander 
(Alexander 2002; Coppola 2015). Alexander (2002) further specified the functions and 
operations of each cycle (see Section 2.2.1-4). In addition, Alexander’s model is more 
comprehensive than that proposed by UNISDR which was a model for the Hyogo 
Framework for Action (2005-2015), as a series standards to guide operations. The 
following sections explain the key tasks, requirements and challenges of the four phases 
of the disaster management cycle. 
 
Figure 2.1: The disaster management cycle (Alexander 2002) 
 
 
This material has been removed from this thesis due to Third Party 
Copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at the 





The focus during the disaster mitigation phase is prevention before a disaster occurs 
(Schwab, Sandler and Brower 2016). Mitigation is defined as any sustained effort to 
reduce the disaster risk by reducing the likelihood and / or the consequences of the risk 
of the hazard (Coppola 2015). In other words, mitigation seeks to reduce the likelihood 
of disasters and the negative impact following disasters (Coppola 2015). The function of 
mitigation is to tackle the cause of disasters and thus reduce the possibility of disasters, 
and also limit the impact of disasters on people, companies, and government agencies, 
where the key is to prevent a disaster occurring in the first place (Lindell, Prater and 
Perry 2007). Venton (2009) describes that mitigation might entail both structural and 
non-structural measures implemented in order to limit the adverse effects of natural 
hazards, technological hazards, and environmental degradation.  
 
Table 2.1: Risk matrix (Vatanpour et al. 2015) 
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In the case of the natural disaster, the key task for mitigation is carrying out a risk 
assessment (Copploa 2013) which also incorporates application of the possibility and 
magnitude impact matrix UNISDR (2005) have argued that the disaster mitigation and 
preparedness phases are the most important phases in the disaster management cycle. In 
particular, in the Hyogo Framework for Action (1995) and Sendai Declaration (2015), 
these highlight the usefulness of using risk assessment and mitigation to reduce disaster 
risks. It is believed that these can predict the probability of a disaster to a high degree. 
Table 2.1 illustrates the relationship between the possibility and magnitude of 
consequences of a disaster where low likelihood and low magnitude have less impact 
and vice versa. Table 2.2 further explains the differences between the different levels of 
risk. 
 
The identification of the risks is the first step of mitigation which is then followed by 
intervention strategies as the second step. This stage involves many stakeholders such as 
government institutes, NGOs, and researchers (Coppola 2015). Nevertheless, the NGOs 
that participate in community development projects are the only type of NGOs involved 
in this phase that can help communities prepare for a disaster (Alexander, 2002). For 
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example, the Taiwanese government carried out a risk assessment before Typhoon 
Morakot occurred. It was found that there were several emergency supplies repositories 
and a few groups of aboriginal people from Chiayi County that were at huge risk, and 





Disaster preparedness is the advanced actions taken in preparation for a disaster to 
ensure that there is an adequate response to its impacts, and so that the relief and 
recovery from its consequences can be achieved while eliminating the need for any last-
minute actions (Coppola 2011). The main activities undertaken in this phase include 
training exercises, providing early warnings and information describing what people 
should do in order to transfer risks in the face of imminent property loss. These actions 
and activities will be different depending on the information given and previous similar 
attempts to implement them (Perry, Lindell and Tiemey 2001). In terms of approaches 
to preparedness, the government component, which includes administration, emergency 
management, public health and NGOs can be considered to be one group, while 
individuals and businesses are the second group (Perry, Lindell and Tiemey 2001). 
Preparedness by the first group is normally defined and conducted through the creation 
and application of an emergency operation procedure and bolstered by training and 
exercises (Perry et al. 2001). 
 
Preparedness involves activities and measures put in place in advance to ensure efficient 
responses to the impact from disasters (McElreath et al. 2013). It might entail leadership 
training and reinforcing community participation. As noted by Venton (2009), strategies 
for the issuance of well-timed and useful early warnings are also measures that ought to 
be put in place in advance, including the measures for the transitory evacuation of 
persons and property from endangered locations, for instance communities living in 
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close proximity to a likely cause of flooding. Therefore, disaster preparedness is based 
on knowing what to do in the aftermath, and being equipped with the right tools to do 
this effectively. This difficult process may take years before attaining satisfactory levels, 
and maintaining such levels is an on-going process. 
 
The mainstreaming of disaster mitigation and preparedness is continually acknowledged 
as an important step in disaster management discourse. This explains to some extent 
why mitigation and preparedness is becoming increasingly prominent in the disaster 
management cycle (Coppola 2011; UN 2015a). Houghton (2005) has argued that 
disaster preparedness and mitigation can be regarded as a principal issue to emerge from 
contemporary humanitarian assistance appraisals. He suggests that NGOs can 
effectively employ disaster preparedness by educating local communities in relation to 
the risks they encounter, and in addition by assisting them in the development of their 
coping mechanisms and emergency plans in the event of an inevitable disaster. In other 
words, modest prevention is more significant than addressing the disaster. In this 
context, educated communities that are prepared with strategies for a satisfactory 
response in an emergency condition, will evidently assist in easing the works of a relief 
operation, where in turn it will accelerate the process towards restoration. 
 
2.3.3 Response Phase  
 
When an emergency occurs, there is a need for time-sensitive actions to ensure the 
safety of both lives and property. Such needs are what constitute the response phase. 
They include notification of the relevant authority of the crisis, where usually, the 
relevant authority consists of the emergency management personnel. Then there is 
always the need to warn the population and conduct the evacuation and sheltering of the 
population. The response phase also involves updating the population with any relevant 
information that would assist with the evacuation process. And incorporates rescuing 
individuals and treating the victims, maintaining the rule of law, accessing the damage, 
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addressing any mitigation issues that arise from the response activities, and requesting 
help from external sources if needed. In the event of rapid onset disasters, for instance 
earthquakes, the response phase might last for several weeks to a few months 
(Wassenhove 2006). In the event of slow onset disasters, for instance droughts, the 
response phase might last for several months or run into a number of years. 
 
The response phase commences instantly following the occurrence of a disaster and 
involves an instantaneous response or relief, as well as a medium-term reaction 
(Haddow, Bullock and Coppola 2017). The function of a disaster response includes 
actions aimed at reducing injuries, loss of life, and damage to property and the 
environment, that are undertaken during and immediately after a disaster event (Dillon 
2014). The response processes begins as soon as it becomes apparent that a disaster 
event is imminent and lasts until the emergency is declared to be over (Bullock, 
Haddow and Coppola 2011). In addition, the response includes not only those activities 
that directly address the immediate needs, such as first aid, search and rescue, and 
shelter, but also includes identification, analysis, assessment, and monitory systems 
developed to coordinate and support such efforts (Coppola 2015). 
 
It is important to note that the ratified systems for disaster management endeavour to 
reinstate the infrastructural and systemic functionality of the affected area (Coppola 
2011). It is essential to note that the medium-term response builds on the initial steps in 
the direction of recovery such as evaluating the damage caused to communities, 
institutions, infrastructure, industry, as well as business, and establishes the requisite 
measures towards restoring these factors to their previous conditions prior to the event 
or to even better levels (Coppola 2011).  
 
Response and recovery checklist - Disaster recovery begins with stabilization of the 
incident and ends when the victims have fully recovered from the impact of the disaster. 
Stabilization refers to the moment at which the immediate threats to human safety and 
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property emanating from the disaster have been resolved. The beginning of an 
emergency response is also marked by the beginning of the thoughts on how to rebuild 
the damage suffered to structures, restore infrastructure services, and return the 
community to its initial patterns of activity and normal performance levels. The phases 
of disaster recovery thus include the emergency period, the restoration period, the 
reconstruction replacement, and the final stage, namely the development phase. The 
restoration stage starts when repairs to the damage are started, there is the removal of 
debris, and the return of the evacuees among other rescue activities. The third phase 
involves activities conducted with the main aim of returning the economy to its initial 
status before the disaster struck. The final stage is commemorated by the building of 
memorial structures and attempts are made to improve the community and measures put 
in place to cater for future disaster occurrence. Some scholars have argued whether 
relief should be classified into the response or recovery phase, depending on when the 
relief work is carried out (Dillon 2014). Stephenson (2005) stresses that immediately a 
disaster has occurred the primary concern involves effective relief. This entails assisting 
the persons affected in recovering from the immediate impact of the disaster. This relief 
work involves offering food, shelter, clothing, and medical care to the impacted persons 
(The Sphere Project 2011).  
 
Response is by far the most stressful phase of the disaster management cycle, as it 
conducted during periods of very high stress, in a highly time-constrained environment, 
and with limited information (Coppola and Maloney 2009). In addition, the response 
phase requires holistic cooperation among government agencies, NGOs, and to some 
extent the military (Manandhar et al. 2017; Chen and Li 2016; Paton and Johnston 
2017). For example, the government first response group will be police officers, the fire 
department, emergency medical personnel, while the first response group of NGOs will 





2.3.4 Recovery Phase 
 
Disaster response is followed by disaster recovery, a process mainly aimed at bringing 
systems effected (by the disaster) to their normal state, as much as possible. Disaster 
recovery efforts extend after the occurrence of a disaster. And recovery operations aim 
at the restoration of all the disaster impacts so that society and the economy can be 
brought back to normalcy. Additionally, recovery aims at giving the affected area and 
individuals certain degrees of financial, physical, environmental, and social stability. In 
essence, recovery is all about indemnifying the society or the persons affected. Post 
disaster recovery plans and operation can be divided into two periods based on the 
intended recovery goals - short-term and long-term recovery plans. Short-term recovery 
plans are always the first of the set and can often last periods exceeding 6 months but do 
not surpass the 12 month mark. These involve the delivery of much needed immediate 
services that would bring the community and the affected people back on their feet 
while the long term plans are initiated. The long-term plans themselves are often 
implemented over a long period of time as they are intended to bring permanent and 
long term solutions to the affected community and individuals. The plans are 
thoughtfully strategized and executed over time. Recovery generally helps the 
community attain economic diversification so that it can start all over again, and 
involves infrastructural development and renovations as well as business financing 
operations. 
 
The recovery phase is sometimes difficult to differentiate from the response phase. 
Some relief efforts may last for longer than the recovery phase, e.g. healthcare support 
such as psychological treatment. Rehabilitation refers to a set of decisions and actions 
taken following a disaster for the purpose of restoring/improving the pre-disaster state 
in the disaster hit area. It is important that these decisions be tailored to decrease latent 
vulnerabilities and facilitate actions to reduce disaster risk. Reconstruction concerns 
repairing the damaged living conditions of the affected communities in consideration of 
their long-term economic, environmental, and social sustainability (Boano 2014). As 
39 
 
shown in Figure 3, disaster recovery management can be considered to incorporate both 
relief and rehabilitation. 
 
Researchers have divided disaster recovery into a number of stages, but these 
definitions vary. Kates and Pijawka (1977) proposed a frequently cited four phase 
model which begins with the emergency period, which lasts for a period ranging from a 
few days to a few weeks and encompasses the emergency response period when the 
emergency operation plan is implemented. Next comes the restoration period, when 
repairs to utilities are made, debris is removed, evacuees return, and residential, 
commercial, and industrial structures are repaired. This period can take weeks to months 
to complete. The third phase, the reconstruction replacement period, involves rebuilding 
capital stocks and returning the economy to its pre-disaster levels. This period can take 
from months to years. Finally, there is the development phase, when commemorative 
structures are built, memorial dates are institutionalized, and attempts are made to 
improve the community. Sullivan (2003) used a similar typology which consists of four 
“intra-recovery elements”, these being post-impact, restoration, replacement / 
reconstruction, and commemorative, betterment and developmental reconstruction. 
 
Others have divided the recovery period into somewhat different phases. The United 
Nations Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO 1984) calls the period from the day the 
disaster first impacts to Day 5 the immediate relief period, followed by the 
rehabilitation period (Day 5 to Month 3) and the reconstruction (Month 3 onward) 
period. Schwab and colleagues (1998) adopted a similar three phase typology that 
broadly distinguishes between the emergency response, short term recovery, and long 
term recovery. Alexander (1993) (Figure 2.2) described three stages of disaster recovery, 
with the first being the rehabilitation stage which involves the continuing care of the 
victims. During the temporary reconstruction stage, temporary bracing is installed for 
any unstable buildings and bridges, and prefabricated or other temporary housing is 
established. Finally, the permanent reconstruction stage relies on good administration 
and management to achieve full recovery of the community. 
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As was the case with conceptualizing emergency management as a sequence of phases, 
namely hazard mitigation, emergency preparedness, emergency response, and disaster 
recovery, defining disaster recovery as a sequence of phases is also problematic. Even 
the earliest formulations noted that these phases often overlap in practice, shortening the 
whole recovery period (Kates 1977). It is now generally accepted that disaster recovery 
encompasses multiple activities, some implemented sequentially and others 
implemented simultaneously. At any one time, some households might be engaged in 
one set of recovery activities while others are engaged in other recovery activities. 
Indeed, some households might be fully recovered months or years after others, while 
there might be households or businesses that never recover at all. Thus, attempts to 
define finely differentiated phases of disaster recovery are inherently limited in their 
validity. Because of the simple and self-explanatory nature of their typology, Schwab 
and colleagues’ (1998) very broad distinctions of the phases of emergency response, 
short term recovery, and long term recovery will be used here to organize the discussion 
in the remainder of this chapter. The sections that follow begin with a description of 
what happens to two basic social units—households and businesses following a disaster. 
Figure 2.2: Phase of recovery in the aftermath of disaster (Alexander 2002) 
 
This material has been removed from this thesis due to Third Party Copyright. The unabridged version of the 
thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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According to the Hurricane Disaster and Emergency Committee (2010), the recovery 
phase entails actions in regards to areas such as rehabilitation and reconstruction. This 
phase also presents opportunities towards developing risk reduction measures that may 
be put in place in the subsequent pre-disaster phase (Smith 2012). 
 
While there has been significant focus on the pre-disaster preparedness and mitigation 
aspects, post-disaster reconstruction issues should not be overlooked (Schilderman and 
Lyons 2011). Rehabilitation and reconstruction programs are development opportunities, 
and therefore their sustainability is an important issue (Nakagawa and Shaw 2004). 
Each disaster has different characteristics and disasters like earthquakes can be 
particularly destructive especially to lives and property. According to Nakagawa and 
Shaw (2004), when damage is caused to an urban area, the massive re-planning of the 
city is required. All the stakeholders involved should therefore put tremendous efforts 
into reducing vulnerability and enhancing sustainability in the reconstruction and 
rehabilitation programs (Shaw, Gupta and Sharma 2003). However, the key question is: 
even though much effort is put into disaster recovery programs, why have some 
communities carried out faster (in terms of time frame) and more successful (in terms of 
holistic and participatory) recovery programs than others? Where do such differences 
come from? It is prudent to realize that involvement in recovery depends on the 
willingness of the interested parties and the goodwill of the federal or the state 
government involved. 
 
Recovery operations are always divided into two types: short-term and long-term. The 
differences between the long-term and short-term recovery activities are numerous. The 
main distinction is that short-term recovery activities are those immediate (i.e. within 
two weeks) activities performed to maintain critical human systems at the minimum 
required standards for their optimum duration (Schildermanand 2011). The challenges 
during the recovery stage are about short-term and long-term relief and sustainability. 
Different NGOs play different roles and this collectively helps to hasten the recovery 
processes and therefore the whole operation. This follows from the theory of the 
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division of duty (see Chapter 4). The National Response Framework of the United 
States published by the Department of Homeland Security in 2008 describes short-term 
and long-term recovery as follows:  
 
Short-term recovery is immediate and overlaps with the response. It includes actions 
such as providing essential public health and safety services, restoring interrupted 
utilities and other essential services, re-establishing transportation routes, and providing 
food and shelter for those displaced by the incident (Smith 2012). Although called 
“short term,” some of these activities may last for weeks. Long-term recovery, which is 
outside the scope of the Framework, may involve some of the same actions but may 
continue for a number of months or years, depending on the severity and extent of the 
damage sustained. For example, long-term recovery may include the complete 
redevelopment of damaged areas (Department of Homeland Security 2008:45). 
 
However, normally NGOs play a major part in reconstruction and development, 
however usually less than 10% of NGOs (compared with the total from the time the 





This chapter has considered the four stages of disaster management, namely mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery. The findings here indicate that the response phase 
is more difficult to implement due to the improper coordination between stakeholders 
and all the agencies that are mandated by law to take proper action. An example is a 
relief operation that should be conducted by government bodies and NGOs. When the 
two independent parties fail to communicate with one another, coordination may fail 
and the operation might not proceed as planned as conflicts may arise. In the event that 
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a response operation might need the intervention of two or more independent bodies, 
then proper communication is necessary to ensure cohesion and common goal. This is 
the most effective approach to managing this problem and any other that might arise 
during any of the other phases. This is equally dependent on good and proper 
emergency planning where all the interested response parties are effectively notified on 
the best practices while at the scene. 
 
The next chapter will extensive discuss the need for holistic emergency planning which 
incorporates all the tasks supposedly carried out by all the relevant stakeholders, 




Chapter 3 Emergency Planning 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The chapter commences with an in-depth examination of emergency planning, the 
different kinds of emergency planning and the differences between them. It then 
proceeds to identify the principles of emergency planning in the second section. The 
third section considers an example of emergency planning, and what should and should 
not been done as part of this planning. The last section of this chapter examines whether 
an all hazard approach to an emergency would be effective in the management of 
disasters. Studies have indicated that the response phase of disaster management is 
always very effective when sound planning is adopted, and thus this chapter highlights all the 
relevant standards for this response phase. 
 
3.2 Emergency planning 
 
According to Alexander (2002), emergency planning is the implementation of disaster 
management cycles during the legislation stage, where planning is the process, actions, 
and guidance for operational/practitioners to follow. This makes it possible to plan 
actions during the disaster management cycle. 
 
The main scope of emergency planning is to reduce the risk to life and limb posed by 
actual and potential disaster (Alexander 2002). Although it is also extended to include 
damage reduction, ensuring public safety during the aftermath of a disaster, and 
indirectly caring for survivors and the affected area (Fagel 2013). Fagel (2013) notes 
that in order to deal with the increasing number of natural and man-made disasters, 




Emergency planning is a continuous and progressive process that allows growth and 
supports adaptation to changing circumstances (Alexander 2002). Perry and Lindell 
(2007) further describe that emergency planning is achievable through extensive and 
effective consultations, exercises, equipping, and critiquing activities. Emergency 
planning activities are based upon the premise that an emergency will occur and that 
plans, procedures, and resources must be prepared in advance. These are designed not 
only to support a timely and effective emergency response to the threat of imminent 
impact, but also to guide the process of emergency recovery (Coppola 2013). As such, 
the agency managing an emergency needs to address a number of pertinent issues 
including: which agencies will participate; what emergency response and recovery 
actions are feasible for each emergency; how the agencies will function; what resources 
the agencies need; and how the emergency planning (preparedness) will be established 
and maintained. Lakha (2004) explains that effective emergency planning should 
encompass plans for pre-, during and post-disaster events, and needless to say, effective 
and sound planning is a major component of emergency planning. 
 
 Before the event: includes decisional planning, testing and control of major 
accidents as well as hazard planning 
 During the event: includes an activate disaster and emergency policy and pre-
planning, co-ordination and code of conduct 
 After the event: includes immediate, short-, medium-, and long-term activities. 
 
The emergency planning activities after the event include those activities that are 
conducted during the emergency and immediately after, so that the situation following 
its impact can be stabilised. The primary goal of the emergency planning is to save lives 
and property (Doyle 1996; Ford and Schmidt 2000; Kelly 1995; Ramachandran 1999; 
Tierney et al. 2001) by providing emergency resources, such as emergency and rescue 
equipment and supplies, food, water, shelter, and medical provisions, and systems at the 
right time and the right place. During this phase, the responsible personnel managing 
the emergency must also continually assess the damage and coordinate the arrival of 
converging equipment and supplies so they can be deployed promptly to those areas at 
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greatest need (McEntire 2014). The response phase ends when the situation has been 
stabilized, which means that the risk of loss of life and property has de-escalated back to 
the pre-crisis level. The response phase is actually the phase that puts the plans in the 
planning phase into action. 
 
According to Alexander (2016), the success of the adopted emergency plan in disaster 
management cycle depends on three critical emergency response factors, these being the 
response plan, the time and the location of the disaster. The pre-recovery and response 
plans that are put in place before the occurrence of an emergency also matter in 
determining the success of the whole emergency plan. And while each phase of 
emergency management is unique, they often overlap with each other during their 
execution (Perry and Lindell 2006).  
 
3.3 Principals of Emergency Planning 
 
It is believed that effective emergency planning can reduce the impact of a hazard on 
human lives and properties. Without effective planning, it is possible there will be a 
failure to anticipate and tackle potentially foreseeable contingencies (Alexander 2005; 
Perry and Lindell 2003; Fagel 2014). Emergency planning should be seen as a 
continuous process (Perry and Lindell 2003), and informal emergency planning should 
clearly define responsibilities and procedures to prevent vagueness and miss-
communication (Alexander 2005; Perry and Lindell 2003; Fagel 2014). The agencies 
involved in dealing with any potential hazards should be involved in the policy making 
process. In addition, the interoperability of the agencies involved in an emergency 
should be taken into consideration (Manyena 2013).  
 
The most effective and common standard principles for evaluating whether or not 
emergency planning has worked have been identified by Alexander (2016). There are 
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46 of principles (see Appendix 1) that should be considered from creating to using an 
emergency plan. This means that these different principles proposed by Alexander are 
used for different planning functions and activities. It is noted that numerous other 
principles have also been proposed in similar initiatives (for example Quarantelli 1982; 
Lindell and Perry 1980 and 1992; Parker 1991; Rockett 1994; Perry and Lindell 2003; 
and Alexander 2005).  
 
Figure 5 illustrates the eighteen criteria/standards for emergency practitioners which 
they should consider when planning the creation of an emergency plan, these being 
truncated from: Alexander (2016); Quarantelli (1982); Lindell and Perry (1992); Parker 
(1991); Rockett (1994); and Perry and Lindell (2003). These criteria are the summation 
of experience, theory and good sense applied to the process of writing, revising, testing 
and utilising emergency plans. Alexander (2005) has stated that his inspiration was the 
lists of criteria and guidelines given in previous studies. Based on these articles, these 
suggest there are 18 standards for emergency planning. Table 3.1 provides a detailed 
summary of the standards for emergency planning. 
 
Table 3.1: Emergency plan Standards (Alexander 2016) 
 
1 The basic or reference level of emergency planning is that set by the municipal 
government. 
2 The plan should be prepared by, or under the direction of, a qualified emergency planner. 
3 There should be only one plan, not several, and this should be cover all likely hazards. 
4 The plan should be written in clear, simple, unambiguous language. 
5 The plan should conform to the laws on emergency and disaster management that are in 
force in the country or region it pertains to. 
6 The plan must be specific about the extent, limits, and limitations of its jurisdiction. 
7 The plan should seek to be fully compatible with the plans and planning requirements at 
other levels of government and in neighbouring jurisdictions. 
8 The first objective of the plan is to ensure that lives are not lost unnecessarily. 
9 The second objective of the plan is to match urgent needs with appropriate resources in the 
most efficient and timely manner. 
10 The plan should be based on a careful, and as far as possible exhaustive assessment of 
48 
 
what is likely to happen when an emergency occurs in its geographical area of jurisdiction. 
It must be based on adequate basic research. 
11 The emergency plan should take account of any urban and regional planning provisions in 
effect in the area under its jurisdiction, especially regarding the hazardousness of the 
location and the siting of critical facilities. 
12 The plan should conduct and present the results of a full audit of the resources that will be 
used during emergency operations. 
13 Emergency planning should deal with processes, not merely quantities. 
14 The plan should adequately specify the roles and activities of each and every participant in 
the risk management and emergency operations activities it covers. 
15 Irrespective of whether or not an emergency plan is focused on the early post-impact 
phase, it should take account in an integrated manner of all the phases of the ‘disaster 
cycle’. 
16 Activities described in the plan that are designed to combat disaster should include or at 
least facilitate sustainable measures for disaster prevention. 
17 The plan should seek to integrate and embrace provisions for the private sector, hospitals, 
industries, airports, etc. 
18 The plan should constantly be revised and circulated among its participants, and should be 
tested regularly. 
 
3.4 Emergency Operation Plan 
 
According to Dillon (2014), the emergency operation plan is a set of proposed actions 
designed to manage a dangerous unforeseen sudden situation and to prepare for 
different types of disasters. The emergency plan describes the activities, gives 
instructions, directs policy, and crucially, is only effective when implemented by people 
trained in its use. Therefore, the regulations not only set the standards for the 
emergencies but also practice/operations for a disaster situation. However, Alexander 
(2016) has claimed that an emergency plan is a co-ordinated set of protocols for 
managing an adverse event, whether expected or untoward, in the future. It seeks the 
most efficient way to use essential resources to satisfy urgent or chronic needs under 




Therefore, the emergency plan is of importance as it is able to guide the disaster 
management (Haddow, Bullock and Coppola 2012). In fact, all disaster reliefs (both 
internal and domestic) have to be carried out using a national or local emergency plan as 
a guide, which gives adequate instructions to the relevant authorities during a disaster 
response. For example, during the Wenchuan Earthquake in China, many international 
NGOs delivered aid and sent personnel to the disaster spot, but had to follow the 
instructions of the Chinese National and Local Emergency Plan and operate under the 
supervision of the local Chinese authorities.  
 
Although there is uniqueness in every disaster, there is enough common ground 
between events to make forecasting, prediction, warning and the anticipation of 
consequences possible, and therefore it is possible to plan feasible tasks (Alexander 
2005). An emergency operation plan can therefore be defined as: a written instrument 
that provides a set of guidelines concerning the use of available resources to solve 
pressing problems caused by the impact of an adverse event (Alexander 2016). The 
emergency operation plan describes how a facility will respond, act, and recover from 
an occurrence of a disaster. It has six elements which are communications, resources 
and assets, safety and security, staff responsibilities, utilities and supportive activities, 
and operates on an “all hazards” basis. The all hazard approach gives the plan the ability 
to respond to a range of emergencies varying in degrees, time frame, and cause. It also 
gives the structure and processes an organization uses to recover from calamities and 
return to its initial state before the disaster struck. This organization proposes very 
specific terms that the facility needs to follow to the letter. 
 
Notably, the purpose of an emergency plan is more to co-ordinate activities than provide 
the basic procedures (Alexander 2016). Moreover, emergency plans are part of the 
process of creating resilience and must therefore promote both robustness and the 
adaptability of society in the face of hazards (Alexander 2016). Thus, in order to make 




Choosing the right plan title is also important. This discussion may seem complex and 
semantic, but it is necessary to make these distinctions to increase the clarity of the 
planned approach. Thus, they are important descriptors of the planning hierarchy. 
 
3.5 All Hazards approach to emergency planning 
 
There are single hazard and all hazard approach in emergency planning (Alexander 
2014). There are many different types of hazard, the risk assessment of single-hazard 
approach focused on the specific type of hazard or threats. In contrast, the all-hazards 
approach it aims to include all types of hazards, irrespective of its origination, and 
generate a balanced overview (Parker and Handmer 2013). The all-hazards approach is 
currently seen by most organizations and experts throughout the world as being the 
most effective method for dealing with the various risks and hazards faced by nations 
and their communities (Adini et al. 2012; Ayyub, McGill and Kaminskiy 2007). In the 
United States in particular, the National Response Framework has chosen to make this 
approach mandatory for all government entities, further increasing its influence 
(McQuire and Silvia 2010). However, what many fail to realize is that while the all-
hazards approach to emergency management does have its advantages, it also has its 
disadvantages and weaknesses. The all hazard approach is the emergency operations 
plan that advocates for all the threats and risks of doing something to be considered as 
hazardous. Once the fears are confirmed, the results are always hazardous and this is the 
reason why every possible plan should consider any planned uncertainty as hazardous. 
Contrarily, most emergency managers believe that the all-hazards approach to 
responding to disasters means planning for every possible eventuality (Canton 2007). 
 
There are two components of all-hazards planning, the first is based on the concept of 
risk analysis (Canton 2007). The first principle of emergency management states that 
one must "consider and take into account all-hazards" (Kunreuther 2017). The third 
principle of emergency management, encourages the use of risk analysis to assign 
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priorities and resources (Alexander 2002). Instead of applying the limited planning 
resources to all possible hazards, risk analysis instead focuses on the community 
vulnerability to specific hazards. This allows the resources to be allocated to those risks 
(not hazards) that are most likely to affect a given area or locality (Kunreuther 2017). 
 
The second component of all-hazards planning is the development of the capacity to 
deal with multiple hazards through functional planning (Canton 2013). This is based on 
the assumption that certain core functions, such as warning, evacuation, and sheltering, 
will be needed in most disasters, and will be to a large extent handled in the same way. 
This creates a baseline capability that cannot only deal with anticipated risk but can also 




The advantages of the all-hazards approach to emergency management, as discussed 
thus far, is its potential to increase the speed of a government’s response to an 
emergency (Waugh 2005). This particular advantage can be attributed to the fact that 
the approach requires coordination between all organizations involved in the four 
phases of disaster/emergency management: mitigation, preparedness, response, and 
recovery (Petak 1985). As Hammond (2005) points out, the initial response to a disaster 
will be chaotic, and the all-hazards approach prevents the confusion and waste of 
resources that occurs when multiple organizations act independently of one another to 
achieve common goals, where the more effective the response, the more lives that are 
likely to be saved. 
 
The same coordination that makes the all-hazards approach to emergency management 
so economically attractive and efficient also yields a number of further logistical and 
managerial benefits, particularly when responding to an emergency (Schwab et al. 
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2016). It fosters an underlying infrastructure of management and resources that can 
theoretically be used to respond to any emergency or disaster (Epstein et al. 2014). As 
previously described, it alleviates the need to have multiple and separate plans for 
responding to each aspect of a potential emergency. In this case, rather than simply 
consolidating and focusing the plans of several organizations, the all-hazards approach 
consolidates the several plans that a single entity such as a government might have in 
place to respond to different threats (Haddow, Bullock and Coppola 2017). 
 
These consolidated action plans are one of the key principles of any incident command 
system, and allow governments to save valuable time and resources in areas where 
multiple plans would have previously overlapped (Hammond 2005). Instead of a 
government needing a specific plan in place for every possible scenario, the all-hazards 
approach provides a general framework on which all of the government's emergency 
management operations can be based. Consolidated plans increase efficiency, and once 




The disadvantage of all-hazards planning is the fact that those who create an all-hazards 
plan in a given area typically decide which general emergencies and hazards to prepare 
for (Bellavita 2008). This being the case, there is a very real danger that the media, 
political leaders, influential residents, or influential participants in the planning process 
may become involved in creating the all-hazards action plan and deciding which 
hazards are most pressing (Waugh 2005). This is dangerous because the media can 
capitalize on certain disasters, making them seem worse and more common than they 
really are, and because persons who have experienced personal or family traumas due to 
a particular kind of hazard or disaster may be biased and become champions of lesser 





This chapter provides a brief discussion of emergency planning and the emergency plan. 
The disaster response for every single disaster has to be carried out under the guidance 
of an emergency plan, and in order to achieve an effective and efficient disaster 
response this requires the best coordination among all organizations and personal. 
Therefore, it is crucial to have a well-structured and organised emergency operation 
plan. And while the most efficient emergency plan is the all-hazard approach, there are 
still ways to improve. For example by including NGOs who are the main players during 

























Chapter 4: NGOs 
 
This chapter discusses the disaster management cycle employed by non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) in their prevention or reduction of potential hazards. The four 
major phases of the cycle: disaster preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery, are 
thoroughly discussed. The definition, scope, types and functions of NGOs are also 
analysed in detail. In addition, the challenges faced by NGOs in their disaster 
management efforts are articulated. 
    
4.1 Introduction 
 
This literature review endeavours to explore the concept of disaster management as it 
relates to NGOs and explores how NGOs operate during each disaster phase, as well as 
presenting the lessons learned in each disaster phase. While a significant amount of 
international attention is focused on the incidence of disaster events, as well as the 
interim responses to them, the disaster management cycle entails three major phases: 
pre-disaster, response and post-disaster. This chapter demonstrates the diversity of 
activities suitable for each phase.  
 
4.2 Definition of NGOs 
 
NGOs include groups and institutions that are largely or entirely independent of the 
government and which focus on humanitarian functions rather than commercial gains. 
They are often referred to as non-profit making entities (Mawlawski 1993; Weiss 1996). 
This attribute seeks to draw a line between NGOs and other non-state actors, such as 
multinational companies, whose primary aim is the pursuit of profit. Instead, NGOs are 
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interested in advancing their designated objectives, such as the interests of their 
members (Schoener 1997). NGOs activists combine their skills, means and energies in 
the service of shared ideals (Mawlawski 1993). They also seek to influence 
governmental actors, such as states or IGOs, or to implement policies in their field of 
concern. The money they make through publications, fund raising and sales is used to 
pay for staff and activities to support their aims more effectively. 
 
In addition to the term NGO, a number of alternative terms are used to represent the 
principle under which these organisations work. These include civil society, private 
voluntary organisation, trans-national social movement organisation, volunteer sector, 
non-state actors, self-help organisations and the independent sector. NGOs are task-
oriented organisations driven by people who share a common interest. They perform a 
variety of humanitarian service and functions by pinpointing the concerns and 
grievances of the people about their respective governments, advocating and monitoring 
key policies, and encouraging political participation through the provision of 
information to the public (Coppola 2011). Some NGOs are organised around particular 
issues such as health, human rights and the environment (Laaser and Epstein 2010). 
They play a crucial role in monitoring and implementing international agreements, and 
in the provision of analysis and expertise, as well as serving as early warning 
mechanisms (Suguna and Surekha 2016).  
 
4.3 Types and roles of NGOs 
 
There are different types of NGOs, which can be categorised by orientation and level of 
operation (Badiru and Racz 2013; Lewis 2014). NGO types by orientation include 
charitable, service, participatory and empowering orientation. In the empowering 
orientation category, the goal is to empower people in terms of social, economic or 
political change, or increase awareness aimed at improving their lives. Service 
orientation, on the other hand, includes NGOs that design and implement activities such 
56 
 
as health, family planning and education services for the public (Martens 2002). In 
contrast, participatory orientation often involves the participation of local people, who 
contribute cash, land and materials, or provide labour for the implementation of projects. 
The NGOs in this category are often concerned with community development projects. 
Charitable orientation, meanwhile, is widely characterised by a top-down paternalistic 
effort, with the beneficiaries playing quite a passive role. These mostly includes the 
NGOs that focus on meeting the needs of the poor or those disadvantaged in society by 
building schools, providing transport, medicine, clothing or food. Table 4.1 below is a 
summary of the NGOs types by orientation and their main activities. There are many 
different types of NGOs and these can be understood by their orientation and level of 
operation, and categorised by their activity types, such as charitable, service, 
participatory and empowering (Badiru and Racz 2013; Lewis 2014; Lewis 2012; 
Martens 2002).  
 










Involves a top-down paternalistic effort with little participation by the 
‘beneficiaries’. Includes NGOs with activities directed towards meeting the 
needs of the poor - distribution of food, clothing or medicine; provision of 
housing, transport, schools etc. Such NGOs may also undertake relief 
activities during a natural or man-made disaster (Badiru & Racz, 2013). 
Service 
Orientation 
Includes provision of health, family planning or education services in which 
the programme is designed by the NGO and people are expected to participate 
in its implementation and in receiving the service (Badiru & Racz, 2013; 




Characterised by self-help projects in which local people are particularly 
involved with the implementations by contributing cash, tools, land, materials, 
labour etc. In the classical community development project, participation 
begins with the need definition and continues into the planning and 
implementation stages. Cooperatives often have a participatory orientation 






Aims to help poor people develop a clearer understanding of the social, 
political and economic factors affecting their lives, and to strengthen their 
awareness of their own potential power to control their lives. Sometimes, these 
groups develop spontaneously around an issue; other times, outside workers 
from NGOs play a facilitating role in their development. In any case, there is 




NGO types by level of operation include citywide organisations, national NGOs, 
international NGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs) (Badiru and Racz 
2013). City wide organisations mostly exist for the purpose of uplifting the lives of the 
poor and include organisations such as the Lion’s or the Rotary Club, coalitions of 
businesses, chambers of commerce and industry, and other groups and associations. 
National NGOs, on the other hand, include organisations such as the Red Cross and 
other professional organisations. Some national branches also offer assistance to local 
NGOs; whereas international NGOs include a variety of agencies, including Save the 
Children, Ford, CARE and religiously motivated organisations. The activities of 
international NGOs vary as well, from offering assistance to local NGOs to actually 
implementing the projects. CBOs, meanwhile, arise out of the initiatives of the people. 
They include religious and educational organisations, sports clubs and women’s 
organisations. They receive support and operate at the local, national and international 
level (Lewis 2014). Table 4.2 in below  is a summary of NG types by level of operation 
and illustrates that different types of NGOs have different operations and activities; 























Include sports clubs, women's 
organisations and neighbourhood 
organisations, and religious or educational 
organisations. There are a large variety of 
CBOs; some supported by national or 
international NGOs, or bilateral or 
international agencies, and others 
independent of outside assistance (Badiru 
& Racz, 2013) 
Some are devoted to raising the 
consciousness of the urban poor 
or helping them to understand 
their rights in gaining access to 
needed services while others are 
involved in providing such 






Include organisations such as the Rotary or 
lion's Club, chambers of commerce and 
industry, coalitions of business, ethnic or 
educational groups and associations of 
community organisations (Badiru & Racz, 
2013). 
Some are involved in helping the 
poor as one of many activities, 
while others are created for the 
specific purpose of helping the 




Include organisations such as the Red 
Cross, YMCAs/YWCAs and professional 
organisations (Lewis, 2014). 







Range from secular agencies such as Save 
the Children organisations, OXFAM, 
CARE, Ford and Rockefeller Foundations 
to religiously motivated groups (Lewis, 
2014) 
Activities vary from mainly 
funding local NGOs, institutions 
and projects, to implementing the 
projects themselves (Lewis, 2014) 
 
 
There are several characteristics distinguishing NGOs involved in disaster management 
from those developed for other purposes. Unlike other NGOs, NGOs involved in the 
management of different types of disasters are developed to benefit people affected by 
these disasters, such as hunger, floods, earthquakes, hurricanes and other natural 
calamities. The main role of NGOs working in disaster management is to reduce human 
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suffering and restore normalcy in the region hit by the disaster. On the other hand, other 
NGOs may either work to support the disaster NGOs or for the benefit of the capital and 
labour contributors (Croom, Romano and Giannakis 2000). 
 
Despite the fact that there are several NGOs participating in the process of disaster 
management, not all of them are involved in disaster response or recovery. Therefore, 
NGOs in disaster management can be distinguished by examining their operations and 
activities in a particular stage of the disaster management process. NGOs involved in 
disaster preparedness dedicate a great deal of their efforts to an analysis of disaster risks 
as well as the establishment of improved linkages with early warning systems. NGOs 
employ both structural and non-structural measures in disaster mitigation (Helbing and 
Kühnert 2003). Structural measures describe the construction of physical facilities, 
apparatus, equipment or the application of technology to avoid or reduce the possible 
impact of a hazard. Common structural measures may include the construction of dams, 
ocean wave barriers, flood levies and evacuation shelters. Non-structural measures, on 
the other hand, involve the use of knowledge, practice, or consensus, as opposed to 
physical constructions, aimed at reducing disaster risk. These measures are implemented 
in various ways including raising public awareness, providing training and education, 
and through the implementation of key policies and laws. Common non-structural 
measures may comprise land-use planning laws, building codes, public awareness 
programmes, and research and assessment efforts (PreventionWeb 2017). Mitigation 
use both structural and non-structural measures. In structural measures, activities such 
as the construction of community shelters and strengthening of flood embankments are 
carried out to reduce the losses caused by a possible disaster. Non-structural measures 
involve the use of non-engineered activities for a similar purpose (Helbing and Kühnert 
2003).  
 
Although there are several NGOs working in the process of logistics, every NGO has a 
single or few different roles to play in the entire process. Charitable NGOs work to meet 
the needs of the poor through various activities. These NGOs may be involved in the 
60 
 
distribution of medicine, food and clothing. They are also involved in the provision of 
transport, schools and housing. Service oriented NGOs are those that take an active role 
in the provision of services such as family planning, health or even education services. 
The beneficiaries are expected to assist the NGO in the implementation of the various 
programmes. Others are mainly active in the definition, planning and implementation of 
projects that make the supply logistics as smooth as possible. Other NGOs act as the 
donors to financially support the logistics and supply process in addition to playing the 
advocacy role (Gunasekaran and Kobu 2007). 
 
4.4 NGOs’ ethical considerations 
 
It is a generally accepted fact that NGOs play an important role in promoting 
humanitarian issues, development aid and the needs of the disadvantaged, in addition to 
other major problems in society. However, in spite of their crucial role, there are ethical 
concerns in regard to the function of NGOs. There is a common belief that NGOs do, at 
times, influence other governmental and business organisations (Doyo 2012). These 
concerns are linked to the increasing presence of NGO agencies and the influence they 
attract at local, national and international levels. A key concern is the lack of 
accountability in the majority of activities implemented by NGOs, with some being 
linked to accounting scandals and libellous government officials. In addition, NGOs 
have been associated with non-desirable power struggles, which ruin their reputation 
and mandate. The massive rescue mission by NGOs, following the Asian Taiwan in 
2004, is testimony to their power and influence. This relief effort also highlighted major 
concerns regarding opportunities for the abuse and misuse of humanitarian funds. The 
arrest of the NGO coordinator, in Indonesia, for alleged corruption raises further doubts 
about the level of accountability in NGOs (Transparency International 2005). Numerous 
case linking NGOs to corruption and other related scandals have also been reported 
globally. In 2012, for instance, 16 employees, including senior managers, of the 
Norwegian Refugee Council were arrested for corruption and mismanagement. In 2014, 
a senior official at Oxfam international in the UK was arrested for embezzling an 
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amount in excess of £64,000 (Sandbrook 2015). A number of NGOs in the USA have 
been accused of a lack of transparency, conflict of interest, questionable funding 
practices and the failure to implement the organisation’s objectives (Doyo 2012). It is, 
therefore, important to develop and implement a more effective functional framework 
for NGOs aimed at enhancing transparency and accountability. 
 
4.5 NGOs’ activities in the Disaster Management Cycle 
 
The goal of disaster management is to avoid or reduce the potential risk of loss of a 
hazard, to provide necessary aid to the victims, and to achieve a quick and effective 
recovery for those affected. The disaster management cycle shows the processes, the 
activities, and the key steps undertaken by NGOs in reducing the risks of a hazard, the 
initiatives undertaken during and following such a hazard, and the recovery effort put in 
place (Warfield n.d.). The activities in the cycle lead to better warnings, greater 
preparedness and reduced vulnerability in the subsequent iteration of the cycle. 
Appropriate plans and polices aimed at reducing the causes or the impact of a potential 
hazard on people, property or infrastructure are also included in the cycle. The cycle 
comprises four different phases, which overlap and have varying lengths depending on 
the severity of a disaster: mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery, all of which 
are discussed in the following sub-sections (Dimersaar Academy 2017).   
 
4.5.1 Mitigation and preparedness (Pre-Disaster) 
 
Pre-disaster management involves both mitigation and preparedness efforts. Mitigation 
measures aim at reducing or preventing the impact of a disaster. They differ from other 
phases in that they tend to focus more on long-term efforts for reducing a potential risk. 
Preparedness, on the other hand, entails the development of a proper course of action in 
light of an anticipated or a potential disaster. This phase involves planning, training, and 
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educational programmes and activities to increase the level of readiness to respond to 
any emergency situation that might arise (Warfied n.d.). NGOs involved in disaster 
preparedness dedicate a great deal of their efforts to an analysis of disaster risks as well 
as the establishment of improved linkages with early warning systems. NGOs active in 
disaster mitigation use both structural and non-structural measures. In structural 
measures, activities such as the construction of community shelters and strengthening of 
flood embankments are carried out to reduce the losses caused by a possible disaster. 
Non-structural measures involve the use of non-engineered activities for a similar 
purpose (Helbing and Kühnert 2003).  
 








1. Risk awareness and 
evaluation 
 
Includes hazard assessment and capacity or vulnerability 
analysis. 
2. Public commitment, as 
well as institutional 
frameworks 




Include public education, research and training, as well as 
information. 
4. Early warning systems 
 
Includes forecasting, broadcasting of warnings, 
preparedness procedures and reaction capacities. 
 
5. Implementation of 
measures 
 
Includes environmental management, urban planning and 
land-use, protection of vital facilities, appliance of science 





Based on Table 4.3 above, it can be deduced that the pre-disaster phase is generally 
comprised of five categories of activities, which include risk awareness, knowledge 
development, public commitment, early warnings and implementation of measures 
(Helbing and Kühnert 2003). Risk awareness and evaluation refers to the assessment of 
a potential hazard in terms of causes and effects. Public commitment and institutional 
framework, refers to the design of key legislation, organisational policy and community 
actions aimed at reducing or preventing risks. Conversely, the goal of knowledge 
development activities is to increase the awareness and understanding of potential risks 
in order to reduce or avoid their possibility of occurring. They include activities such as 
training, research, information dissemination and public education (Helbing and 
Kühnert 2003). Early warning systems are red flags that alert NGOs of possible risks. 
The activities here include forecasting, broadcasting of warnings, preparedness 
procedures and reaction capacities. In contrast, implementation measures are more long-
term and are inclined towards futuristic preventive efforts. They include activities such 
as environmental management, urban planning and land-use, protection of vital facilities, 
appliance of science and technology, collaboration and networking, and financial 
instruments (Helbing and Kühnert 2003). 
 
According to the UN ISDR (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk 
Reduction) (2005 p. 63), the pre-disaster phase may be considered to be the most 
important phase in the disaster management cycle. With the rare exceptions that have 
taken place, the incidence of disasters is technically predictable, even though their exact 
severity, timing or location is not. Consequently, a diversity of measures ought to be put 
in place in advance, particularly in regard to risk evaluation, mitigation or prevention, 
disaster preparedness and risk reduction. It should be noted that these measures are 
epitomised in the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015. There is a close link 
between disaster preparedness and risk reduction. Risk reduction initiatives in the pre-
disaster phase are usually concentrated mainly at the community level. These initiatives 
are in the conceptual framework of factors considered liable to reduce vulnerabilities, as 
well as disaster risks within a society, in order to avert or mitigate, and prepare, for the 
adverse effects of hazards, in the wider perspective of sustainable development.  
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The gains of preparedness and mitigation may appear obvious, but paradoxically they 
are hardly ever factored into limiting disaster strategies and approaches to the relief and 
development cycle. In practice, some scholars have argued that disaster mitigation and 
preparedness is considered a form of activity, instead of something inherent to 
sustainable development (Coppola 2010).  
 
Technologies in early warning systems and education programmes must therefore be 
incorporated into NGOs’ development projects that promote sustainable development in 
regions that are prone to disasters. However, this seems to be a weakness of this 
evidently ever-evolving sphere of knowledge. In addition, the time span involving 
instantaneous relief and post-disaster restoration necessitates re-evaluation, in addition 
to enhanced coordination among all parties involved. The NGOs that respond to natural 
disasters must be sensitive to the impact of their activities, both environmental and 
societal in the course of the transition period, which entails relief, rehabilitation and 
restoration. What distinguishes natural disasters from other disasters, for instance 
conflict, is that a re-emergence of the incident is practically inevitable. This presents a 
distinctive challenge to the mitigation efforts of NGOs. As a result, natural disasters 
require extra attention in the course of the period of transition in order to guarantee that 
strategies are in position for improving preparedness and reducing the vulnerabilities as 
a way of mitigation against possible subsequent occurrences. When nations fail to 
consider risk and vulnerability factors in their development plans, the result is large 
scale disasters eroding policies, strategies, economic development and social welfare, 
while demand is increased on national and global humanitarian assistance (Davis 2007). 
 
Rocha and Christoplos (2001) expressed their criticism of the disaster management 
cycle employed by NGOs in mitigating risks. They asserted that there is a lack of 
consistency between the preparedness and the relief phase, thus, undermining continual 
and sustainable development in disaster management. In other words, since the cycle is 
a continuous process, which involves the progressive flow of activities in the 
management of a disaster, the lack of uniformity and lack of progression between the 
preparedness and relief phases, works to limit the effectiveness of the cycle as a whole, 
65 
 
thereby impacting negatively on long-term sustainable efforts. Figure 9 highlights the 
inconsistency between the disaster preparedness phase and the relief phase as 
highlighted by Rocha and Christoplos (2001). This, therefore, creates the need to review 
the current disaster cycle relied upon by NGOs, in an effort to ensure consistency across 
all phases, as a means of ensuring its effectiveness in promoting sustainable long-term 
development. Rocha and Christoplos (2001) have divergent views regarding the disaster 
cycle and maintain that there are no distinctive phases, or a linear progression that flows 
from one phase to another. This implies that there are no borders involving relief and 
development, and consequently, it is neither a cycle nor linear. There are emergency 
circumstances within continuing development, and it is important to employ an 
emergency response towards promoting long-term development; consequently, the two 
are entrenched in each other. A possible upgrade to this model may be a cyclical 
representation that illustrates the on-going incorporation that is fundamental to disaster 
management (see Figure 4.1). 
 
 
Figure 4.1: The Disaster Cycle (Rocha and Christoplos 2001) 
 
According to Alexander (2002), the misunderstanding that surrounds disaster mitigation 
and preparedness regarding where it fits into the wider picture of relief and development 
has indeed contributed towards its failure to be mainstreamed. In the same manner, the 
drive to be at the forefront of humanitarian work or address poverty may always not be 
This material has been removed from this thesis due to Third Party 
Copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at the 
Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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felt within disaster mitigation and preparedness. Eventually, the coordination between 
NGOs and other stakeholders is essential for this area to be effectively managed. It also 
follows that outside the community level, coordination among government, NGOs and 
the private sector is necessary (Rocha and Christoplos, 2001). From this perspective, 
Merlot and De Cieri (2012) assert that there here has been in recent times an increase in 
the level of coordination between NGOs, as evident in the development of prominent 
umbrella organisations, and the advancements in the SPHERE manual, International 
Federation of Red Cross and Crescent Societies Code of Conduct, to mention just a few. 
It is inherent in their character that NGOs require working with other agencies. In 
addition, linkages to academia, especially the scientific academic community, ought to 
be developed.  
 








The goal of emergence response is to provide urgent assistance to improve health, 
maintain life and offer moral support to those affected by a disaster. The assistance 
provided under this phase may range from more specific, but limited, aid to include the 
provision of shelter, transport and food, to the setting up of temporary settlements in 
camps and other ideal locations. It may, as well, involve the repair and maintenance of 
damaged infrastructure. It is worth noting that the main focus of the response phase is to 
meet the basic needs of the victims in the short-term until more long-term and more 
sustainable solutions are devised. This phase of the cycle is often highly represented by 
humanitarian organisations. In the event of rapid onset disasters, for instance 
earthquakes, the response phase might last from a several weeks to a few months. In the 
event of slow onset disasters, for instance droughts, the response phase might last for 
several months or run into a number of years. It is essential to note that response 
assumes the initial steps in the direction of recovery through evaluating damage caused 
to communities, institutions, infrastructure, industry and business, and through planning 
the requisite measures towards restoring these to their previous conditions or even better 
levels. Table 4.4 below shows the types of activities performed by NGOs in the 
response phase.  
 
Table 4.4: NGOs’ activities in the disaster response phase 
 
Number Activities 
1.  Search and rescue 
2. First aid 
3. Evacuation 
4. Disaster Assessments 
5. Providing water and food 
6. Shelter 
7. Fatality management 
8. Sanitation 
9. Security 
10. Social services 
11. Resumption of critical 
12. Infrastructure 
13. Donations management 
68 
 
14. Volunteer management 
15. Coordination 
 
Several factors have been linked to a successful disaster response support. Essentially, 
these factors include flexibility, ownership, inclusion, accountability, transparency and 
speed (Alexander 2002). In addition, effective coordination between government and 
NGOs has been identified as a key factor in ensuring an effective and efficient disaster 
response team.  
 
In the response phase, the government actively participates in coordinated activities and 
invites the military to carry out search and rescue. Therefore, during this phase, NGOs 
have to work closely with both the government and (sometimes) the military in order to 
conduct an effective and efficient disaster response (Christopher and Tatham 2014). 
Coordination is a vital and immediate component of disaster response because of the 
sheer numbers of agencies that quickly descend upon the impacted areas (Dube 2016). It 
is common in large disasters to see, in addition to the local, regional and national 
government response agencies, several hundred local and international NGOs, each 
offering a particular skill or service, while successful coordination and cooperation can 
and often does lead to many lives saved, much suffering alleviated, and the safe and 
efficient use of response resources (Coppola 2011). 
 
As aforementioned, effective coordination between government and NGOs plays a 
crucial role in the successful implementation of disaster response projects. However, it 
is noteworthy that the relationship between the government/military and the NGOs 
involved in the humanitarian logistics and supply chain has greatly deteriorated in 
recent years (Nisha de Silva, 2001). Most NGOs have coordinated with the 
government/military in the course of executing their aid activities. However, this has 
been happening with varying degrees of caution as well as reluctance. NGOs in 
humanitarian logistics have not been able to devise an appropriate way of cooperating 
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with the government/military in the delivery of relief services. However, the role of the 
government/military in supporting the NGOs to deliver their services cannot be ignored. 
The government/military plays a vital role in protecting the workers from the NGOs 
during their missions (Nisha de Silva 2001).  
 
Globally, NGOs work together with a number of other agencies in the provision of 
services in the various stages of disaster management as well as other areas where their 
services are needed. For example, governments of the host nations, neighbouring 
nations as well as the governments functioning in the international community activate 
the stream of humanitarian logistics when a disaster occurs. Donors are also important 
actors as they provide the main funding for main relief activities. Therefore, NGOs 
worldwide should have a good relationship with pre-determined donors. NGOS are also 
required to collaborate with various private companies. Some private companies have 
the ability to provide NGOs with technological support as well as logistics managers 
and staff (Beamon and Balcik 2008). They can also provide particular services whose 
availability on the ground may be scarce immediately after the onset of the disaster. The 
services may include banking support, postal services, engineering solutions and 
electricity supply. 
 
4.5.3 Recovery Phase 
 
According to the Disasters Emergency Committee (2010 p.94), the post-disaster phase 
entails actions in regard to areas such as recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction. 
This phase also presents opportunities for developing disaster risk reduction measures 
that may be put in place in the subsequent pre-disaster phase. Recovery activities 
continue until the situation at hand improves or returns to normal. It is noteworthy that 
the goal of recovery efforts, both in the short and long-term, is to return the situation 
and life support systems to minimum operating standards. There are a number of 
activities involved in this phase including re-establishing basic conditions such as 
temporary housing, implementing self-care measures and the provision of external 
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support such as loans. Table 4.5 illustrates the activities implemented by NGOs during 
the recovery phase. 
 
Table 4.5: NGOs’ activities during recovery phase (Clinton 2006) 
 
 NGOs’ activities during recovery phase 
1. Decisions, as well as actions executed following a disaster with the intention of 
reinstating or advancing the pre-disaster conditions of those living in the affected 
community. This goes together with encouraging, as well as facilitating required 
adjustments towards reducing disaster risk.  
 
2. External support, for instance loans to governments, agricultural resources, technical 
assistance and assistance towards revitalising businesses. 
 
3. Re-establishing the necessary basic services that facilitate life, to get back to normalcy.  
 
4. Rebuilding homes, as well as industry. This is linked to the re-establishment of 
economic and social development. At this stage, it is important to design buildings 
which can survive future disasters.  
 
5. Initiatives focused towards facilitating communities to care for themselves. These 
measures require being particularly accessible to persons at greatest risk. These 
include the poorest, as well as the most vulnerable persons in a community. 
 
 
According to Clinton (2006), the post-disaster recovery phase is best pursued through 
the development of existing institutions, or through formulating time-bound 
professional bodies which have the single mandate of implementing short- to medium-
term restoration undertakings. It is complex to create efficient fresh institutions in the 
after effects of a disaster, except for where their mandates and duration are clearly 
defined. In the Lanka Tsunami Emergency Recovery Program in Sri Lanka, the 
formulation of new institutional structures in the after effects of the disaster to execute 
restoration efforts presented key challenges. These challenges involved the capacity of 
the new institution to undertake the restoration task in a short duration as well as its 
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sustainability. In this context, the Reconstruction and Development Agency in the 
country acquired a significant amount of financial support from donors and international 
NGOs yet failed to build capacity to an optimum level. Consequently, its functions were 
transferred to the Ministry of National Building and Estate Infrastructure Development. 
A different state of affairs emerged in Pakistan concerning the Earthquake 
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority that was established following the 
earthquake of 2005 (Malik, Salma and Krishna 2008). The institution performed 
effectively in the development of capacity, and in its efficient response to the disaster. 
An aspect that contributed to its achievement was that the institution was created with a 
time-bound and unambiguous mandate, in addition to being staffed through government 
resources. However, it was also provided with supplementary key specialists hired 
through international NGO facilitation. It was, consequently, perceived to be a 
government-led, although donor-assisted, body having the complete backing of other 
government agencies (Clinton 2006).  
 
Benson and Clay (2004) assert that a community-driven system to recovery and 
restoration can considerably assist in building up local capacities necessary for 
upcoming project identification, planning and implementation, in addition to post 
operation and maintenance activities. For instance, in a study conducted by the World 
Bank (2009 p. 201), in the Cyclone Emergency Recovery Program in Samoa, it was 
demonstrated that the amount of community grants employed towards identifying, 
planning and executing structural and non-structural solutions should not be large. 
However, the participatory process through which suitable solutions were established in 
order to ensure ongoing community commitment in providing supplementary resources, 
in addition to ensuring that the resources developed were preserved and well utilised 
following the project’s closure, proved to be increasingly essential in this programme. It 
should be noted that government ministries had important roles to play, either directly 
via their structures, or via NGOs, or both. Contrary to the Samoa project, the Tsunami 
Emergency Recovery Program in Sri Lanka was hindered by insufficient social 
mobilisation (World Bank 2009). Although in its housing programme, the provision for 
development of community rehabilitation committees was provided, there is little 
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evidence that this was extensively put into practice, or that the local rehabilitation 
committees extensively participated in mobilising communities. In this context, NGOs 
that engaged in this programme failed to utilise social mobilisation as a key focal area, 
other than concentrating on contractor-driven restoration in line with a donor-led 
housing programme. This facet of the programme in Sri Lanka demonstrates that 
dissemination of information and social mobilisation require consideration as priority 
components to guarantee that all prospective beneficiaries have the chance to benefit 
from NGO support (World Bank 2009). 
 
According to the World Bank (2009), the Gujarat Emergency Earthquake 
Reconstruction Project in India is an endeavour that demonstrates that when NGOs, in 
their disaster management and response undertakings, prioritise transparency, 
accountability and equity, even in complicated emergency circumstances, the target 
goals can be realised. However, this is only practical in the event that appropriate 
measures are planned and integrated as fundamental components of the overall 
intervention. This project, through international NGOs, supported the restoration of 
more than one million houses. It should be noted that this was accomplished with 
minimum grievances and claims of fraud, reflecting the effective integration of 
transparency and the needs of the local communities. Telford (2007 p. 97) argues that 
accountability and transparency are important for every institution that provides 
assistance. Correlation among the programmes of dissimilar international stakeholders 
is also critical. In the event that communities with parallel needs are treated in a 
different way by different programmes, it is likely that major problems will arise in the 
programme. It is from this perspective that accountability towards the affected 






4.6 Challenges of NGOs regarding task delivery during the disaster response phase 
 
The NGOs working in humanitarian logistics are faced with a number of major 
challenges. Among these challenges are a failure to recognise the importance of 
logistics and a lack of qualified staff. Additionally, a lack of institutional learning, 
inadequate utilisation of technology and limited collaboration are other key challenges 
facing these NGOs (Bagchi, Skjoett-Larsen and Soerensen 2005). In addition, there 
seems to be confusion between programmes and support services, particularly in the 
implementation of NGO goals by senior managers. Activities in the programmes 
category should include the front-line activities relevant to relief and development. The 
programmes category also includes the provision of services such as sanitation, water 
and food. Support services are the activities directed towards the support of front-line 
activities. They include, but are not limited to, human resources, communication finance, 
technology and logistics. However, according to Helbing and Kühnert (2003), there are 
times when programmes are confused for support services, resulting in a conflict of 
functions. Furthermore, a number of humanitarian logisticians do not focus their efforts 
on short-term direct relief, but rather invest their time and resources in processes and 
systems meant to reduce expenses. This explains why there is no adequate funding for 
logistics and its support services. Leaving the people with control of the budget to make 
decisions during relief operations, coupled with the failure to include a logistician, is 
another related challenge (Helbing and Kühnert 2003).  
 
The high intensity of relief efforts, coupled with high turnover and the fact that the 
disaster response is oriented to the crisis, eliminates institutional learning from the relief 
environment. Aid workers are not given ample time to reflect on the lessons learnt from 
previous missions. Reflection time between disaster management missions can allow 
the aid workers to make improvements where necessary before the next mission. 
Limited collaboration has crippled NGOs in the area of humanitarian logistics for a 
number of years. This has been facilitated by the emergence of competition for 
donations among the main relief NGOs, giving rise to an environment characterised by 
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battles and little collaboration. Despite the heads of logistics knowing each other and 
facing similar challenges, they only meet when disasters occur (Jahre and Jensen 2010).  
 
4.6.1 Challenges faced by NGOs 
 
NGOs face a number of challenges in their attempts to achieve their objectives. The 
following are some of the major challenges they face.  
 
i) Lack of professional staff 
 
A majority of NGOs have inadequately trained staff, which has a negative bearing on 
how they respond to disasters. Compared to other non-governmental agencies, where 
continuous professional training and development takes place, there are limited 
employee training and professional development programmes within most NGOs. 
When a disaster occurs, research shows that some NGOs are forced to recall their 
experienced and trained staff from active relief missions to manage the new disaster 
(Christopher and Towill 2000).  
 
ii) Inadequate skill sets among a majority of NGO workers 
 
Humanitarian intelligence is a mandatory skill in the humanitarian sector due to the 
political complexity of most emergencies. New skills are required for people working in 
humanitarian NGOs, which allow them to operate effectively. A great deal of the 
emergency aid reaches the beneficiaries through negotiated access, making political 
analysis and humanitarian intelligence very important factors in the success of the 
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supply chain. The personnel should have enough skills to be able to gather accurate 
information from people under control of every disaster area. NGOs should also have a 
group of personnel with the ability to develop a clear report about the actors ready to 
negotiate with the organisation, in addition to determining their interests, bottom lines, 
positions and intentions (Christopher and Towill 2000). This has proven to be very 
important in helping humanitarian NGOs negotiate access to important resources 
through the use of appropriate strategies and tactics. In addition, the development of 
humanitarian intelligence allows NGOs to develop appropriate language skills that 
dovetail with diverse cultural groups and political landscapes. All these analyses, 
coupled with the analysis of the effects of the aid on the beneficiaries are important 
tools for the NGOs to come up with the best humanitarian response to every crisis. 
 
It is worth mentioning that the development of necessary humanitarian knowledge and 
intelligence in addition to analyses of local changes and dynamics of a certain conflict 
will give the NGOs a good chance to develop appropriate responses with the potential 
to reveal the various ranges, objectives and types of diplomacy in the humanitarian 
sector. Despite the fact that all the NGOs in the humanitarian supply chain and logistics 
have the common mission of responding to humanitarian need, their missions should 
also focus on other objectives that address the various needs of the target population. 
Furthermore, the professionals should be highly skilled to allow them to provide 
responses that have a durable impact. Therefore, the skills required by the NGOs in all 
the sectors should not only make the humanitarian workers experts in the provision of 
health, food and relief services, but the training should also allow them to achieve the 
secondary objectives of these organisations: Violence reduction, generation of human 
rights violations reports and participation in peace building initiatives. As a result, the 
organisation’s capacity to promote peace in the societies affected by a crisis increases 
(Cooper, Lambert and Pagh 1997). 
 
Humanitarian workers should receive training to allow the NGOs to uphold human 
rights. The need for particular training has increased due to the increasing number of 
human rights atrocities in various regions. NGOs in the humanitarian supply chain and 
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logistics are also in great need of skilled workers to contribute to the investigations 
conducted on human rights violation. Workers should be skilled enough to deal with the 
issues that arise between the political humanitarian players and their employers. The 
issues mainly arise due to the fact that most human rights monitoring initiatives may are 
viewed as ‘political’ instead of ‘humanitarian’. It is prudent for the aid workers to 
firmly maintain the human rights regardless of the effect this stand will have on their 
NGOs’ relationships with the political players (Dynes 1994).  
 
Despite the fact that the monitoring of human rights is vital for the elimination of 
human rights violations, NGOs involved in the humanitarian supply chain and logistics 
are required to employ individuals who can respond to propagandist messages, in order 
to avoid incitement. In such regions, aid workers should use their skills to communicate 
messages of peace to counter messages of violence and hatred. For example, United 
Nations agencies are good broadcasters of peace messages through the BBC World 
Service in Cambodia and Afghanistan. The ability to conduct evaluations is another 
important skill valued by NGOs in the humanitarian supply chain and logistics. 
Evaluations are important in this case because aid workers should be accountable not 
only for their actions and demands of the target population, but also due to the 
increasing economic, political and social effects of humanitarian assistance on the target 
society (Ebersole 1995). 
 
iii) A lack of proper coordination and communication between NGOs and 
the military  
 
It has been noted that the relationship between NGOs and the military has gradually 
deteriorated in some countries in recent years (Davidson et al. 1996). It has been 
reported that most NGOs have hardly coordinated with soldiers in the course of 
executing their aid activities. NGOs in humanitarian logistics have not been able to 
come up with an appropriate way to cooperate with the military in the delivery of relief 
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services. However, the role of the military in supporting the NGOs to deliver their 
services cannot be ignored. The military plays a vital role in protecting the workers 
from the NGOs during their missions (Nisha 2001).  
 
Globally, NGOs work together with a number of other agencies in the provision of 
services in the various stages of disaster management and other areas where their 
services are needed. For example, governments in host nations, neighbouring nations 
and functioning in the international community, activate the stream of humanitarian 
logistics when a disaster occurs. Donors are also important actors as they provide the 
main funding for main relief activities (Wassenhove 2006). Therefore, NGOs globally 
should have good relationships with pre-determined donors. NGOs are also required to 
collaborate with various private companies. Some private companies have the ability to 
provide NGOs with technological support, and logistics managers and staff (Beamon 
and Balcik 2008). They can also provide particular services whose availability on the 
ground may be scarce immediately after the onset of the disaster. The services may 
include banking support, postal services, engineering solutions and electricity supply. 
 
The high intensity of relief efforts, coupled with high turnover and the fact that the 
disaster response is oriented to the crisis, eliminates institutional learning from the relief 
environment. Aid workers are not given ample time to reflect on the lessons learnt from 
previous missions. Reflection time between disaster management missions can allow 
the aid workers to make improvements where necessary before the next mission. 
Limited collaboration has crippled NGOs in the humanitarian logistics area for a 
number of years. This has been facilitated by the emergence of competition for 
donations among the main relief NGOs, giving rise to an environment characterised by 





iv) Under-utilised IT platforms to coordinate and share information across 
NGO agencies 
 
There is a compelling need to increase the current utilisation of IT platforms in 
coordinating as well as in sharing information across NGO agencies. Currently, IT 
platforms are at the centre of most operations undertaken by NGOs. However, it is 
important to increase the reliance and utilisation of more advanced technologies in order 
to enhance information and resource sharing. Other strategies include the 
standardisation of training and certification and concentrating on the measurement of 
metrics and performance. All the players working together with NGOs in disaster 
management, including governments, donors and private companies should do their best 
when it comes to information sharing and collaboration (Moe et al. 2007).  
 
Additionally, there is an essential need for consistent meetings that bring a community 
of information and resources together to increase the acknowledgment of the major 
function of the humanitarian logistics. For the last three years, for example, the Fritz 
Institute has held the annual Humanitarian Logistics Conference. Such conferences 
encourage high-level logistic managers from various aid agencies to share knowledge in 
addition to fostering initiatives in matters of common interest including training, 
information technology and performance management. There is also a great need to 
ensure that there is standardised staff training (Mwenja and Lewis 2009). Equipping the 
NGO staff with relevant skills will enable them to achieve the objectives set by their 
employers in the humanitarian sector. There are various benefits from comprehensive 
training specific to this sector. The training improves communication and cooperation 
among the NGOs, due to the standardised catalogues, processes and terminologies. 
Furthermore, job satisfaction and career mobility for all the NGOs in the sector are 
increased. The training also allows the development of a pool of logisticians with 
externally verified skills. This provides room for donors and agencies to hire their staff 




Organisations concerned with relief missions have overemphasised the management of 
the disaster and neglected the need for performance measurement. It is therefore 
necessary to ensure that performance measurement is not done only when there is a 
disaster, but rather through a well-structured process that incorporates continuous task 
improvement (Dynes 1994). Since backbone information systems are being developed 
by many organisations, there is increased potential for performance measurement in all 
operations and the use of measurement information in ways similar to the information 
use in the corporate world. Proper use of metrics will allow the NGOs to use actual 
performance to plan the way forward in addition to identifying and eliminating factors 
that cause performance breakdowns (Neely, Gregory and Platts 1995). The 
organisations need to use the analysis of current performance to direct constant process 
improvement, and inform all the players involved in the humanitarian logistics of the 
strategic importance of this field. There is also a need to overcome the technology 
challenge through the development of flexible solutions in technology. This will 
improve the process of procurement, distribution and tracing of funds and goods. There 
is a great need for better technologies with the potential to increase the flexibility and 





This chapter reviews the fundamental knowledge of NGOs by reviewing literature 
reviews and further summarizes the different roles, tasks, and operations of different 
types of NGOs during each disaster cycle phase. On this basis, through reviewing the 
literature review, further examined and investigated the various challenges that NGOs 










The number of disasters around the world has significantly increased, but there are still 
relatively few published papers that have sought to improve the understanding of the 
nature of the supply chain management (SCM) of humanitarian aid under disaster 
conditions (Roh et al. 2008). 
 
The requirement to improve the humanitarian supply chain has recently received 
increased attention, due to the perceived failures in aid delivery systems following 
major crises (Fritz Institute 2005). The humanitarian supply chain is often treated as a 
series of discrete activities disconnected from each other and there is often a weak (or 
non-existent) connection between each stage in the delivery of aid (Taylor and Pettit 
2008; United Nations Development Programme – (UNDP), 1993). Kovacs and Spens 
(2007) however, suggest that this is now changing. Ho et al. (2002) recognised that such 
problems exist in the understanding of commercial supply chains and there is no reason 
to believe that the level of understanding of humanitarian supply chains is any different. 
Little effort has been put into developing a sound theoretical basis underpinning how 
the supply chain management for business differs from the humanitarian supply chain. 
 
5.2 Supply Chain Management 
 
The concept of supply chain management began way back before the industrial 
evolution; and has been applied to a wide range of fields. Figure 5.1 illustrates the 
classic supply chain which consists of the flow of material, information, money and 
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services from raw material suppliers through factories and warehouses to the end 
customer (Houlihan 1985; Arndt 2004; Mentzer et al. 2001; Lambert and Cooper 2000; 
Christopher 2005; Christopher 2016; Tan 2001; Stadtler 2015). In general businesses, 
the supply chain links the sources of supply (suppliers) to the owners of demand (end 
customers) (Wieland and Wallenburg 2011). The ultimate goal of any supply chain is to 
deliver the right supplies in the right quantities to the right locations at the right time. 
Supply chains comprise of all the activities and processes associated with the flow and 
transformation of goods from the raw material stage through to the end user (Beamon 
and Balcik 2008). Supply chain management has been used by both profitable-industrial 
and non-profitable-humanitarian organizations. 
 
Historically, researchers and practitioners have focused more on profitable and 
industrial organizations as these commercial supply chains apply optimal decision 




Figure 5.1: Supple Chain process (Vorhies 2015) 
 
This material has been removed from this thesis due to 
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Among these processes, logistics is the most important. Logistics is that part of the 
supply chain process that plans, implements, and controls the efficient, effective flow 
and storage of goods, services, and related information from the point-of-origin to the 
point-of-consumption in order to meet customers' requirements (Christopher 2016). 
Thus, logistics is an important part of the supply chain. From literary research, the word 
‘Logistic’ in China first appeared in the chapter ‘Gao Zu Ben Ji ‘from the book “Shi Ji” 
which describes the winning strategies and tactics of the first battle of The Han Dynasty. 
It means strategy, strategy planning and control during military action. From the history 
of western countries, the word logistics came from the Greek ‘logistikos’ and French 
‘logistique’, meaning logical concept and skill in calculating (Russell 2000), and until 
more recent times had only been used in a military context. 
 
According to Christopher (2016), logistics is the process of strategically managing the 
procurement, the movement and storage of materials, parts, and the finished inventory 
through the organization and its marketing channels in such a way that current and 
future profitability are maximized through the cost effective fulfilment of orders. 
Ultimately, the mission of logistics management is to serve customers in the most cost 
effective way. 
 
Under the complexities of modern society, the meaning of logistics extends to suit the 
needs of people from different groups and organizations. From the perspective of 
business logistics, it is defined as a planning framework for the management of 
materials, services, information, and capital flows (Rushton, Croucher and Baker 2014). 
Logistics also includes the increasingly complex information, material, communication 
and control systems required in today’s business environment. In relation to 
humanitarian issues, Thomas and Mizushima (2005) define it as “the process of 
planning, implementing and controlling the efficient, cost-effective flow of and storage 
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of goods and materials”, associated with “information, from the point of origin to the 
point of consumption for the purpose of meeting the end beneficiary’s requirements”. 
For humanitarian aid needs, logistics is the process of helping vulnerable people 




It is noted that, in the disaster management and humanitarian relief context, the meaning 
and function and operations of the supply chain and logistics are quite different. The 
next section provides details about logistics in the humanitarian supply chain context. 
 
5.3 Humanitarian Supply Chain Management 
 
In contrast, research on humanitarian supply chains is about 15 years behind that of 
commercial chains (Wassenhove 2006). For years, humanitarian logistics has been 
struggling for recognition. It has been locked into a vicious circle with a lack of 
understanding regarding its function and importance.  
 
The humanitarian supply chain refers to the network created through the flow of 
supplies, services, finances and information between donors, beneficiaries, suppliers 
and different units of humanitarian organizations for the purpose of providing physical 
aid to beneficiaries (Wassenhove 2006; Tovia 2007; Mentzer et al 2001). Thus, the 
supply chain when used for relief purposes is the ultimate sense-and-response chain 
(Lee and Lee 2007). Once a disaster occurs, an aid agency sends experts to complete an 
initial assessment of the extent of the damage and the number of people affected. This 
assessment forms the basis for an appeal that lists the specific items and quantities 
needed to provide immediate relief to the affected populations. Emergency stocks of 
standard relief items are then sent from the nearest relief depots and warehouses 
(Christopher and Tatham 2014).  
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A typical humanitarian supply chain procedure could follow the sequences described in 
Figure 5.2 which describes a multilateral approach through international agencies and 
NGOs. Although it is noted that aid is often given on a bilateral country-to-country 
basis, and delivered in a number of ways. Unlike most business supply chains, the 
humanitarian aid supply chain is often unstable. Sometimes, the supply chain breaks 
down at the receiving end (Munslow and Brown 1999; Stewart 1998; Byman et al 2000), 
but it may also be unstable at its origin for two main reasons: politicised donations by 
governments and the competitive nature of fund-raising from private donors (Ebersole 
1995; Oloruntoba and Gray 2002; Bennett and Daniel 2002). 
 
Figure 5.2: A typical humanitarian supply chain (Oloruntoba and Gary 2002) 
 
Due to these variations, Figure 5.2 is modified based on information and collaborative 
methods with the result shown in Figure 4. Local NGOs have become the central of the 
relief, because the flows in Figure 5.2 only make sense when a project base is applied, 
i.e. one NGO matches with one community. On the other hand, when a disaster happens 
in China, the Central Government will mobilize all the relief carriers and goods to the 
disaster spot to carry out the relief work, therefore, local NGOs will become a vital 
component of the response phase. 
 
This material has been removed from this thesis due to Third Party Copyright. The unabridged version of 
the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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Figure 5.3 below indicates that the information and collaboration among different 
organizations require flows in both directions. Governments and NGOs are the key 
participants in a humanitarian supply chain. Governments have the primary power and 
the ability to prevail over military and economic considerations and their decisions 
directly affect supply chain processes. Donors, the public, and private organizations also 
play very significant roles in the humanitarian supply chain. The influences from donors 
help to increase both the accountability of humanitarian organizations and the 




Figure 5.3:  Networks between NGOs and stakeholders 
 
McLachlin et al (2009) has described that the humanitarian supply chain is very 
unstable. Unlike the business supply chain, humanitarian aid supply chains can 
occasionally break down even at the receiving end (Munslow and Brown 1999). There 
are two main reasons for this instability, the first is governments raising political funds, 
and the second is fund-raising from private donors (Ebersole 1995; Oloruntoba and 
Gray 2006). It is extremely easy for political and military factors to influence the 
humanitarian supply chain, because as researchers have shown, both of them control the 
main power and have full control over the whole chain. Additionally, the lack of a 
positive collaboration among the military, governments, and NGOs can also cause 
inefficiency within the humanitarian supply chain. Furthermore, the majority of donors 
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are more willing to donate funds directed towards immediate relief goods such as water, 
food, and tents rather than have their funds used for the improvement of indirect 
services, such as relief equipment, information systems, and preparedness training 
(Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006; Wassenhove 2006; Kovacs and Spens 2007).   
 
Humanitarian supply chains contain many functions, including preparation, planning, 
procurement, transportation, storage, tracking and tracing, and customs clearance 
(Thomas and Kopczak 2005). The aims of humanitarian logistics are to alleviate 
suffering and to rescue lives through the delivery of tasks of all kinds. And the 
definition of the humanitarian supply chain is extensive, and it will respond more 
actively in response to the stakeholder supply chain. Moreover, the aim of humanitarian 
logistics is to save lives and to alleviate suffering. All of which means that the definition 
of the humanitarian supply chain is more extensive and it has to respond to a greater 
range of activities than a more commercial stakeholder supply chain. 
 
Calls are made to traditional government donors and the public and at the same time 
commitments for cash and/or in-kind donations secured. Suppliers and logistics 
providers are activated depending upon the severity of the disaster and then the 
necessary mobilization of goods and materials begins from, if necessary, across the 
globe. The government and military are very often the first organizations to receive 
information relating to disasters, and therefore, they are frequently the first 
organizations to initiate rescue operations and to inform other relevant organizations so 
that all the available personnel and resources can be assembled and directed to the 
location of the disaster (Christopher and Tatham 2014). 
 
When supplies arrive, local transportation, warehousing and distribution have to be 
organized. These are usually complicated feats to accomplish, given the remote places 
in which disasters tend to occur, and are associated with the uniqueness of the 
requirements for each disaster in terms of both expertise and materials. Consequently, 
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the disaster site is very often in a complete state of chaos and helpless terror (Thomas 
and Kopczak 2005). 
 
Physical infrastructures, such as roads, railways, bridges and airports, are often 
destroyed. National and local governments through humanitarian organizations must 
coordinate their activities, although they may be severely impacted, and even uprooted 
in the case of a conflict situation. Transport capacity may not exist or become extremely 
limited. 
 
5.3.1 Challenges in the Humanitarian Supply Chain 
 
There are various players in humanitarian aid chains including the United Nations, 
military, commercial and non-governmental organizations, donors to support NGOs, but 
their benefits come at a price. Donors demand to know where and how their funds are 
being used by enhancing money awareness and to see tangible, measurable results 
(Oloruntoba and Gray 2009). When international non-governmental organizations fail 
to achieve efficiency, this will not only cause loss of life, but will lead to the loss of 
crucial donor funds in the future. Under these circumstances, resources come under 
further pressure, conflict levels rise and performance dives (Roh et al 2008; Perry 2007). 
 
In response to a disaster, NGOs must quickly build the very complex supply chains 
required to assemble and distribute food, shelter and other necessities to the same levels 
of efficiency as in commercial supply chain management. An NGO’s supply chain 
involves the planning processes, implementation, and controlling the materials needed 
to introduce efficient, cost-effective flow systems, and the storage of information 
(Thomas and Kopczak 2005). This includes implementation at different stages of 
preparation, planning, procurement, transportation, storage, tracking and tracing, and 
customs clearance. The activities follow the entire supply chain from the very beginning 
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to the ultimate point of consumption in order to improve the situation of those affected 
by the catastrophe. NGOs’ supply chains also have unique challenges because they are 
different to business supply chains as the demands on a humanitarian supply chain 
demand cannot be fully anticipated before the event (Long and Wood 1995). 
Throughout the world, disasters can and will happen anytime and anywhere and will 
often occur in economically underdeveloped areas. Most underdeveloped countries 
share two common issues - poor infrastructure and political instability, and they 
invariably require a combination of military and commercial applications to offset these 
problems. Thus, the requirements of supply and demand cannot easily be evaluated 
(Wassenhove 2006).   
 
The concept of commercial supply chain management can be copied and used among 
NGOs (Kovacs and Spens 2007). Supply chain management is always applied as a 
support function and comes under the charge of a NGO and management as the “back 
office” (Thomas 2003). This has led to the exclusion of supply chain managers from 
critical decisions and failures to recognise the potential contributions of effective supply 
chain management and investment in the area (Wassenhove 2006). In order to fill the 
gap, it is necessary to establish a strategic alliance between all contributing 
humanitarian aid organizations in order to coordinate the humanitarian and 
comprehensive relief network strategy (Winter 2009). The humanitarian supply chain 
has a high level of unique and complex needs, therefore it requires more human 
intervention, and during the response phase it must be quick to implement innovative 
solutions to ensure the initial purpose of lifesaving (Gattorna 2006). According to 
Gattorna (2009), it is only through one completely flexible supply chain that it is 
possible to cope with unpredictable events and obtain a satisfactory result without 
considering the cost, or the use of relationships. 
 
The goals of any international relief and development operation are supposed to be built 
on a supply chain which enhances its effectiveness and efficiency (Petit and Beresford 
2005), or the need to take a planned strategic policy, rather than a "what needs to be" 
method (Gattorna 2009). Despite this, the demands of humanitarian aid are unstable and 
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unpredictable, which results in the needs for flexibility. This shows that the concept of 
agility can be applied to the humanitarian supply chain as proposed by Oloruntoba and 
Gray (2006). 
 
5.3.2 Comparing the humanitarian with the business supply chain 
 
Although both are supply chains, but the aims the humanitarian and business supply 
chains are vastly different. The aim of the humanitarian supply chain is to save lives in 
the shortest time and without concern for expenditures during first 72 hours after an 
event has occurred. The aim in the commercial context is to apply resources to 
minimize the production cost and increase productivity. To some extent, different aims 
can reflect different operations and functions. Thus, it is important to understand the 
differences between both chains. 
 
The humanitarian supply chain is vital to humanitarian relief aid as illustrated in earlier 
sections, and it consumes more than 80% of the expenditure of all relief funds 
(Wassenhove 2006). It is also associated with some major issues. In business, logistics 
can be used to easily address the challenges; however, it is very hard to do so in 
humanitarian logistics (Wassenhove 2006; Christopher and Tatham 2014). 
 
The use of the word ‘customer’ in the context of a humanitarian supply chain is 
different from that of the business supply chain. In the case of the humanitarian supply 
chain, customers are more likely to indicate those who are victims. While in the 
business context, the supply chain is related to the process of the transfer of materials or 
supplies towards the end customers. Beamon and Balcik (2008) state this process is 
linked to the flow of raw materials to the end user. As for any type of supply chain, it is 
aimed at delivering the right supplies in the right quantities to the right locations and 
right people at the right time and at the right price. Therefore, the humanitarian supply 
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chain flows as a relief measure from the donors to the customers (Beamon and Balcik 
2008). 
 
There are many similarities between humanitarian logistics and enterprise logistics, but 
in comparison to the best practice from the enterprise world, humanitarian organizations 
still lag behind. Humanitarian logistics seeks to deliver services and relief aid to people 
who are suffering for any kind of disasters, in order to alleviate human suffering under 




Although the commercial and humanitarian supply chains share aspects in common, 
they still have very distinguishing parts and differences. Balcik and Beamon (2008) 
identified that the key difference between them is the identification of the customer. In 
commercial supply chain management, the customer is simply and clearly defined as the 
one who receives the goods and services while fulfilling the profits based on the 
customer service promises (Ramsden 2014). Wassenhove (2006) points out that there 
are two debates going on - the first defines customers as the providers of funds or 
supplies that the relief organizations deliver, the so-called donors; the second are the 
people who reap the benefits from the relief organization, i.e. the beneficiaries. The 
quote below provides an evaluation of the customer to donor. 
 
‘The customers in the relief supply chain are the aid recipients. It is important to note 
that donors play such a large role in the humanitarian relief sector that the vast majority 
of NGOs currently regard donors (not aid recipients) as customers (Balcik and Beamon 
2008). From this perspective, the NGOs manage a service chain, providing the service 




Above all, the beneficiaries in the business world are those who receive the goods and 
services; however, in the relief world, the victims are the beneficiaries. The victims do 
not have any or at best have a little power or discretion to determine what, when, where 
or how the relief goods are going to be delivered. Most importantly, they do not pay for 
the goods and services. On the other hand, the donors are the ones who directly or 
indirectly pay for these goods and services, because they are the people who pledge 
sometimes many millions to provide the funds to operate this relief work. Therefore, the 
NGOs will try to respect their wishes to spend the money well, so that the donors will 
be well satisfied. 
 
  Unpredictable demand 
 
Humanitarian relief supply chains are highly uncertain about if and when a disaster is 
going to occur, as disasters can happen anywhere, at any time (Dash et al 2013; 
Scholten, Scott, and Fynes 2010). The victims’ needs, demands, and the supply from 
donors are also uncertain. Even then, there is the likelihood of a risk assessment 
programme being introduced and with its impact uncertain, everything is about 
possibilities, but rarely about certainties. Disasters always occur suddenly, and therefore, 
the demand on any humanitarian supply chain is highly uncertain (Wassenhove 2006). 
 
 Short lead time 
 
Disasters usually occur very suddenly, thus, the supply chain needs to provide a large 
number and variety of relief goods and services within a very short time after the event, 
because the speed of response is the prerequisite in this field and is the key to the rescue 
activities during the first three days. Consequently, it is extremely difficult to deal with 




The challenges of obtaining relief supplies and delivery timeliness are difficult to 
control during an emergency (Kirstin et al 2010). These include two areas: first, the 
internal relief logistics distribution centre, known as the relief supply phase, and  second, 
the outbound logistics from the relief distribution centre to the affected area (called the 
aid distribution phase). The main task of the relief stage is to identify multiple vendors 
to obtain supplies, whether internal or external, which is known as the relief distribution 
stage, and seeks to help the distribution centre. Therefore, the corresponding operational 
issues may spring from difficulties associated with non-identified supply sources, as 
well as the coordination of disaster relief to provide a quick response to the affected 
people. As a result, the delay between when the relief demand becomes acute and when 
the corresponding relief is assigned turns out to be rather uncertain. It is noted that such 
a delay could be similar to the delivery time committed for purchasing and order 
processing solutions in the commercial operations of logistics (Simchi-Levi et al. 2000). 
By comparison, the purpose of the relief distribution phase is to direct relief delivered 
from the distribution centre to the disaster spot area, in order to meet the urgent 
demands of the victims. Among the remainder, the reliability of the damaged and 
affected infrastructures in the affected area may increase the uncertainty in the rescue 
distribution environment, and therefore lead to further complexity and difficulties in the 
amplification time stream-based emergency control. 
 
 Lack of initial resources 
 
The lack of initial resources draws the attention of not only the world-wide media but 
also donors. The need is to deliver large quantities of goods and services over a very 
short period (Perry 2007). This situation is most obvious during the initial response 
phase. On the other hand, the commercial field does not have these issues, as the 




In business logistics operations, under appropriate corresponding operational resources, 
such as the container, model and server, these are known and easily controlled logistics 
providers. Emergency logistics operate under a complex operating environment, where 
it is uncertain whether the necessary resources can be obtained from the public and 
private sectors. Lyle (2005) believes that there is always an intense need to coordinate 
the logistics resources of the public and private sectors, in order to avoid the arbitrary 
allocation of resources to escape a disaster. In addition, communication failure between 
suppliers, the logistics server, and demanders is another factor that impacts on resource 
coordination under emergency conditions. 
 
 Duplication efforts 
 
Furthermore, relief work includes a wide range of goods and services that can meet the 
fundamental needs of victims in catastrophic circumstances, such as shelter, food, water 
and medical care. Each organisation might specialize in one particular area, such as 
construction or medical care. However, it is inevitable that there will be duplication of 
effort and shortages in any disaster. In contrast, this situation never occurs in the 
commercial field, where the operation process is fully developed, and each department 
is in charge of one particular area, and there are not cross sector activities among the 




The essential relief requires real-time information, however this is almost inaccessible. 
In the real world, this issue is derived from the facts that the relief requirements (such as 
communication, and the affected persons), and the corresponding information providers 
(such as on-site reporters and aid workers) may be inconsistent. Customers provide 
demand information in business logistics only very directly. On the other hand, demand 
information in humanitarian relief work can be very limited, unreliable, and 
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uncountable, especially in the immediate aftermath of a disaster (Rushton, Croucher and 
Baker 2014). In the case of most disasters, the needs for relief may be unknown, 
meaning that the timely provision of the relief to the people affected may not be 
possible (Blaikie et al 2014). The information needed for emergency relief is the total 
demand for logistics, rather than the total demand for conventional treatment as in 
business logistics. To some extent, demand information for relief is difficult to predict, 
due to the lack of historical data. Therefore, this leads to the challenging problem which 
is to provide real-time information to forecast a disaster (Cozzolino 2012). 
 
This comparison provides fundamental knowledge about both chains, and creates a 
space for identifying the critical successful factors in the humanitarian supply chain 
compared to the commercial supply chain. 
 
5.3.3 Critical Success Factors (CSFs)  
 
The humanitarian supply chain is often the largest and most complex part of 
humanitarian relief operations (UNDP 1993) and in order for successful supply chains 
to be effective and efficient, there is the requirement for a clear understanding of the 
problems and issues involved. Improving supply chain effectiveness and efficiency 
requires the uncertainty to be reduced, minimised, or even eliminated, but in many 
business cases this may not be completely achievable due to the product involved 
(Mason-Jones et al. 1999; Christopher and Towill 2001). Such problems are 
exacerbated in a humanitarian aid context when the products become relief goods 
destined for communities of people either distressed or displaced as the result of a crisis 
outside of their control, and through which the supply chain will inevitably have to 
operate. Developing an understanding of which factors are critical to the success of 
humanitarian supply chains, and whether the same factors emerge in all crises, is 
important. It is apparent that, as with commercial supply chains, there are certain key 
factors which will determine the ultimate success of humanitarian delivery. As a 
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contribution to the debate on supply chain management for humanitarian aid, this 
section seeks to identify the range of factors which are critical to the successful 
operation of a humanitarian supply chain. 
 
5.3.3.1 CSFs from the commercial perspective 
 
According to Huotari and Wilson (2001), Rockart (1979) expounded on the idea of 
CSFs as far as the supply chain is concerned. All which was founded on the existing 
work on MIT, by acknowledging proper distribution as one of the CSFs where 
applicable. There are a considerable numbers of researchers who have appreciated the 
role that CSFs play within supply chains in commercial contexts. As Porter (1985) 
considered the concept of the value chain with CSFs, Gunasekaran and Ngai (2003) 
proposed five core elements which are invaluably important to the survival of small-
sized companies specializing in logistics. The identified factors being: proper planning, 
capacity planning, transportation planning, management of the inventory, and the up-to-
standard management of information within that particular company. Razzaque and 
Sheng (1998) examined the concept of CSFs from the perspectives of outsourced 
logistics, determination of the payback time, significance of the human resources, 
proper channels for the communication of ideas, relationships, setting company goals, 
gauging the performance of the company by using those goals as the benchmark, and 
the focus of customers. 
 
Power et al. (2001) states that CSFs in business supply chains have seven main elements 
which are: participative management that is more specific than human resource 
management, the management of information, unremitting progress, the proper handling 
of the inventory, and good relations with their respective suppliers, the just-in-time 
methodology, and the integration of technology in their operations. In contrast, Wong 
(2005) examined the factors of success in relation to the management of knowledge in 
ventures ranging from the small to the medium sized, and grouped eleven diverse 
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undertakings into resource management, information management, strategic planning, 
unrelenting progress, and the management of human resources. 
 
Therefore, from the reviewed literature, one can conclude that there are few success 
factors that cut across a range of resources and can be implemented for the success of 
supply chains that lead to operational effectiveness and cost efficiency. In addition, 
these factors are of immeasurable importance in the quantification of the progress 
achieved by humanitarian supply chains. 
 
5.3.3.2 Critical success factors for humanitarian supply chain management 
 
There are seven factors that have been deemed important for the management and 
progress of humanitarian supply chains. These CSFs are: 
 
 strategic planning 
 management of the inventory 
 time 
 transport and capacity planning 
 unremitting progress and collaboration 
 management of human resources 
 management of information 
 
The first is strategic planning since for supply chains to make their expected progress, 
they must be formulated in such a way that caters for the long-term decision-making 
process which is required. Moreover, the most superior management department in an 
organization should be in charge of this process of strategic planning to make sure the 
best decisions are made which are in-line with the ultimate goals and objectives of the 
company. Daft and Marcic (2004) state that, strategic planning should be implemented 
in such a way that focuses on the entire organization and handles all the concerns which 
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ensure that the company matches the environment in which it operates. In the absence 
of appropriate strategic management, it is impossible to accomplish the goals of these 
humanitarian agencies such as realizing effectual chains of supply. Strategic 
management aims at pinpointing the assets, strengths, and weaknesses of all the 
imaginable situations in the company. Long (1997) suggests that, organisations should 
feel obliged to take up a sustainable and an enduring style which allows the company to 
be ready for the necessary steps to be taken in the face of an emergency.  
 
The second is the management of inventory, since it has been identified that the 
commercial management of the inventory is the main function of logistics ruled by the 
“pull” systems. Although, Whybark (2007) feels obligated to inform his audience that in 
the inventory used in disaster relief situations, they call for the “push” into strategic 
storage located right before the implementation of the “pull” systems which are meant 
to get through to the exact area of need. In contrast, other functions of logistics are 
dedicated to the management of the inventory involved in planning, coordination, and 
regulations of the flow of materials within these logistics chains of supply. Moreover, 
the amount of materials, the timing of the supply chain, and the consolidation of the 
prospective materials are crucial factors which are subject to supply and demand. 
 
Evidently, time is one of the most significant CSFs in all disaster relief operations, since 
for the stocks to be of help to the affected target population, they must get to the precise 
place at the expected time. Tatham and Kovacs (2007) state that, approximately three to 
five days after a disaster takes place, a nation is obliged to use the resources that it has 
so that it can provide emergency relief services to its citizens who are affected. To make 
this initiative successful, a comprehensive network should be put into place to meet the 
demands which accompany any catastrophe. According to the Fritz Institute (2005) as 
much the donors are important to ensure relief aid operations are successful, in the same 
way, the importance of logisticians cannot be ignored since they play a pivotal role in 
these operations. Therefore, a well-thought suggestion is proposed that for the provision 
of relief to the victims to be successful, this calls for the implementation of a 
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collaborative warehouse strategy which integrates many agencies. Moreover, it is of 
great importance that the present warehouse structure is expanded so that it can handle 
humanitarian responses effectively in future in case the country faces more crises and 
disasters.   
 
The fourth crucial factor of success is transport and capacity planning since the way 
transport is handled in crisis circumstances is dissimilar when compared to the 
situations of commercial organizations. Kovacs and Spens (2007) argue that, 
commercial companies have reliable means of transport and proper infrastructures to 
conduct their endeavours, while in handling emergency relief operations, logisticians 
encounter an unreliable infrastructure and fleet to deliver the provisions which will have 
to be obtained from the resources at hand, despite how minimal and limited they are. 
Long (1997) notes that besides the dire need for transport and distribution services in 
the face of a disaster, humanitarian logistics is needed to address various concerns like 
scheduling and maintenance. Gunasekaran and Ngai (2003) propose a broad spectrum 
of undertakings which are necessary in these operations including the minimisations of 
cost, contracting, payments, tendering, and brokering among others. 
 
The fifth requirement is unremitting progress and collaboration, since according to 
Power et al. (2003), it is obvious that if the commercial chains of supply are meant to 
meet the needs of the market place, they must come up with a strategy and approach 
which ensures that the needs of their customers are met. According to the Fritz Institute 
(2005), it is important for humanitarian organisations to borrow from different methods 
of operation and integrate these into their endeavours. For instance, they can adopt 
performance determining systems which gauge the efficacy of the chain of supply.  
 
The sixth CSF is the management of human resources which is a pivotal factor in all 
humanitarian organisations since the efficiency of an organisation to respond to a 
calamity will be partially determined by its ability to organise its human resources. 
99 
 
Even so, Perry (2003) and Thomas (2003) note that logistics expertise levels in many 
relief aid organisations is below per and the available logisticians have no autonomy to 
execute the decisions which they deem right for the operation. Moreover, Thomas and 
Kopczak (2005), insist that the ability of organisations to manage their staff at the sites 
where the incidents took place can have an immense impact on their efficiency and 
capability to deliver aid to the affected population. 
 
The final determinant of success in supply chains for disaster handling is the 
management of information. As noted by Perry (2007), King (2005), and Maxwell and 
Watkins (2003), the promptness with which it is utilised has an important effect on the 
success of an organisation’s response to a disaster. Long (1997) argues that IT is a 
crucial element in humanitarian aid operations since it supports the organisation’s 
activities. The author goes on to state that the way in which information is passed 
between different departments in a relief aid operation has tremendous effect on the 
success or failure of the operation. Moreover, information management is the largest 
determining factor of the success of any relief aid operation (Long & Wood, 2005). This 
is because IT systems are responsible for providing precise information, gauging 
performance, and controlling the entire operation (Gunasekaran and Ngai, 2003). 
Furthermore, Gunasekaran and Ngai (2003), Soin (2004), and UNDP (1993), point out 
that the flow of information, compatibility of the systems, and strategic management are 
the key factors which dictate the success of any operation.  
 
5.4 Humanitarian Logistics 
 
Humanitarian logistics and enterprise logistics have a lot of similarities, but compared 
to the best practices from the enterprise world, humanitarian organizations still lag 
behind. Humanitarian logistics seeks to deliver services and relief aid to the people who 
are suffering for any kind of disaster, in order to alleviate human suffering based on the 
prior condition of the response speed. 
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A set of characteristics that set business logistics apart from humanitarian logistics can 
now be identified. Business logistics usually deals with a predetermined set of suppliers, 
manufacturing sites, and a stable or at least predictable demand – all of which are 
factors unknown in humanitarian logistics (Cassidy 2003). Humanitarian logistics are 
again characterized by large-scale activities, irregular demand, and unusual constraints 
in large-scale emergencies (Beamon and Kotleba 2006). In terms of the end-result that 
is strived for, business logistics aims at increasing profits whereas humanitarian 
logistics aims at alleviating the suffering of vulnerable people (Thomas and Kopczak 
2005). The supply network structure of humanitarian logistics also differs from that of 
business logistics because it is comprised of so many actors with no clear or stated 
linkages between each other. While the operations and actors are intertwined, different 
groups of actors and different phases of disaster relief operations can be distinguished. 
All these operations have a common aim to aid people in their survival. They often have 
to be carried out in an environment with a destabilized infrastructure (Cassidy 2003; 
Long and Wood 1995), ranging from a lack of electricity to a limited transport 
infrastructure. Furthermore, most natural disasters are unpredictable, thus the demand 
for goods in these disasters is also unpredictable (Cassidy 2003; Murray 2005). The 
immediate response stage of humanitarian aid involves emergency and rapid response 
measures and usually involves a large amount of supplies being rushed to the disaster 
location. This is distinct from the commercial supply chain which uses tried and tested 
routines to move merchandise according to set schedules. Most of these characteristics 
can actually be associated with different types of emergency situations, and not only 
those that deal with disaster relief. Nevertheless, what sets this type of emergency 
situation apart from others is usually the magnitude of the catastrophe taking place and 
the logistical operations needed to cope with it. 
 
However, the humanitarian support is not always put to effective use. When the 
effective and good use of systems is discussed, reference is made to the reasons why 
unnecessarily large operations and costs are incurred or why some victims have 
succumbed to unnecessary deaths because of shortcomings in the supply chain (Pitt 
2010). There is clear evidence that up to recent times, humanitarian logistical efforts 
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have registered significant failures in their operations, thus calling for the introduction 
of some of the best practices from their commercial counterparts (Wassenhove and 
Pedraza 2012). Many studies which have sought to understand the problems of 
humanitarian supply chain management and provide solutions to the associated 
problems have failed to capture the full extent and network of the supply chain (Tatham 
and Houghton 2011). This has seen researchers hurriedly providing remedies that only 
support fractions of the whole network. In the opinion of this researcher, the 
humanitarian supply chain is too wide to be comprehended and managed without an 
independent evaluation and monitoring body (Charles 2010).  
 
5.4.1 Importance of Humanitarian Logistics 
 
In disaster relief work, logistics is the most significant factor and is the key point which 
makes the difference between a successful and a failed operation and is also the most 
expensive component in any disaster relief work (Wassenhove 2006). According to 
Wassenhove, the money spent on logistics has reached as high as 80% of the total for 
humanitarian relief work. Therefore, enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of 
humanitarian relief requires proper investment, in order to utilize the resources during 
the relief work (Cozzolino et al 2012). Secondly, Scholten et al (2010) claim that 
humanitarian organizations can increase the number of donors by utilizing their 
resources, and can also easily gain their trust especially with long-term commitment. 
Humanitarian organizations need to prove that they are using sufficient, adequate, and 
different types of funds for the people who are really in need. 
 
Humanitarian logistics is the key to the response phase in many different types of 
disasters; it involves different operational requirements at different stages of the 
response phase including immediate, short and long-term needs. All these operations 
have a common goal which is to aid people in their struggle to survive. However, aid to 
facilitate the recovery and development of a region means that there are two main 
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streams of humanitarian logistics that can be distinguished, continuous aid assistance, 
and disaster relief (Long 1997). Under normal circumstances, long-term disaster relief is 
left to a later date. The focus points for immediate disaster relief operations are: first aid 
medical materials, transportation, food, relief equipment, and rescue personnel from the 
supply points to possibly a large number of geographically dispersed locations in the 
disaster area, whilst safely evacuating and transferring people affected by the disaster to 
the nearest health care centres (Barbarosog Lu et al 2002). 
 
 
Figure 5.4: The vicious circle of logistics (Wassenhove 2006) 
 
This in turn has led to a ‘fire-fighting’ mentality (Coppla 2006). Managers see logistics 
struggling and conclude that a review of logistics is not advantageous, further fuelling 
the lack of understanding, and so the cycle begins again. It is only recently that 
humanitarian organizations, such as the International Federation of the Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the World Food Programme (WFP), have tried to 
break free of this vicious circle by pinpointing logistics and supply chain management 
as the keys to a relief operation (Wassenhove 2005). Other organisations in the sector 
are beginning to follow suit and raise the profile and professionalism of logisticians. In 
the private sector, over a decade ago, humanitarian organizations began to wake up to 
the fact that logistics: is crucial to performance (effectiveness and speed) of current and 
future operations and programmes. And this serves as a bridge between disaster 
preparedness and response, between procurement and distribution, and between 
headquarters and the field (Thomas and Mizushima 2005). Logistics also provides a rich 
This material has been removed from this thesis due to Third Party Copyright. 




source of data, since it is this department that handles the tracking of goods which could 
be used to analyse post-event effectiveness (Thomas and Mizushima 2005). And it is 
the most expensive part of any relief operation and the part that can mean the difference 
between a successful or failed operation. Whatever the definition should be, a common 
awareness of logistics, including the planning and preparedness, design, procurement, 
transportation, inventory, warehousing, distribution and recipient satisfaction, become 
important. In short, all logistics operations have to be designed in such a way that they 




This section has reviewed the basics of supply chains and, on this basis, examined the 
differences between the humanitarian and commercial supply chains. The CFSs in the 
commercial supply chain represent seven important points that can increase the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the humanitarian supply chain. 
 
This chapter reviewed the fundamental knowledge of supply chain management, on that 
basis, further identified the differences between business supply chain and 
humanitarians supply chain. In addition, summarized from previous literature and 
highlight the most importance seven CFS which contributed the operational 















This chapter describes the research philosophy and methodology utilized in this 
research. The structure of this chapter is illustrated in Figure 6.1 through the use of the 
‘research onion’. This chapter begins by examining the philosophy of the methodology 
followed by the research approaches and methods utilized in this research. This study 
relies on qualitative data, the case study, and comparative approaches. This chapter 
highlights the approaches that are used in research generally before illustrating and 
evaluating the specific methods used in the completion of this research. 
 




This material has been removed from this thesis due to Third Party Copyright. The unabridged version of 
the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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6.2 Research Philosophy 
 
A research philosophy is a belief about the way data should be collected, analysed and 
used. The discussion of a research philosophy includes ontology, epistemology, and 
methodology (Howell 2013), while philosophical assumptions based on research can be 
divided into positivism and interpretivism (Stanford 2006). Through studying the 
various philosophical concepts that involve the way a researcher views the world, these 
assumptions will support the choice of research strategy as part of the methodological 
strategy (Saunders et al. 2007).  
 
Although, philosophy can be influenced by practical considerations (e.g. time, degree of 
access to data, etc.), it is more likely to be influenced by the researcher’s particular view 
of the relationship between knowledge and the process by which it is developed (Smith 
1998; Saunders et al, 2007). This is mainly because not only might there be a different 
strategy and methodology, but even their perspective is different. For example, a 
researcher who is more concerned about the disaster response phase is likely to have 
different views, conclusions and recommendations compared to researchers who pay 
more attention to the recovery stage. Thus, it is very important for researchers to 
understand the research ideas and aims to ensure that the correct research method is 
chosen as this can help enhance the reliability of their research results.  
 
In this chapter, the main focus is on ontology and epistemology since these are two 
major views of research philosophy, and they are the two important elements of 
philosophy and its foundations, which this research is built upon. Thus, the research 
methods chosen are closely connected to and built upon ontological and epistemological 
assumptions (Grix 2004). Each contains important differences that influence the way in 






Ontology mainly explores the nature of reality (Saunders 2007). Both Blaike (2014) and 
Welty (2003) point out that philosophy is the subject of scientific practice which can be 
traced back to Aristotle. It mainly explores the type of object, its structure, properties, 
events and processes, and thus illuminates the reality that can be related to all areas 
(Saunders 2007). Ontology on the other hand is about the things out there or the 
existence of things. The ideas of ontology mainly centre on why it is important to know 
what is out there. Although the nature of existence is often about how to learn, it is 
important to know that it is also related to how it has been researched or studied (Yin 
2004). This will make it possible to conceptualize social reality in some terms. 
 
Ontology is related to what people might know and the simple explanation of 
epistemology is about the truth that is out there but is yet to be discovered (Grix 2004). 
In general, researchers have some ingrained ontological assumptions that often affect 
their understanding of what is real, whether the property exists or whether there is any 
attribute of a group of things in the other (Flower 2009). If these basic assumptions are 
not considered, some researchers may be blind to some particular aspects of their 
investigation because they implicitly assume or take something for granted, and 
therefore are not open to problems, to consider or to discuss (Flower 2009). When 
considering the different points of view about what is real, researchers must be realistic 
about how to measure another question and that is the basic definition of the knowledge 




“If ontology is about what we may know, then epistemology is about how we come to 
know what we know” (Grix 2004: 63). Epistemology is what is known to be true, which 
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can contain a diversity of research philosophy (Jerry 2008). Thomas (2004: 36) defined 
epistemology as the ‘branch of philosophy that asks questions such as how we can 
know anything with certainty; or what methods can yield reliable knowledge’. Thomas 
(2004) quoted the Royce list which contains four methods of achieving this: 
 
 First is ‘rationalism’. This refers to knowing through thinking and reasoning. If a 
research area is not logical, then that assumes there is nothing that can be true. In 
this way, knowledge occupies a prominent position in both mathematics and 
philosophy.  
 Second is ‘empiricism’ and largely depends on sensory perception. When the 
assumption is precise consciousness, then it is the truth. In this case, empirical 
science therefore plays a key role in the world.  
 Third is knowledge by ‘intuition’ which is the basis for direct or obvious 
consciousness, perhaps from the unconscious process. It is assumed that, if there 
is consciousness of insight, then the area of research is real. For instance, a large 
portion of basic art knowledge is intuitively derived from meditation or from 
personal knowledge.  
 Finally, ‘authoritarianism’ plays a significant role. This refers to the method of 
knowing based on the power or authority. It is true because the authority says 
that it is true. For example, in some religions, the authority reveals the truth 
about God or Allah or Buddha.  
 
Thomas (2004) comments that the field is often largely drawn from one or two out of 
these four (listed above) methods. For instance, a cognitive method is usually adopted 
as a rationalist philosophy which tries to build the truth through the deployment of 
parameters and the rebuttal of some aspects. In contrast, physical scientists think 
carefully and use logic control and record empirical observations and then interpret 
theory (Richard 2010). This therefore means that every single path to knowledge can be 




In terms of this research, the epistemology comes from the reality of the uncertainty of 
disaster (location, time and scale), where the disaster response has to continuously 
improve in order to become more effect and efficient. There are three main response 
participants in disaster relief, the government, military and NGOs. And due to the 
distinct national background of each country, the emergency plans and participating 
departments may vary. In spite of this, all the disaster responses need to be implemented 
in the framework of the emergency plan and this is the first step of a disaster response. 
In addition, many researchers have argued that 80 per cent of humanitarian aid 
operations comprise of supply chain management activities (Van Wassenhove 2006; 
Kovács and Spens 2007; Thomas, 2003; Trunick 2005b; Scholten et al. 2010). And 
moreover, logistics has always been an important factor in humanitarian aid operations, 
to the extent that logistics efforts account for 80 percent of disaster relief (Trunick 
2005b). The speed of humanitarian aid after a disaster depends “on the ability of 
logisticians to procure, transport and receive supplies at the site of a humanitarian relief 
effort” (Thomas, 2003, p. 4). It is from these foundations that this research proceeds. 
 
In epistemology, there are two main orientations found in the social science fields, 
namely positivism (positivist) and interpretivism (interpretivist) (Saunders et al. 2007). 
Whereas positivism must imitate the importance of natural science, interpretivism 
advocates the role of the human social action (Bryman and Bell 2003; Bryman and Bell, 
2007; Saunders et al 2007). Although they represent the two main approaches, they are 
not the only ways to support social studies of epistemology. The following section 




The roots of positivism can be traced back to Aristotle and was largely used as the main 
research approach in the twentieth century (Grix 2004). Instrumental contributions 
towards its development were however achieved through Francis Bacon and Auguste 
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Comte among other researchers (Thomas 2004; Grix 2004). Apparently, it refers to the 
method of knowledge gained by limited observable facts and their relationships. Since it 
rules out unobservable entity references to god and to the senses (Crossan 2003), this 
epistemological approach is considered wild and comprises a mixture of empiricism, 
objectivism, and naturalism (Bryman and Bell 2003; Grix 2004; Thomas 2004). 
 
In terms of their distinguishing features, positivists believe that reality is stable and can 
be observed with interference phenomena being studied and from the objective point of 
view which it describes (Cohen 2007). Besides that, they argue that even in isolation, 
the observed values of the phenomena can be repeated. This often involves the 
manipulation of reality so that only one independent variable changes. This will in turn 
make it possible to identify the regularity and form of the relationship between some of 
the constituent elements of the social world. 
 
Positivism has a long and rich historical tradition (Ashley 2005), and has particularly 
successful associations with the physical and natural sciences. In this respect, 
positivistic approaches help a researcher to seek identify, measure and evaluate 
phenomena and to provide rational explanations (Blanch et al. 2006). Therefore 
applying positivism to this current research entails adhering to the observation that 
solitary “factual” knowledge gained from the established virtual links as well as 
relationships among different elements of the humanitarian supply chain management 
within distinctive NGOs as well as related agencies is trustworthy. This will be 
instrumental in determining the best way to enhance both the effectiveness and 
efficiency of humanitarian supply chain management and its operations. Besides that, 
positivism limits this current research to data collection and its subsequent interpretation 
through the use of the objective approach. And thus, this make the findings of this 







Interpretivism, as distinct from positivism, seeks to "understand the reality of life and 
constitute an overall objective by survey and consideration by social actors to build 
specific meaning to the world" (Outhwaite 2009; Schwandt, 1994: 118). Interpretivism 
usually has considerable links with other terms such as; idealism, constructivism, 
phenomenology, and relativism (Grix 2004; Thomas 2006). 
 
The subjectivity of interpretivism concerns understanding, and cannot be explained by 
mechanical means (Primus 2009). This makes it an appropriate approach for business 
and management research especially in the areas of organizational behaviours, 
marketing and human resource management (Crossan, 2003). Besides that, the major 
concern of interpretivism is the behaviour of the participants. Therefore, when choosing 
research methods, attempts to describe, translate and interpret research theme events 
must be used from the perspective of the people who are the subject of the research. 
This standpoint therefore assumes that people tend to influence events and actions in an 
unpredictable manner, which interferes with any attempts to identify construction rules 
or guidelines (Bryman and Bell 2003). However, from an interpretivism research 
method point of view, human behaviour is not easy to measure as is natural scientific 
phenomena. Human motivation is not always visible, such as internal thought processes, 
so that it can become difficult to generalize, for example, the motivation just observed. 
In addition, people have a habit of interpreting events in dissimilar ways (Bryman and 
Bell 2003). 
 
Research shows that interpretivists assert that only through subjective interpretation and 
intervention in reality, can reality be fully understood. The study of phenomena in their 
natural environment is the key to the interpretivist philosophy, together with the 
acknowledgement that scientists cannot avoid affecting the phenomena they study 
(Richard 2010). They easily admit that there may be many interpretations of reality, but 
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maintain that these interpretations are in themselves a part of the scientific knowledge 
they are pursuing (Bryman & Bell 2003). In this respect, interpretivism epistemology 
enables this research to develop the truth by basing it on social interaction, and thus 
paving way for the inductive approach to be applied. This necessitates the use of 
qualitative methods for the collection and analysis of data. 
 
The possibility of using a positivist approach was considered in this research, however, 
as this research aims to gain a better understanding of the disaster response, emergency 
planning, and humanitarian logistics which means in contrast to the natural scientific 
type of research topic, the emphasis here lies in achieving an understanding of the social 
world through an examination of the interpretation of that world by its participants. 
Moreover, the interpretivist approach allows the researcher to carry out interviews and 
case studies which are likely to deepen our understanding of the topic. Although this 
research utilizes interviews, the findings here are not solely based on interactions and 
communications with people, and in the end, people are not central to this research, but 
rather are an alternative way to gather data in parallel with case studies and other 
secondary data to increase the validity of the research (McGregor and Murnane, 2010). 
Based on the reasons explained above, the interpretivist approach for this research 




There are two main research methods these being the quantitative and qualitative 
approaches (Morgan and Smircich 1980). Quantitative methods are mostly employed by 
positivists and always result in numbers as they try to produce causal explanations or 
even scientific laws. And they do not only refer to the notion of natural science in their 
ontology and epistemology (Phillimore Goodson 2004). Qualitative methods, on the 
other hand, are usually employed by relativists. Corresponding to their ontological and 
epistemological position of a world that is only socially constructed and all knowledge 
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that we can have about it is subject to interpretation, relativists use interviews, focus 
groups and other qualitative methods to get an in-depth insight into a field. This 
provides a richness of description not obtainable by quantitative research. The aim is to 
find out the meaning of social behaviour (Walliman 2005). 
 
6.3.1 Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches 
 
Qualitative research usually requires a lot of different academic disciplines like those 
frequently used in the social sciences and educational researches. The aim of qualitative 
researchers is to gain a better understanding of human behaviours, and why they act as 
they do. Besides, qualitative research methods investigate the reasons and methods of 
human decision-making, not only just what decisions people make, but also answers to 
questions like; why, when, where and how they make decisions (Richard 2010). Thus, 
qualitative research tends to focus on a smaller but more concentrated sample resulting 
in tighter information or knowledge about a particular case study (Yin 2006). In the 
traditional view, qualitative methods produce only particular case study data, where any 
more general conclusions need different considerations. In addition, qualitative methods 
can be used to seek empirical support for a postulated hypothesis (Bryman 2001). 
Among the key cons of this approach are that it has a complete and detailed aim. Key 
benefits are also derived from the fact that the researcher is the ultimate instrument used 
in the gathering of data. Flaws on the other hand exist for this approach. First, during 
the process of research, the researcher gets immersed fully in the research topic. Finally, 
since qualitative methods cannot be designed before a research study commences, the 
qualitative approach becomes time consuming (Yin 2006). 
 
In the social sciences, quantitative research refers to the use of statistical, mathematical 
or computational techniques and other methods to carry out the systematic empirical 
study of social phenomena (Given and Lisa 2008). The goal of this research is to 
develop and apply a mathematical model related to the social phenomenon, theory or 
hypothesis. Apparently, quantitative research is the most important measuring process 
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since it fundamentally links the phenomena of "empirical observation" and 
"mathematical representation”. In addition, quantitative data includes a variety of 
information presented either in digital form, such as statistics or percentages. 
Quantitative research methods generally make use of obtained data, pre-data, and data 
analysis to give a summary of findings (Miles and Huberman 1994). Two methods that 
can be used to implement quantitative research methods are descriptive statistics and 
linear programming methods. The quantitative approach comes with a number of 
advantages. First, the data used can be relied on to act as a snapshot of a whole 
population. Secondly, by just increasing the sample size, the p-value can be adjusted to 
the required one, which ultimately improves the statistical power and thus further boosts 
accuracy (Yin 2006). Although this approach is instrumental in research, it is known to 
contain several flaws. Sometimes the quantitative approach fails to provide vital 
information, and it is also known to be time consuming and has a tendency to make 
predictions difficult (Bryman 2015). 
 
Quantitative and qualitative research studies typically contrast, for instance in terms of 
their analysis and observations to discover potential meanings, patterns and 
relationships, including the type of phenomena and entities classified in such a way as 
to not involve any mathematical model of explanation (Yin 2006). A scientific 
investigation normally draws a distinction between qualitative and quantitative aspects, 
although some researchers argue that the two go hand-in-hand. To exemplify this, 
Gutting (2004) states that large amounts of qualitative work have usually been the 
prerequisite to fruitful quantification in the physical sciences. 
 
A qualitative approach is defined by Patton (2001: 39) as “a naturalistic way that seeks 
to understand phenomena in context-specific settings”. Winter (2000) defines the 
quantitative approach as attempts to fragment and delimit phenomena into measurable 





Comparing the two approaches, it is found that “qualitative data (thus analysis) is 
normally transient, understood only within context and is associated with an interpretive 
methodology, while quantitative data (thus analysis) is normally precise and can be 
captured at various points in time and in different contexts” (Collis and Hussey, 2009: 
143). In addition, the qualitative approach pays more attention to illumination, 
understanding, and extrapolation in similar situations, while the quantitative approach 
seeks causal determination, predication, and the generalisation of findings (Hoepfl 
1997). In the end, qualitative analysis may result in a different type of knowledge than 
the quantitative inquiry, because “one argues from the underlying philosophical nature, 
enjoying detailed interviewing and the other focuses on the apparent compatibility of 
the research methods” (Glesne and Peshkin 1992: 8).  
 
Interpretivism and qualitative approaches are sometimes used interchangeably while 
positivism and quantitative approaches are often related (Williams, 2000). Although a 
qualitative approach is adopted, the two approaches are not mutually exclusive and can 
be combined sometimes quite naturally. Numerical data have been proven to be 
appropriate, for example in dealing with a growth rate, total output, and production 
share. Having chosen which approach to take up in this study, the research strategies 
associated with the qualitative approach are case studies and interviews which are 
discussed below.  
 
6.3.2 Case Study Approach 
 
A case study can be used to develop both primary and secondary data. According to Yin 
(2004), the distinctive features of a case study are that it attempts to explore 
contemporary phenomenon in real-life situations especially when the boundaries 
between a phenomenon and its context are not obvious. Compared with other methods, 
a case study is one of the advantages of the ability to conduct in-depth research. In 
addition, the case study is one of the best applications mainly because it provides a 
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description or explains how or why it happened (Shavelson 2002). Its main purpose is to 
produce a first-hand description used in the understanding of people and events. Yin 
(2004) defines a case study as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context especially when the boundaries between a 
phenomenon and its context are not clearly defined. Yin (2004) further argues that a 
case study allows an investigation to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of 
real-life events such as individual life cycles, organisational and managerial processes, 
neighbourhood change, international relations, and the maturation of industries. 
 
The case study provides the opportunity to a researcher to study a particular subject in 
depth, such as one organisation or a group of people (Yin 2013). It normally contains 
information/data collection and analysis, which could be both qualitative and 
quantitative in nature. When giving the case study due consideration, data should also 
be collected from different sources for its integrity to be ensured. Due to their renowned 
benefits of simplifying research, case studies have been applauded by critics who have 
focused on the extent to which the method can generate some useful data, and allow 
easy availability to several distinct perspectives (Thomas 2004). The value of the form 
of case studies shows another aspect of triangulation (e.g. using a number of 
circumstances, if possible). According to Rothbauer (2008), triangulation is an effective 
way to enhance a case study’s effectiveness.  
 
There are two main types of designs for case studies which are single case and multiple 
cases (Yin 2009) (see Figure 6.2). Multiple cases offer a robust framework for data 
collection (Remenyi et al, 1998), and are a source of explanatory data to feed 
subsequent generalisations about the how and why of the network explored. These 
multiple case studies are included to increase the explanatory power and generalizability 
of the data collection process (Miles & Huberman 1994). When a multiple case study is 
used it comes with both benefits and difficulties, which is important to take under 
consideration by the researcher. The researcher may however, according to Baxter and 
Jack (2008), keep in mind that it can be an expensive and time-consuming process to 
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implement a multiple case study. The more case studies a study has, the more likely it is 
that it is confident in its representativeness, but the less observation time the researcher 
has had to study each of the cases (Gerring 2004). According to Yin (2003) it is better 
to implement a single case study when the researcher wants to study for example a 
person or a group of people. In addition, the researcher can question old theoretical 
relationships and explore new ones when the single case study is used. As noted by 
Dyer and Wilkins (1991), this depends on the fact that a more careful study is 
implemented. 
 
Figure 6.2: Basic types of designs for case studies (Yin 2009) 
 
6.3.2.1 Comparative approach 
 
In order to facilitate the extraction of data that would most satisfactorily address the 
research questions in this study, the comparative case study approach is adopted here. 
Yin (2004) has described the case study methodology as a distinctive means of 
empirical enquiry particularly suitable for exploring the how and why of contemporary 
phenomena within a real-life context.  
This material has been removed from this thesis due to Third Party Copyright. The unabridged 
version of the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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This methodology, notes Yin (2004), is particularly relevant when the researcher 
believes the context to be highly pertinent to the subject under study, hence the rationale 
for choosing this approach is that it allows for ‘cross-region’ (Hakim 2000) 
comparisons between the disaster response and humanitarian supply chains in China 
and Taiwan (see also Flick 2006; Mangen 2013). Likewise, case study techniques are 
recognised as providing a means to examine a multiplicity of perspectives to illustrate a 
social entity or pattern and to test ideas and processes (Hakim 2000; Ritchie & Lewis 
2006). This research methodology, therefore helps to provide an understanding, and to 
compare the operation of governments and NGOs, practice and policy implementation, 
processes of change, and comparative studies of the two regions (Kennett 2001). 
 
Techniques applied to case study methods have been described by Yin (2004) as 
including the use of multiple sources of information, establishing a chain of evidence, 
pattern matching, explanation building, addressing and explaining variations and 
applying replication logic when using multiple case studies. Consideration in terms of 
case study methods is also given to the need for a transparent, robust and unbiased 
process of data analysis with the accurate presentation of carefully selected and relevant 
information (Hakim, 2000). The development of theoretical propositions prior to a case 
study research process is also recognised as beneficial in guiding the logic of the 
research design, data collection, and analysis techniques (Kennett, 2001; Yin, 2004). In 
this manner, and as discussed below, in this research a comparison of the disaster 
responses and humanitarian supply chains from both the governments and NGOs during 
the Wenchuan Earthquake and Typhoon Morakot in China and Taiwan is undertaken, 
using a theoretical framework and standards informed by a review of the theoretical and 
empirical literature. 
 
A possible weakness of the case study methodology has been identified in terms of 
objectivity and the vulnerability of this method to being shaped by the researcher’s own 
interests and perspectives (Becker and Bryman 2004). To address this concern, it was 
important that this researcher consciously adopted as much of an objective perspective 
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as possible throughout the study. In addition, it was necessary to remain aware of the 
challenges identified by Becker and Bryman (2004), such as for instance, the large 
quantities of data which might be gathered, especially that drawn from interviews with 
informants, the manner in which some of it may be contradictory in nature, and the 
research skills required in overcoming the complexities of accurately analysing, 
determining and capturing unbiased and representative participant views. 
 
6.3.2.2 Rational for choosing the Wenchuan Earthquake and Typhoon Morakot 
 
In this research, the chosen case studies are China’s Wenchuan Earthquake and 
Typhoon Morakot that occurred in Taiwan. The rational for choosing these particular 
sites was mainly due to the characteristics of the Wenchuan Earthquake and Typhoon 
Morakot, the development of their associated disaster management and emergency 
planning, and the development of the resultant humanitarian relief and involvement of 
the NGOs in these disasters. 
 
China is not only a country that is still in its developing stages in terms of its disaster 
management and emergency planning, but also the Chinese government has so far 
barely officially noticed the efforts of NGOs during responses to disasters. In contrast, 
the developments of disaster management and emergency planning and humanitarian 
relief in Taiwan are more developed. In addition, the characteristics of the Wenchuan 
Earthquake and Typhoon Morakot were very similar. Both were historical natural 
disasters huge in scale with many casualties, and were complex which made it difficult 
to carry out relief work in response. Moreover, China and Taiwan have many 
similarities, such as their culture and history.  
 
Therefore, the benefits of this research are to act as an eye opener to the Chinese and 
Taiwanese governments and to inform them that the time has come when these 
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governments should both reinforce and enhance their NGOs’ capabilities to carry out 
more effective disaster responses and humanitarian relief work under a new emergency 
response plan. However, for achieving the objectives of this research, the scope was 
limited to only two NGOs selected to act as appropriate case studies. These were the 
China Red Cross and Tzu Chi which are the most influential NGOs in China and 
Taiwan respectively and both were the biggest contributors and participants during each 
disaster. 
 
6.3.3 Data Collection 
 
During the primary data collection stage, interviews constituted one of the main sources 
of data in this study. The data utilized in any research study can either be primary or 
secondary but this fully depends on the source of the information. However, this 
research used a combination of both primary and secondary data. The secondary 
research was first conducted and then followed up with primary research to fill any gaps 
in the knowledge. The secondary sources used include scholarly analysis of 
humanitarian supply chain management in humanitarian relief work, official reports of 
the Chinese and United Kingdom authorities, international humanitarian organizations, 
and newspaper and online articles. 
 
6.3.3.1 Primary Data  
 
The main reason for preferring the use of primary data is that researchers gain the 
opportunity to collect information for the specific purposes of their study and therefore 
do not have to filter the collected data (Yin 2015). In essence, the questions researchers 
ask are tailored to elicit the data that will help them with their study. Researchers collect 
the data themselves, using surveys, interviews and direct observations. In its basic form, 
primary data constitutes information collected by a researcher directly through such 
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instruments as surveys, interviews, focus groups, or observations. When this is tailored 
to the researcher’s specific needs, primary research data provides the most accurate, 
reliable, and up-to-date type of data (Creswell 2013). 
 
 Semi-structured Interviews 
 
Semi-structured interviews refer to attempts made to collect information from another 
person by asking questions (Wengraf 2001). Although the interview follows 
predetermined questions, the semi-structured interview provides opportunities for 
participants to state what in their opinion they regard as the most important issues 
(Bryman 2007). Many researchers prefer the use of the semi-structured interview 
because the interview questions can be prepared in advance (Shavelson 2002). This 
therefore allows the interviewers to be prepared and appear competent during the 
interview (Cohen 2006). Besides that, semi-structured interviews not only allow 
informants to freely express their views using their preferred terms, but these also 
provide reliable and comparable qualitative data (Tom 2001). 
 
Semi-structured individual interviews were utilized in this study because they have the 
capacity to provide a deeper understanding of the reality of how governments and 
NGOs carry out their disaster response under the instruction of emergency plan. 
Through a face-to-face conversation the researcher sought to find out how and why the 
governments and NGOs manage their supply chains, what procedures are involved, the 
effectiveness and efficiency of their relief measures, and the basic level of humanitarian 
support for the affected population. Subjective views of respondents were used as the 
crucial instrument for interpreting empirical data acquired through secondary sources. 
The protagonists' views on the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian logistics 
under emergency plan and their opinions on the potential ways to improve them, form 
the critical supplement and materials in this study to understand humanitarian supply 
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chain management during the disasters response among different NGOs. For more 
details see the sampling section.  
 
 Interview Questions 
 
Semi-structured interviews were organized based on the following seven main points: 
1. How do you criticise current emergency plan? How does it affect deliver aid 
(positive or negative and why)? 
2. Frame the structure of the existing humanitarian relief aid and humanitarian 
supply management in China/Taiwan; 
3. During the disasters response, how did the humanitarian supply chain system 
operate and why? 
4. How is humanitarian supply management organized? And what part is played by 
the differently with instructions provided by emergency plan? 
5. How can the humanitarian supplies chain become more effective and efficient? 
And how important is it to apply this in humanitarian relief work? 
6. In what ways do the authorities coordinate their efforts at the local and national 
levels? And are they really satisfied by the roles played by different authorities? 
7. What was the biggest challenge or challenges during the time of the disasters? 
Why? And how can these challenges be solved? 
 
The interview questions mainly focus on the existing structure of the disaster responses 
required by the emergency plan, governments, or relevant authorities; how the 
governments and NGOs respond and carry out their relief work separately and together; 
and the gaps between the theoretical and practical levels. Although further relevant 




Despite, the availability of the relevant data and information through secondary data, 
this is not the most reliable and complete source of information. In addition, these 
secondary data were collected for other purposes. Therefore conducting the interviews 
was necessary. By collecting primary data, this allows more accurate, extensive and in-
depth data to be obtained with which to identify and address the research objectives. 
 
Notably, the interview questions excluded sensitive questions linked to the respondents' 
organizational position, their personal views on the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
Chinese authorities' response to the disaster, and other issues associated with moral 
hazards. Each respondent was granted the opportunity to refuse to answer any question 




The interview was one of the main sources of primary data collection in this study, and 
thus the choice of respondents in this study was critical. This needed to meet the 
following two requirements. First, the respondents needed to have the relevant 
knowledge within the scope of research, and secondly, they had to be willing to openly 
discuss issues with the interviewer.  
 
A number of persons were interviewed to meet the objectives of this research. First, 
various humanitarian personnel drawn from the two aforementioned NGOs provided 
useful information that was used in the examination of China’s and Taiwan’s 
emergency planning structure. Secondly, respondents were randomly chosen from 
different government departments as well as the military. These respondents gave 
crucial information on how they managed the humanitarian supply chain during the 
disaster response. Finally, respondents were also drawn from various disaster response 
and recovery teams who disseminate important information used to determine the index 
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of effectiveness and efficiency. All this information was invaluable towards 
understanding the various challenges faced by China’s and Taiwan’s NGOs and 
therefore provided a basis from which to make appropriate recommendations. There 
were two basic yet important requirements for choosing the respondents in this current 
study.  
 
The total population of my potential interviewees are very small, there are less than 20 
people who qualified for this research in China. The sampling population in NGOs are 
bigger than government section, but due to the China Red Cross fraud scandal it was 
hard to get contact with my potential interviewee. The Ministry of Civil Affairs Bureau 
of China was the first to be contacted, and they recommended a possible study 
participant and provided their contact details. In addition, the China Red Cross and the 
Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, were also contacted in order 
to identify any further potential interviewees. Same situation happened in Taiwan as 
well. 
 
Table 6.1: Number of interviewees 
 
Location China Taiwan Total 
Government 3 5 8 
NGOs 2 1 3 
Military 1 0 1 
Total 6 6 12 
 
A total of 12 interviewees were interviewed (see Table 6.1) whose backgrounds were 
drawn from either central/local government and who had previously been involved in 
the humanitarian relief aid and humanitarian supply chain management during either the 
Wenchuan Earthquake or Typhoon Morakot, or who were NGO workers or officers 
who had previously been involved in the humanitarian relief aid and humanitarian 
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supply chain management. Due to the aim and objectives of this research, all the 
participants were required to have the relevant background and be managers at the local 
level. 
 
In China a total of 6 people were interviewed. The first 2 people were interviewed from 
China Red Cross which ranks as the largest NGO in China; 3 were from the government; 
and 1 person from the military. The reason of interviewing them was that the 
government was the leading department during the response and recovery stage. The 
military only played a supporting role. And although no single regulation calls for NGO 
involvement, during the Wenchuan Earthquake, NGOs made great contributions to the 
humanitarian support and relief operations. This shows that the government, military 
and NGOs are the leading response and recovery parties in China during disasters. 
 
On the other hand, in Taiwan, efforts to interview respondents from Red Cross were 
unsuccessful and as a result, Tzu Chi - the biggest NGO in Taiwan - stood out as a 
better alternative. They too were involved in international relief aid, and made 
significant contributions during Typhoon Morakot. Additionally 2 persons from the 
Taiwanese government department were also interviewed. The case study in this 
research involved only 12 interviewees mainly because the selected departments 
constitute the main force during disaster response and recovery. Moreover, 3 people 
were interviewed from the Civil Affairs Bureau which plays an instrumental role in the 
managing and distribution of relief goods. The case studies did not focus on the central 
or senior decision-making level but limited its focus to the actual operators in the field. 
In this respect, all the interviewees were drawn from either the same level or were 
responsible for the same things. For instance, whereas the government interviewees 
were being drawn from the Civil Affairs Bureau which specializes in emergency 
supplies management and distribution, the NGO interviewees were drawn from those 




On the other hand, the most important reason why military interviewees were selected 
for China is that the military is the only government body that is involved in the 
provision of manpower during disaster relief, especially during the rescue phase. This 
means that China’s army is the main source of China’s disaster relief and can therefore 
not be ignored. However, in Taiwan, the army only plays a supporting role. The 
interviewing for the purpose of meeting the objectives of this research was realized 
through face-to-face conversations the time of which were determined through a phone 
call. A total of six core people were interviewed, three people from the government 
sector mainly responsible for relief materials management, two people from NGOs, and 
one from the military. 
 
 Time and Location 
 
Using an appropriate schedule agreed to by the respondents, the researcher conducted 
interviews in both China and Taiwan. In China, the researcher conducted face-to-face 
interviews in different cafes or teahouses chosen by participants and telephone 
interviews. One full interview took approximately 1 to 2 hours. The interviewing 
process in China was conducted in July 2014. However, in Taiwan it was more difficult 
to conduct interviews due to the culture of a formal meeting having to be face-to-face. 
After obtaining informal consent from the study participants, they were provided with 
the formal consent form that contained a basic description of the research topic and its 
purpose, ethical and confidentiality provisions to assure them that their opinions and 
views were not to be used for purposes other than this research. Moreover, the 
respondents had every right to freely terminate their participation in the interview 





6.3.3.2 Secondary Data  
 
Secondary data refers to data that already exists since it has already been collected 
(Saunders et al 2007). The advantages as pointed out by Weathington (2010) of relying 
on secondary data are its ability to save the researcher a lot of financial resources as 
well as time. In other words, using secondary data will always cost the researcher much 
less than collecting primary data. In addition, secondary data usually provides 
permanent and readily available data sources that can be checked relatively easily by 
others in the form of data and research results, which means there is more openness to 
public scrutiny (Brains 2011). 
 
Figure 6.3 below that adopted from Saunders et al (2007), there are three different types 
of secondary data. The first category is made up of documentaries which are made up of 
either written materials and comprise of books, journals, magazines, newspapers, 
websites or non-written materials which include television, radio, pictures, drawings, 
films, DVDs and CD-ROMs. The second type consists of multiple sources which 
comprise of industry statistics and reports, as well as government publications. The final 
type is surveys and is generally made up of government surveys, organisation surveys, 
and academic surveys. To effectively make use of secondary data sources in fulfilling 
the objectives of this research, all the three types were utilized. The researcher made use 
of published journals found freely on online databases, reliable websites, accredited 
news sources as well as books written by renowned authors about humanitarian supply 
chain management. Moreover, the references from articles and books also contained 
sources of data, so the researcher could track these down to the original source. In 
addition, secondary data were collected from industry statistics and reports as well as 







Figure 6.3: Types of secondary data (Saunders et al. 2007) 
 
In terms of collecting secondary data, there are a number of methods. For example, the 
author has read books (e.g. How to write an emergency plan; Introduction of Disaster 
Management; Humanitarian supply chain) and journal articles (e.g. Journal of Disaster 
Management; International Journal of Logistics, International Journal of Emergency 
Management, etc.) on the chosen topics mainly through the Coventry University library 
and its on-line database (e-library). In addition, books and articles (including those from 
the e-library) often contain full references to the sources of data which makes it 
relatively easy to track down the original source. Moreover, there are also quality 
newspapers and official reports (mainly published by the United Nations) which allows 
the author to remain up to date with recent events.  
 
6.3.4 Reliability and Validity 
 
It is very important that an assessment of the validity and reliability of the methods used 
in this research is conducted. According to Thomas (2006), validity and reliability are 
frequently presented together in social research. Cozby (2009) states that reliability 
refers to the constancy of results achieved in research. In order to meet this criterion, 
another researcher should be able to replicate the original research using the same 
subjects and research design under the same conditions (Collis and Hussey 2009). 
This material has been removed from this thesis due to Third Party Copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis 
can be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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On the other hand, both validity and reliability are crucial in ensuring the research 
conducted is effective in achieving its goals. The utilization of the interview, 
documentary survey (including literature and grey literature) to validate the outcomes of 
this research are instrumental in this study. By using a sufficient number of both 
primary and secondary sources of data, validity of this research can be attained. Among 
the accepted definition of reliability is the consistency that a research instrument 
achieves in its role (Bryman 2001). In order to ensure the reliability is increased to 
acceptable levels, the use of random sampling in the selection of interviewees was put 
to practice. Secondly, the fact that only one person conducting the interviews is a good 
enough reason to ensure the reliability of the collected data (Arksey and Knight 1999). 
 
6.3.5 Research Ethics  
 
Ethics are the norms or standards of behaviour that guide the moral choices about our 
behaviour and our relationships with others. The goal of research ethics is to ensure that 
no one is harmed or suffers adverse consequences from any research activities, 
including both the researcher and the research participants. Therefore, the researcher 
needs to receive ethical approval before collecting any data (Gregory 2003). This 
research conforms to the Coventry University research ethics guidelines, which consider 





Figure 6.4: Research Ethics Pentagon (Beech 2014) 
 
With reference to the principle of the rights of the participants, the interview questions 
excluded sensitive questions. The Participants received ‘Interview protocol’ (Appendix 
3) ‘Participant Inform Sheet’ (see Appendix 4) and ‘Consent From’ (see Appendix 5) 
before the interviews started.  
 
With reference to routes, the researcher received ethical approval before collecting any 
data. In the case of respect, the interview participants assented that their views and 
opinions were elicited in an appropriate and non-biased context without changing their 
original meaning. They agreed therefore that their interview responses could be used in 
the current research process. With regard to risk and confidentiality, no real names 
appear in this research, and the research data was personally sealed with the feedback 
separated from other information. Finally, with regard to record keeping, permission 
was granted to conduct and record interviews before getting started. Primary data 
security was guaranteed through the use of password protected computers. Each file 
containing an interviewee’s feedback data was protected by a unique password known 
This material has been removed from this thesis due to Third Party Copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be 
viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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only to the researcher. Upon completion, all the data were destroyed on or before the 1st 




The study is naturally limited as obtaining empirical data associated with natural 
disasters and humanitarian relief meets a number of challenges. Moreover, data linked 
to humanitarian relief management and logistics is often sensitive in terms of national 
security as military personnel and security forces are widely used in the course of 
humanitarian relief operations (Christopher 2000). Therefore, it was very difficult to 
identify any volunteer participants to participate in this study. 
 
The challenges of conducting the interviews were varied. In China, at least 20 emails 
were sent to potential participants but no one replied. In the end, my supervisor helped 
me to connect with the China Red Cross and a few government staff members. These 
participants were contacted in the early part of November 2013, and interviewed at the 
end of March and April 2014. The situation in Taiwan was more difficult. The biggest 
issue was the consideration of the acceptability to undertake an interview. In this case it 
took at least 2 months for the researcher to start interviewing. Due to cultural conflicts, 
the participants in Taiwan preferred face-to-face interviews and to meet in person to 
have a little chat first, all of which prolonged the research process. 
 
Moreover, the primary data collection and analysis procedures were limited by the 
subjective perspectives of the respondents and interpretation difficulties. Seeing 
emergency logistical management through the prism of the main managers is often 
instrumental in understanding the response, but this may impair the objective 
perspective towards the disaster. In this study, this potential discrepancy was overcome 
through the efficient utilization of the theoretical research framework organized around 
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robust methods and approaches for the analysis of secondary data. In summary, these 
research methods have all contributed to a better understanding of the theoretical and 
practical aspects of emergency logistical management in highly complex emergency 
situations.  
 
Nevertheless, the transparency of government information access was very different in 
China and Taiwan. This means that different aspects of this research obtained different 
levels of information. This in turn may have caused reduced accuracy in the 





The research adopted examined positivism and interpretivism in research philosophy 
and conducted qualitative approaches with semi-structured interviews and case studies 
with comparative approach. In addition, explained the strengths and limitations of both 





















China is prone to many natural hazards such as earthquakes, typhoons, floods, and 
droughts (Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs 2008). Such disasters have created a 
significant challenge and factors that have impacted on economic and social 
development (Helbing and Kühnert, 2006). In addition, natural disasters have posed a 
significant threat to China’s national security and social stability. Amongst these natural 
disasters, the one regularly occurring in China and which has had a great impact over 
recent years has been earthquakes (Chang 2000). 
 
One recent and devastating example was the Wenchuan earthquake that struck the 
Southwest Sichuan province of China on May 12th, 2008. This earthquake led to the 
destruction of buildings, schools, infrastructure, etc. The number of people who died 
was 69,227, with 374,643 injured, and 17,923 missing (Chinese Ministry of Civil 
Affairs 2008). Amongst the dead were 5,300 children; most whom were students. In 
addition, economic losses were huge, at approximately 3% of China's 2008 GDP, the 
value was 845.14 billion Yuan equal to £97 billion British Pounds. Most of these 
economic losses due to buildings, of which 27.4% was residential, 21.9%, infrastructure, 
and 20.4% non-residential space (Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs 2008). Furthermore, 
with approximately 15 million people living in the affected area, the disaster left 
approximately 4.5 million people homeless (Hooker 2008), although this number may 
have reached 10 million (Malcolm 2009). These all made it the deadliest earthquake to 




A disaster of such a magnitude affecting such a large-scale area calls for the government 
and other agencies to be adequately prepared in terms of emergency response in order, 
to help protect and possibly save the lives of millions of people. Effective emergency 
response preparedness should including forecasting emergencies and planning for such 
emergencies way in advance (Maxwell, Daniel and Watkins 2003). Disaster 
Preparedness ensures that a response will be faster, more efficient, and will achieve the 
objective of saving lives. In light of the above, the primary objectives of this chapter are 
as follows: 
 
 Use the Wenchuan earthquake in China as a case study to examine the 
effectiveness of the emergency humanitarian response by the Chinese 
Government and NGOs during the Wenchuan Earthquake. 
 Investigate the challenges encountered by the Chinese government and NGOs in 
executing the disaster response and provide recommendations in response to 
these findings. 
 
7.1.1 Brief Background of Wenchuan Earthquake 
 
The epicentre of the earthquake was in Wenchuan County, 92 km northwest of Sichuan 
(Di et al 2010). The map below (Figure 7.1) shows the epicentre and how the 
earthquake spread to the neighbouring provinces. It can be seen that the earthquake 
covered a large-scale area and location that felt the impact were in the areas from 




Figure 7.1: The epicentre of the Wenchuan Earthquake and the affected neighbouring areas (Maps-of-
China 2008) 
 
The earthquake spread and covered a large-scale area including 44 counties. There were 
secondary hazards that occurred as a result of the primary effects (Benedikter et al. 
2013). For example, the earthquake resulted in lakes being blocked leading to a threat to 
millions of people due to flooding, moreover, aftershocks and the risks of landslides 
were also very high (Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs 2008). There were 33,000 
aftershocks in the central area up to 21st October. Over 600 of this aftershocks 
measured 4.0 and above on the Richter scale, 60 aftershocks measured up to 5.0, and 7 
that measured 6.0 to 6.9. The Figure 7.2 below shows the areas that experienced 
aftershocks. 
 
Figure 7.2: Map Showing areas that Experienced Main Aftershocks after Wenchuan Earthquake (Chinese 
Ministry of Civil Affairs Report 2008) 
 
This material has been removed from this thesis due to Third Party Copyright. The unabridged 
version of the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
This material has been removed from this thesis due to Third Party Copyright. The unabridged 
version of the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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The earthquake posed a tremendous challenge to the government as some of the major 
infrastructure was damaged, including the railway, roads, and communication 
(Benedikter et al., 2013). These posed a great challenge to humanitarian relief 
distribution, as accessing the affected areas became almost impossible. 
 
7.2 National Emergency Plan in China 
 
7.2.1 Classification of Emergency Response in China 
 
The main objectives of emergency response in China are to aid in decision-making, and 
offer guidance and protection to the rescue operators (Chinese National Emergency Plan 
2012). The Chinese government recognised the importance of disaster reduction by 
preparing an efficient emergency response (China National Emergency Plan 2012).  
 
The emergency response system in China covers the disaster reduction phases described 
below (National Emergency Plan 2012):  
 
Natural disaster readiness involving risk evaluation, institutional and practical 
arrangements for emergency response, mitigation, observation, and early warning; 
 
 Field responses for the aid team, mitigation and rescue actions, with the 
participation of the whole of society, civilians, and military; 
 Disaster recovery and rebuilding outlined in advance action plans, prior, during, 





The government has exerted unified control by identifying different headquarters that 
are responsible for various constituents of the relief work depending on the level of and 
classifications of the earthquake. These headquarters are the State Council, the 
provincial relief headquarters, the city relief headquarters, and the county disaster relief 
headquarters (Chinese National Emergency Plan 2012). Different leading 
departments/headquarters are assigned to coordinate the command and control systems 
to respond to the disasters. 
 
Four levels of emergencies are classified according to their death toll and economic 
impact (Xu et al. 2009). For example, for the significant, major, large, and general 
levels and the emergency response is categorized as grade I, II, III, and IV. The table 
below (Table 13) summarises the classifications and the emergency response according 
to China National Emergency Plan.  
 
Table 7.1: Classifications and Levels as per the China National Emergency Plan (Chinese Emergency 
Plan 2012) 
 




































































Figure 7.3: Disaster and emergency identification and reporting process (Chinese Emergency Plan 2012) 
 
After the classification of emergencies, this is followed by the disaster and emergency 
identification and reporting process, illustrated in Figure 7.3 above. In addition, Figure 
7.4 below shows how during the Wenchuan earthquake, the Chinese government 
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economic losses (CCTV 2008). The Chinese National Seismological Bureau reported 
that the Wenchuan Earthquake was Richter 7.8, which the Sichuan Provincial 
Seismological Bureau subsequently revised to 8, reporting at the national level, based 
on instant information collected by the first rescue team (Peng 2007). 
Figure 7.4: Initial response actions about disaster classification and reporting (CCTV 2008) 
 
 
7.2.2 Roles and Responsibilities of a Leading Department 
 
The response to Wenchuan earthquake by the Chinese government was based on a 
system linking central and local government departments, the State Council, and 
provincial relief headquarters.  
 
7.2.2.1 National Earthquake Relief Headquarters for Level 1 Responses 
 
Led by the State Council, the responsibilities of the National Earthquake relief 
headquarters include taking the lead, coordination, and providing direction during level 
1 earthquake emergencies (Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs 2008). The Vice Premier 
Wen Jiabao was the director of the Chinese Earthquake Administration, the Secretary of 
the State Council, and leader of National Reform Commission and Ministry of Civil 
This material has been removed from this thesis due to Third Party Copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis 
can be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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Affairs (Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs 2008). Members are from different 
government ministries, armed police, committees, and bureaus. Its principal mandate is 
to ensure there is proper cooperation and coordination for a government response to 
natural disasters. 
 
7.2.2.2 Local Earthquake Relief Headquarters for a Level 2-4 Response 
 
The local earthquake relief headquarters is based in the local government and is 
responsible for the unified leadership, direction and coordination of the relief work at 
the local level of administrative areas (Ministry of Civil Affair Report 2008). It works in 
close coordination with the national earthquake relief headquarters, and its main role is 
to coordinate relief work at the local level by mobilizing the government and 
community rescue efforts. 
 
In fact, the local headquarters carries more responsibilities with 3 levels than the 
national headquarters which just has one. This indicates that the local level is more 
partition orientated while the national is more control, command, and coordination 
orientated.  
 
7.3 Chinese Government Emergency Response during the Wenchuan Earthquake 
 
The timeline of the Chinese government response activities in the first few days of the 
Wenchuan earthquake are a key focus of this thesis and are described in Appendix 6. It 
is important to consider how the Chinese government conducts its emergency response 




7.3.1 Central Government response to the Wenchuan Earthquake 
 
Wenchuan earthquake was classified as a significant earthquake (Wu, Li and Xie 2012) 
and hence the State Council was responsible for leading, coordinating and 
implementing collective actions for the emergency response. The head of the State 
Council is the Vice Premier, and the Vice Heads are the Director General of the Chinese 
Earthquake Administration, and other members are the leaders from different 
government departments (Chinese National Emergency Plan 2012). 
 
When the Wenchuan earthquake struck, Sichuan Province reported this information to 
the State Council and implemented the disaster response. A few hours later, the 
National Seismological Bureau revised the level of response and the State Council 
immediately established a command headquarters for response and relief. The Vice 
Premier headed the Headquarters. Later, the Premier flew to the affected area with top 
officials from the relevant government departments. In addition, the Premier and 
government officials flew to Dujiangyan one of the most affected areas to guide and 
coordinate the emergency response operations. Under the joint guidance of the 
headquarters, different government departments of the State Council attended to their 
own duties as part of the disaster relief (Peng 2008). The State Council worked closely 
with the local governments in disaster-affected counties, such as Sichuan Province, 
Dujiangyan City, and Beichuan County (Liu 2008). The presence of the senior officials 
indicated the scale of the government attention and the coordination in the relief and 
recovery (CCTV 2008). The immediate establishment of the relevant protocols to 
respond to the Wenchuan earthquake disaster relief demonstrated the commitment of 
the State Council in responding to national disasters (Xinhua News 2008). However, 
despite the dedicated efforts of the ministries and agencies under the coordination of the 





The efficiency of the work by the State Council in coordination with the local 
government was not up to standard resulting in administrative delays. There was a lack 
of coordination between the State Council and ministries and agencies due to a lack of 
preparedness, practice, and pre-event risk reduction activities (Chung 2013), and these 
amplified problems that became much bigger than they might have been. The scale of 
the disaster was huge, putting severe pressure on the emergency headquarters at the 
national and local levels. 
 
The Central Government responded by performing the following specific functions as 
described by a report prepared by the Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs (2008 and 
2009): 
 
Chinese Central government responses to the Wenchuan earthquake (General Office of 
the State Council 2008): 
 Supreme command system was established: An earthquake disaster relief groups 
was established; 
  Army mobilization and rescue forces: A rescue force consisting of the army and 
fire-fighters was mobilized by the armed forces; 
 Emergency Fund: RMB 27.482 billion for disaster relief was allocated 
 Internal appeal for disaster relief: This was conducted through government 
administrative channels; 
 International emergency rescue aid was requested: Four emergency rescue teams 
came from neighbouring countries and undertook emergency rescue activities; 
In fact, Chinese government rejected all international aid at the beginning but 
accepted some donations from a few countries after 2 days; 
 Building temporary shelters: To help in providing shelter to the millions of 
people who had become homeless; 
 Provision of a three-month temporary living subsidy: The subsidy was given to 
the affected people; 
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 Regulations in dealing with the dead: a timely regulation on dead body disposal 
was implemented; 
 Mobilizing hospitals: 375 hospitals were mobilized for the injured; 
 Post-disaster reconstruction efforts: a disaster recovery and reconstruction plan 
was established for the post-Wenchuan earthquake period; 
 
7.3.1.1 Evaluation of the Central Government response 
 
The central government organized a strong management network for the delivery of 
rapid disaster response and relief (Luis et al. 2012). Immediately after the Wenchuan 
earthquake, the Chinese central government began high-level response actions as 
stipulated by the Emergency response plan for earthquake disasters. Within the first few 
hours of the response, the central government, under the leadership of the Premier 
established nine working groups (Xinhua News 2008; Xinhuanet 2008; Sina 2008; 
News163; GOV 2008; CCTV 2009). These were: the Rescue Group; Living People 
Group; Seismic Monitoring Group; Epidemic Prevention Group; Advocacy Group; 
Production Recovery Group; Infrastructure Protection and Reconstruction Group; Water 
Conservancy Group; and Social Security Group.  
 
The initial government response activities were followed by the National Emergency 
Response Plan, with these national level activities achieving more than expected, such 
as establishing the Production Recovery Group and the Infrastructure Protection and 
Reconstruction Group during the response stage. These indicated that the response stage 
had overlapped with the recovery stage and was well managed. 
 
The working groups were useful as these conducted rescue operations through the key 
roles played by the Chinese armed forces, the police, and the rescue teams (General 
Office of the State Council 2008). The Central government deployed more than 113,000 
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soldiers, 15 medical treatment centres, while epidemic psychological intervention teams 
were deployed from the rescue groups (Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs 2008). More 
than 78,000 tons of rescue and humanitarian materials were shipped and immediately 
supplied to the earthquake victims (General Office of the State Council 2008). The 
coordination efforts of the national emergency relief headquarters through the central 
government pulled 21,560 people from the debris, some of whom were still alive (China 
Ministry of Civil Affairs 2008). The medical centres treated more than 34,051 injured 
persons and managed to relocate 205,370 residents, with 557 kilometres of roads being 
restored over a very short period (Ministry of Civil Affairs 2008). The above 
achievements by the Central government demonstrate the implementation of the strong 
administrative network during the disaster management. This management was 
dedicated to delivering flawless and effective response and relief. 
 
However, despite the achievements by the central government, some issues led the 
response to fall below standards (Shieh and Deng 2011). Firstly, the lack of sufficient 
professional rescue teams led to a failure in offering adequate medical and 
psychological support to the victims (Shieh and Deng 2011), and the Central 
government demonstrated a lack of disaster preparedness and practice (Interviewee 
No.8). 
 
“There were not enough professional rescuers offering humanitarian aid to 
the thousands of injured victims, and the lack of professional teams led to 
an increased number of deaths. These contributed to the injured victims 
having to help themselves.” 
(Interviewee No.8 2014) 
 
Secondly, there were insufficient stockpiles of materials for disaster humanitarian aid 
kept by the Central Government (Shieh and Deng 2011). The national and local 
warehouses were not able to meet the demands of the disaster due to the vast number of 
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people affected. Also, the locations of the warehouses were not appropriate to ensure 
the timely distribution of humanitarian materials. 
 
 “The mountainous areas where the earthquake had struck lacked a road 
network and the government had constructed warehouses for emergency 
relief supplies nowhere near….” 
(Interviewee No. 7 2014) 
 
Thirdly, the national government was reluctant to accept assistance from the 
international community including UN agencies. 
 
“The Chinese government was reluctant to invite the international 
community in good time.” 
(Interviewee No.8 2014) 
 
This contributed to reduced participation by the international community which had a 
major impact on the disaster humanitarian response and relief. If the Chinese 
government could have invited the international community more promptly, more 
people could have been saved. 
 
7.3.2 Local government response 
 
Under the leadership and coordination of the Central Government, the local government 
of the three provinces (Sichuan, Gansu and Shaanxi) responded faster and effectively 




The responses of Sichuan Provincial government included undertaking the following 
tasks (Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs 2008): 
 
 Establish an earthquake headquarters: A centre was established at the local 
level that could coordinate with the national emergency centre. 
 
 Mobilisation of the rescue team: Mobilised armed forces through coordination 
at the national Level, where local people and medical teams undertook 
immediate rescue efforts. 
 
 Mobilizing emergency relief supplies: Mobilizing and delivering emergency 
relief supplies to the affected areas 
 
 Repairing damaged infrastructure: Such as roads, bridges, 
telecommunications and electricity power lines 
 
 Evacuations and relocation of affected people: survivors and the affected 
people were evacuated to safe places 
 
 Security Patrols: security was strengthened through patrols 
 
 Provision of subsidies to farmers: To encourage them to build their own 
temporary houses 
 
There were two headquarters during the Wenchuan Earthquake, these are considered in 
more detail in Section 7.3.3. 
 
7.3.2.1 Evaluation of the Local Government Response 
 




“The local government of Sichuan province managed to provide farmers 
with temporary shelters. They provided the farmers with a subsidy 
amounting to 2,000 RMB per household to build temporary shelters.’’ 
(Interviewee No.10 2014) 
 
The local government of Sichuan managed to organize the central government officials, 
NGOs, the military, and local people in undertaking the immediate rescue efforts. These 
emergency delivered humanitarian supplies and managed to build temporary shelters for 
the affected people (Interviewee No. 10). The local government was also useful in 
repairing the damaged infrastructure, for example roads, bridges, electricity and 
telecommunications at the county level. Another role executed by the local government 
was to conduct monitoring and provided the central government with relevant 
information about secondary hazards such as aftershocks and landslides. These enabled 
the central government to have up to date information on events at the county and 
provincial levels. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the local government were responsible for three levels of response 
indicating that the local level was the mean partition level during the response. The 
local government carried out their relief following the response plan, and by providing 
national level support to the local level to coordinate with relevant departments, such as 
the armed forces. However, during the Wenchuan Earthquake, the national level played 
the role of control and command, and coordination (National Emergency Plan 2012). 
The local level reported all the ongoing activities to the national level, and if there 
needed to be any changes then the local level will follow national level instructions 
(People 2008). 
 
The local government also strengthened security by ensuring that patrols at the local 
level were effectively coordinated. These enabled the affected people in the outdoor 





“The security was heightened as more security personnel patrolled the 
affected areas. Even during the night when they would guard the camps and 
monitor the progress of the rescue operations.” 
(Interviewee No.9 2014) 
 
Despite the tremendous achievements, there were a number of issues that led to an 
inefficient response by the local government. 
 
There were inevitable delays in the deployment of the rescue teams to the affected areas. 
This was caused by the damaged roads and infrastructures which resulted in access to 
the affected areas being almost impossible (Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs 2008). For 
this reason, the response within the first 72 ‘golden hours’ was inefficient (China 
Translation Corporation 2008). 
 
Apart from the damage to the roads by the earthquake, the local government had not 
invested well in the road networks covering the mountainous areas making the rescue 
efforts extremely hard. As described by Interviewee No.8 “There were no road 
networks in the mountainous areas of Sichuan Province…" 
 
7.3.3 Evaluation of national and local level Earthquake Relief Headquarters 
during the Wenchuan earthquake 
 
According to the emergency plan, a lead headquarters should be established after a 
disaster takes place. What is notable is that during the Wenchuan earthquake, due to the 
scale of the disaster, it was necessary to set up two headquarters, and so the National 




The government in response to Wenchuan earthquake established two relief 
headquarters at the national and local levels (Sina 2008). The rationale for having two 
command levels was to ensure collaborative humanitarian efforts between the local and 
national governments, NGOs, and other private sectors (CPCNEWS 2008). The national 
emergency relief headquarters took the lead in terms of emergency coordination, and 
relief; while the local government organized response and rescue teams, and reported to 
the national headquarters. The dedicated rescue teams from the national and local 
agencies played vital roles in responding to the earthquake. 
 
The two levels of earthquake relief headquarters had a number of achievements (China 
Ministry of Civil Affairs 2008): 
 
Firstly, the two levels of relief headquarters managed to form an efficient command 
system that managed to mobilize resources and rescue teams both at the national and at 
the local government levels (China Ministry of Civil Affairs 2008). The rescue team 
mobilized by the emergency centre included militia, local people, and medical teams. 
And the rescue team conducted delivery of the emergency supplies to the affected areas 
immediately. 
 
Secondly, the emergency relief headquarters achieved the mobilization of the donations 
of funds and relief supplies from the international community and internal well-wishers 
(China Ministry of Civil Affairs 2008). These mobilized resources were then channelled 
to the affected areas. 
 
Thirdly, the two emergency headquarters collected and assembled information on the 
rescue operations. Such information was then disseminated to the media. The general 
public was up to date with what was happening and responded by giving donations and 
making contributions to the disaster relief efforts. 
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Fourthly, the two levels of emergency headquarters managed to coordinate the rescue 
operations, evacuations, and relocation of affected people. In addition, camps and 
temporary shelters were built for the thousands who were homeless. 
 
Fifthly, the emergency headquarters achieved success in appealing for international 
emergency rescue aid. The international community and international NGOs intervened 
and assisted China by contributing to the humanitarian response (Chinese Ministry of 
Civil Affairs, 2008) 
 
However, despite the dedicated efforts by the two levels of emergency centres there 
were issues that meant that the response was delayed. The main objective of these 
centres was to act as command centres to provide a faster and efficient disaster 
humanitarian response. However, despite their best-dedicated efforts, the working 
productivity of the government officials involved, the rescue teams, and agencies was 
undoubtedly less than expected due to the lack of preparedness and practice. 
 
The earthquake affected many people as it had covered a large-scale area of 44 counties 
(China Ministry of Civil Affairs 2008). The two centres were overwhelmed by the 
situation and it would have been wise if the Government had established more 
emergency centres to handle the humanitarian response needed. 
 
The rescue officials were overwhelmed by the divergent humanitarian needs as victims 
from different counties needed different resources. The rescue team delivered supplies 
disregarding the specific needs of the various areas. These actions clearly demonstrated 




7.3.4 Government Humanitarian Supply Chain during the Wenchuan Earthquake 
 
The location of the Epicentre led to great challenges in implementing the humanitarian 
emergency supply and logistics in the collection, transportation, and distribution from 
the warehouse and emergency centre (Zhang et al n.d.). Figure 7.5 below illustrates the 
basic five elements of the humanitarian supply chain. 
            
Figure 7.5: Basic humanitarian supply chain 
 
Theoretically, in the response to the Wenchuan Earthquake, evidence has shown that the 
Chinese Government failed in the humanitarian supply (Moor 2013). Although the 
military helped to dispatch relief goods, the needs of the affected population were not 
considered. 
 
“The government adopted a humanitarian supply approach that was not on 
a need basis; rather it was based on the imaginations of the rescue staff. 
Supplies of clothing were not implemented adequately.” 










Secondly, the capacity of the warehouses was questionable. As the size of the affected 
population was so huge, the stockpiles in the warehouses very quickly ran out. This 
illustrated that the formula for how much stock should be stored needed to be re-
calculated during an emergency planning period. In any case, the Chinese government 
found it necessary to invite donations both nationally and internationally to help with 
the relief supplies. In total, the international community gave approximately RMB 4.05 
billion and RMB0.93 billion in cash and relief materials respectively (Chinese Ministry 
of Civil Affairs 2008). 
 
This investigation demonstrates that the government failed almost totally in terms of 
humanitarian supply. First, the Chinese military played a vital role in the delivery of 
humanitarian supplies through airdropping. More than 100 military helicopters ferried 
humanitarian materials (Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs 2008). The source of the 
materials was initially acquired from the emergency stockpiles held in the emergency 
warehouses. Humanitarian supplies were not based on a need basis.  
 
The lack records regarding donations meant that these either became redundant or too 
few relief goods became available. In particular, medical resources and clothing were 
inadequate in many areas. According to information from the interviews (interviewee 
No. 9 below), the government gave an open call for assistance with humanitarian 
supplies. However, the government failed to specify which items were needed leading 
to the duplication of donations. Certain supplies such as medical equipment and 
clothing were inadequately provided. 
“The Chinese Government launched an appeal both internally and 
internationally for humanitarian donations. The Government failed to 
specify the supplies needed and thus people generously contributed based 
on their imagination. Most of the supplies donated were food and water, but 
the needs for medical equipment and clothing were not adequately met.” 
(Interviewee No.9 2014) 
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Finally, the government engaged in the urgent procurement of supplies to meet the 
needs of the affected people. However, the Government procurement team was 
pressured by the divergent humanitarian needs as the earthquake had affected many 
people over a large area. This pressure resulted in the Government procurement team 
adopting a procurement and supply approach, disregarding the actual demands, leading 
to over purchasing or purchasing at above market prices. These unnecessary purchasing 
protocols by the Chinese government led to serious delays in the delivery of urgent 
humanitarian supplies after the Wenchuan earthquake (Miao et al. 2013). For example, 
the delivery of medical supplies took a long time as the staff involved in procurement 
were unfamiliar with such supplies. 
 
7.3.5 Evaluation of the Government Response to the Humanitarian Supply during 
the Wenchuan Earthquake 
 
The humanitarian materials supplied to the affected areas were not supplied on a needs 
basis. This created a mismatch between what the affected people wanted and the actual 
deliveries made. An efficient response to humanitarian supply is supposed to take into 
consideration the needs of the affected people. Despite the magnitude of the earthquake, 
the Government rescue team should have obtained information about the needs of the 
people before providing actual supplies. The earthquake covered a vast area affecting 44 
districts (Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs 2008). Therefore, people from different 
areas required different humanitarian needs. However, the failure to obtain such 
information about these humanitarian needs resulted in a mismatch between what was 
supplied and the actual demands. As described in the interviews: 
 
“…Most of the supplies donated were food and water, the demands for 
medical equipment and clothing were not adequately met.” 




The unnecessary purchasing protocols implemented by the Chinese Government led to 
serious delays in the delivery of urgent humanitarian supplies (Miao et al. 2013). For 
example, the delivery of medical supplies took a long time as the staff involved in 
procurement were unfamiliar with such supplies, thus demonstrating a lack of skills 
amongst the staff in the departments that handle procurement in the Chinese 
Government. These issues contributed to delays in providing the essential medical 
supplies that were vital to the survival of the victims. 
 
Fourthly, the warehouses where the emergency goods were stocked were overwhelmed 
by the large-scale and divergent demands of the affected people (Li n.d.). The 
humanitarian supplies ran out, leading the Chinese Government to launch an appeal for 
donations. These contributed to the delay in providing the humanitarian supplies and 
indicated that China was not adequately prepared to handle a disaster of this magnitude 
 
 
7.4 NGOs in China 
 
7.4.1 China Red Cross 
 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have become increasingly important. Under 
the influence of globalization and increasingly serious global problems which have 
established inseparable connections that individual countries or the government cannot 
solve, it is necessary for international collaborations to handle these issues. NGOs with 
their rich experience and technology play a very important role in offering 





In China, NGOs started appearing after 1948 which was much later than in western 
counties. However, this emergence of NGOs also corresponded with the global trend. 
NGOs in China developed over four distinct phases: 1949—1966 - Initial phase: several 
social groups established, such as the National Youth Union; 1966—1978 - the Lag 
phase; 1978—1995 -Developing Phase; and 1995 until now: the rapid development 
phase (Zhao 2003). 
 
The economic Reforms in the Chinese State and society as a whole have contributed to 
the development of government NGOs in China (Yang 2005), and these reforms have 
led to the State appreciating these NGOs and their activities. The government has 
sponsored the creation of government NGOs (Deng 2001) and has offloaded some the 
functions of government services provision onto these NGOs. The Chinese Government 
hopes that NGOs will develop in the social development sphere and mobilize resources 
supplementing its spending (Yang 2005). However, the development of overseas NGOs 
in China has taken a much slower pace over the years due to factors such as policies and 
restrictive regulations. These have hindered oversees NGOs from developing and 
performing their functions properly in China. Examples of such policies include the 
detailed registration process and regulations on finances which affect their performance. 
 
7.4.1.1 Registration of NGOs in China 
 
Despite the policies and restrictive legal conditions introduced and implemented by the 
Chinese government against NGOs, new NGOs continue to be registered in China 
(Edele 2009). However, most NGOs in China are established by influential people in 
Chinese society who have connections with the Government, although registering an 
NGO in China with the Ministry of Civil Affairs is not easy, even for influential people 
(Saich 2000). For an NGO to get government subsidies from the Chinese Government, 
it has to be sponsored by the government or party department (Whiting 2011). This 
complicates the situation even for influential people, because it is almost impossible to 
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get Sponsorship from the Government or a party department. Moreover, the government 
pays the employees of government NGOs (GONGOs). 
 
To register an NGO in China is a daunting process. The NGO has to abide by the Social 
Organizations registrations and Administration Act (25
th
 September 1998) (State 
Council 1998). The aim of this Act is to guarantee the citizens' freedom of association, 
safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of social groups, strengthen the registration 
and management of social organizations, promote the construction of socialist material 
civilization, and spiritual civilization. These regulations are applied in the form of a 




 The NGO must have a regular business location with full-time employees 
 Capital of more than 30,000 RMB 
 Apart from the Civil Affairs office, there must be another three to four 
government departments that supervise the NGO 
 There must be documents with an official stamp as a sign of approval from all 
the government agencies that act as supervising offices. 
 
The process of registering NGOs in China is subject to the above procedures and 
conditions. The government has to put in place strict and complicated procedures of 
registration. These stringent standards contribute to the increased number of illegal 




7.4.1.2 China’s largest NGO - China Red Cross 
 
The China Red Cross is one of the largest NGOs in China and is directly led by the 
State Council. It was established in 1904 to conduct humanitarian and social relief 
services. Since its establishment, it is on the front line in conducting internal and 
international relief activities (Red Cross Society China n.d.). In 1993, the National 
People’s Congress officially promulgated the Red Cross law that offered a legal shield 
to the organization and its operations (Cagney and Ross 2013). Moreover, the Chinese 
Government has supported China Red Cross through sponsorship and funding, the main 
reason being so that the government can offload some functions to GONGOs. The 
Chinese government has the hope that GONGOs will develop in the social development 
sphere and mobilize their resources thus supplementing its spending (Yang 2005).  
 
The China Red Cross is in the category of GONGOs. Although the Red Cross directs its 
reports to the State Council, the diversity of its roles/tasks has also encouraged the 
organisation of activities with officials in other departments, such as the health 
department. For several years, the organization has been an actual government agency 
operating as a branch of the Chinese Ministry of Health. It is one of the GONGOs that 
has been allowed by the Chinese government to mobilize contributions from Chinese 
citizens (Ashley and He 2008). The organization has the advantage in that it obtains 
support from the Government. 
 
“The Red Cross is able to collect adequate funds from the government 
compared to other local NGOs. Firstly, the central government donations 
are supposed to be channelled to the China Red Cross. Secondly, there is a 
policy directing central government enterprises and private enterprises to 
donate directly to the China Red Cross. Thirdly, it’s the only organization 




(Interviewee No.11 2014) 
 
7.4.2 Response by Chinese NGOs during the Wenchuan Earthquakes 
 
After the Wenchuan earthquake, the China Red Cross took actions which are analysed 
here according to the finance/budgeting allocation and the delivery of humanitarian 
supplies. 
 
In response to the Wenchuan earthquake, the citizens of China contributed 
generously, and they channelled their resources and funds to the China Red Cross. 
According to Interviewee No. 11, the organization disbursed funds to local NGOs for 




“Despite a lack of transparency by the China Red Cross, there were still 
billions of Yuan donated by Citizens to the China Red Cross, although some 
of funds were not accounted for.” 
(Interviewee No. 12 2014) 
 
“However, the billions of Yuan mobilized to facilitate response to Wenchuan 
earthquake was not properly accounted for, a fact that made many citizens lose 
trust in the Red Cross.” 
(Interviewee No.12 2014) 
 
Immediately after the Wenchuan earthquake, the China Red Cross launched an 
emergency disaster response plan to execute its rescue operations and the delivery of 
humanitarian supplies (Kien 2012). The Red Cross Society of China headquarters in 
158 
 
coordination with the Sichuan branch and other branches started to administer 
humanitarian aid by sending a rescue team to these areas. In addition, its Doctors 
without Borders team were dispatched to all the affected areas to treat the thousands of 
injured people (Kien 2012). 
 
China Red Cross mobilized funds from the donations of Chinese citizens. The funds 
enabled the organization to conduct relief operations and provide funding to other 
grassroots NGOs (Interviewee No.12 above). The China Red Cross funded grassroots 
NGOs like Global Village to facilitate post reconstruction activities such as building 
houses for communities in the villages. 
 
However, the citizens of China expected more from the organization in terms of 
properly managing the donated funds. According to Interviewee No. 11, there was a 
lack of transparency and accountability in terms of the billions of Yuan that the 
organization received in the form of donations. Citizens lost trust in the organization 
due to its poor management of public funds after the Wenchuan earthquake. 
 
“The public were angry and raised queries over the management of the 
billions of Yuan donated to the China Red Cross. Subsequently, people 
preferred to donate to other charity organizations due to this lack of trust." 
 
(Interviewee No. 12 2014) 
 
In addition, professional rescue staff from the China Red Cross conducted brief training 
to community volunteers. Such training was important in responding to the large scale 




“China Red Cross officials from all the branches in the Country conducted 
rescue operations, and the professional rescuers conducted brief training 
for the volunteers.” 
(Interviewee No. 12 2014) 
 
It can therefore be reasonably concluded based on the information obtained from the 
interviews that the response to the Wenchuan earthquake by the China Red Cross was 
not efficient. The funds collected were misappropriated, and the management did not 
respect the will of the citizens who generously donated to the organization. 
 
7.4.2.1 Alliance of Local NGOs during the Wenchuan Earthquake 
 
NGOs in China do not execute their day-to-day operations in joint alliances. However, 
immediately after the Wenchuan earthquake, grassroots NGOs formed alliances to 
provide humanitarian aid and disaster recovery. This was called the ‘5.12 Alliance’ and 
was established in Chengdu City of Sichuan Province. The alliance managed to raise 
and transport relief materials, provide urgent training to volunteers and conduct post 
psychological support (Wang n.d.). The alliance of these NGOs assisted the 
Government in disseminating information to websites, blogs, and information hubs, and 
their members came out in large numbers to conduct fund raising and blood drives 
(Roney 2011). The main agenda of the alliances was to facilitate mobilization and the 
delivery of relief materials, and recruiting and conducting training to volunteers as 
individual NGOs did not have the capacity. 
 
However, the alliances did not last more than four years after the earthquake (Hu 2013). 
Factors such as political pressure from the government, funding shortages, and poor 
leadership contributed to the failure of the alliances. Mostly the alliances were 
terminated as a result of the restrictive NGO regulation regime in China that limited 
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their capacity and continuity. In any case in 2016 the Chinese Government issued a new 
regulation to include NGOs in any disaster management. 
 
The China Red Cross response was immediate, noticeable and unique, and it comprised 
of a diverse gathering and collection of many organizations in China (Yang et al. 2016). 
It gave a uniting platform whereby local NGOs, international NGOs, private enterprises, 
and volunteers merged (Chen and David 2011). The NGOs’ response was efficient and 
demonstrated that there is an increasingly refined and professional NGO sector in 
China. The following dimensions described below, illustrate that the response by NGOs 
was positive, unique, and noticeable.  
 
 Partnerships and Networking  
 
A vital dimension of the response demonstrated by NGOs was that NGOs engaged with 
local governments, the private sector, and volunteers effectively, and such a partnership 
was important in boosting the capacity and legitimacy NGOs which had been 
previously lacking (Brenner and Joshua 2010). This enabled the NGOs and all other 
government organizations to penetrate the earthquake zones to give relief support. 
Indeed, the alliance made the relief and emergency response achievable. In addition, 
another vital dimension of the response provided by NGOs was that they formed an 
earthquake relief-coordinating centre. This provided an avenue to coordinate all the 
efforts and make the response a success. 
 
“Grassroots NGO formed the 5.12 Alliance and agreed to establish an 
emergency response centre. The centre mobilized resources and acted as a 
central point where they met and obtained briefings on the rescue 
operations.” 




The primary objective of the partnership networking was to secure the required 
materials and channelling it to the earthquake regions. The partnerships and networking 
brought the operations of the NGOs to the same level as the government due to 
combined synergy. 
 
 Provision of Real-time information 
 
NGOs posted information on their websites about the rescue operations for the 
thousands of affected victims. The emergency centre established by the alliance acted as 
an information centre where updates on progress could be provided. Such information 
was then posted on the NGOs websites and many people from all over the world 
subsequently relied on this real time information. 
 
This information dissemination was effective compared to that provided by the 
government which was not real-time due to the damage to the communications 
infrastructure. 
 
“The media was affected since damage to the communications 
infrastructure resulted in the delay to Government information updates. The 
majority of people from all over the world relied on information posted on 
NGO websites, and donations were made based on such information. NGO 
employees from all parts of the country could easily receive this information 
compared to information from the government, because they did not need to 
follow any report procedures and it was easier to reach the NGOs 
employees to provide the information." 
(Interviewee No. 10 2014) 
 
Interviewee No. 10 also argued that the online information proved to be crucial to 
provide humanitarian relief in a timely manner. The international community and well-
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wishers made contributions to the appeal launched by the NGOs on their websites 
(Interviewee No. 10 2014). 
 
 Mobilization of funds and resources  
 
The NGOs conducted a fund drive based on individual organization capacity, alliances, 
and by appealing for assistance to the world and well-wishers through information 
posted on their websites.   
 
“We posted our bank account and warehouse address online in order to 
receive relief funds and goods from very kind people.” 
(Interviewee No. 10 2014) 
 
The funds and resources that were mobilized facilitated efficient rescue operations and 
the procurement of humanitarian supplies that were disbursed in a timely manner to the 
affected areas. 
 
7.4.3 How China’s Red Cross handled the humanitarian supply chain during the 
Wenchuan Earthquake 
 
The Chinese Red Cross established a good network with all the emergency warehouses 
as dictated by the disaster preparedness strategy in China (Altay and Green 2006). 
These are large centres positioned at strategic positions around the country, filled with 
essential emergency resources necessary in a disaster such as the Wenchuan earthquake. 
These centres formed a very critical part of the humanitarian supply chain that the China 
Red Cross relied upon during this disaster. They provided a large portion of the aid 
material and emergency resources necessary for the humanitarian effort, especially 
since a large part of the communication and transport infrastructure was destroyed. 
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China Red Cross also made use of another major part of the humanitarian supply chain - 
the existing transport and communication infrastructure. These logistics required in the 
humanitarian effort suffered from inadequacy mainly due to the devastation caused by 
the earthquake. However, China Red Cross created partnerships with other humanitarian 
organizations on the ground as well as other stakeholders to create an emergency 
infrastructure to assist in disseminating resources and aid to the affected and remote 
regions. Any infrastructure that could not be created was provided by the military, 
whose role in complementing the remaining portions of the communications and 
transport infrastructure was invaluable. At one time, the Chinese military provided more 
than 100 military helicopters to assist in large scale airlifting operations, which is an 
invaluable resource in all humanitarian supply chains (Thomas and Fritz 2006). 
Therefore, the China Red Cross liaised with all stakeholders to re-establish a 
conventional communications and transport infrastructure in order to complement the 
Wenchuan Earthquake humanitarian supply chain. 
 
While handling the humanitarian supply chain during the Wenchuan Earthquake, the 
China Red Cross encountered a shortage of major stock that included the emergency 
resources necessary during the humanitarian effort. One reason for these circumstances 
was the unforeseen magnitude with which the earthquake affected the country and its 
economy (Kovács and Spens 2007). First, more than 60,000 people lost their lives, 
while more than 300,000 suffered injuries of varying degrees. Second, there were 
millions of people who had been left homeless and destitute after their homes and all 
supporting infrastructure came under the force of the earthquake’s devastation. 
Unfortunately, the emergency warehouses at the state and county level established as 
part of the Chinese Government’s disaster preparedness became overwhelmed. 
Therefore, China Red Cross, in collaboration with other NGOs, established alternative 
resources and auxiliary supply chains to meet these demands. 
 
Immediately the magnitude 7.0 earthquake hit, the China Red Cross sent out a team of 
experts to assess the humanitarian and aid needs of the victims and those affected. The 
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first issue identified by the Red Cross in its post disaster impact assessment was the 
shortage of professional personnel and staff to deliver the relief goods. Hence, the Red 
Cross decided to implement courses and training to ensure that the onsite volunteers 
were capable and able to deliver the relief work.  
 
The training delivery initially targeted priority groups, hence the military police, and 
medical and technological focused groups were the first priority groups to receive 
training. But then this was opened up to as many people as possible to increase the 
capability of the emergency response team (Christopher and Tatham 2011). Although 
the China Red Cross consisted of a formidable force of well-trained emergency 
response personnel to face any disaster scenario, this earthquake’s demands 
substantially exceeded their resources of supply chain personnel. Therefore, the China 
Red Cross decided to complement this personnel shortage by conducting crash courses 
and training on-site to volunteers. Priority was given to those with military, police, 
medical, and technological training, but training was mostly indiscriminate and intended 
to establish a bigger emergency response personnel team. Thus the China Red Cross 
responded to the excess demand on the Wenchuan humanitarian supply chain for 
emergency personnel by training volunteers. This decision demonstrated a keen 
awareness of the relationship between humanitarian supply chain demands and the 
efficiency of the same supply chain. 
 
One important aspect of the humanitarian supply chain that distinguished it from the 
conventional business organization-based supply chain was the absence of any profit-
based objectives (Christopher and Tatham 2014). Unlike the conventional supply chain, 
the humanitarian supply chain is more concerned with creating efficiency in the flow of 
emergency resources and personnel between sources such as the government, NGOs, 





Additionally, the flow of information is an important aspect of any large scale disaster 
such as the earthquake that struck Wenchuan. Consequently, the China Red Cross 
initiated almost immediate initiatives to re-establish the communication infrastructure 
that the earthquake had destroyed. In doing this, the organization based its humanitarian 
efforts and all humanitarian supply chain planning on perceived needs as opposed to 
standard practice. The commonly accepted practice in such circumstances is to 
investigate the needs of the beneficiaries and create a supply chain to enable these 
provisions to reach them (Wassenhove 2006). However, mismatches led to 
redundancies in the humanitarian supply chain as some supplies were replicated, leaving 
the most needy inadequately supplied. Therefore, the China Red Cross, as well as many 
other NGOs who reacted to the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008, did not respond to the 
demands of their humanitarian supply chain in the correct manner. Their choice to rely 
on perceived needs led to redundant humanitarian supply chains that replicated some 
emergency resources, while creating artificial shortage in others, including critically 
needed medical supplies. 
 
7.4.3.1 Analysis and criticism of the role of humanitarian supply chain 
management in the disaster cycle 
 
The relationship between the humanitarian supply chain management and the disaster 
lifecycle is evident even in the definition of the two concepts. Humanitarian supply 
chain management is a branch of supply chain management that targets disaster 
management and recovery by complementing humanitarian efforts through efficient 
supply chains (Long 1997). The main objective in humanitarian supply chain 
management is the creation of supply chains that identify emergency needs in disaster 
scenarios and avail the resources and personnel needed in a just-in-time (JIT) fashion. 
On the other hand, the disaster cycle is a conceptual framework that defines the various 
stages of a disastrous scenario from the perspectives of humanitarian effort, disaster 
preparedness, and emergency response (Cozzolino et al. 2012).  
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In analysing how the processes involved in humanitarian supply chain management 
engage in the disaster cycle, delineating the disaster environment is a necessity. The 
disaster cycle achieves this by breaking down all disasters into four major phases: 
 
 The mitigation phase – this is the stage where government-based and the social infrastructure are 
created in order to overcome society’s vulnerability to disasters and their effects (Scholten et al. 
2010). These are mainly the prerogative of the government and other main stakeholders that the 
society has elected with all the responsibility of assessing and tending to its needs.  
 
From the perspective of the relationship between the mitigation phase of the disaster cycle and 
humanitarian supply chains, the mitigation phase offers little wriggle room for the later. Due to 
the fact that the government and other major stakeholders are those on which society has placed 
the responsibility of establishing a mitigation infrastructure against disasters, the humanitarian 
supply chain has little influence on this phase (Altay and Green 2006). The only thing these 
supply chains can do is augment the existing mitigation infrastructure during a disaster in the 
event that they are rendered incapable either by the disaster itself, or overwhelmed by the effects 
of the disaster as was the case in the Wenchuan earthquake. Therefore, the role of the 
humanitarian supply chain in the mitigation phase of the disaster cycle is mostly reactive. Using 
the Wenchuan earthquake to exemplify this, we see that the China Red Cross was part of the 
advice team that the government consulted on in order to understand how best to mitigate the 
consequential disaster following the main earthquake since large tremors followed for months. 
 
 The preparation phase – this phase of the disaster cycle is the last before a disaster strikes and 
involves all preparations made by stakeholders while anticipating disasters in disaster-prone 
environments (Pettit and Beresford 2005). Strategies for disaster response, resource allocation, 
and personnel preparation all form part of the preparation phase of the disaster cycle. The 
government collaborates with experts and other stakeholders and designs physical networks for 
this particular reason (Lee and Zbinden 2003). Information, transport, and communication 
systems are designed around the identified probabilities as well as collaborative partnerships.  
 
Looking into the characteristics of this disaster cycle, one can see that the humanitarian supply 
chain had more roles to play here. Firstly, during the planning phases involving the physical 
network, a lot of attention was directed towards the supply chain factors that might affect the 
network’s efficiency (Thomas 2003). For example, the distance between the emergency 
warehouses might affect the entire humanitarian’s agility and ability to respond to consequential 
disasters (Cottrill 2002). Second, given the importance of communication on the effectiveness of 
supply chains, the setting up of communication infrastructural systems in preparedness strategies 
must include those that address humanitarian supply chain concepts. The ability to communicate 
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affects a humanitarian supply chain’s agility among other crucial aspects. Last, the 
establishment of collaborative partnerships during the preparation phase of a disaster cannot 
exclude humanitarian supply chains given their importance in all disaster scenarios after they 
occur (Nisha de Silva 2001). 
 
Considering the importance of the humanitarian supply chain in the preparation phase of the 
disaster cycle for the Wenchuan earthquake, we identify various confirmatory examples. China 
Red Cross, part of the larger humanitarian supply chain that served this disaster, had various 
emergency warehouses that served as part of the preparedness of the country to the earthquake 
disaster. Additionally, the communication factor became apparent when first responders on the 
site communicated an almost instantaneous need for addition personnel leading to the 
organization training volunteers (Jahre et al. 2009). Coordination frameworks, which are an 
essential part of the preparedness phase of any disaster cycle, became apparent when the China 
Red Cross joined hands with the military, media, and other NGOs during the Wenchuan 
earthquake. 
 
 The Response phase – this is the actual reactionary phase of the disaster cycle where all the 
mechanisms, resources, and strategies aimed at responding to the effects of disasters come into 
play. Considering that the response phase of a disaster occurs after the disaster occurs, this phase 
has two distinct sub-phases, the immediate response sub-phase, and the restore sub-phase 
(Balcik et al. 2010). The former refers to all the processes of activating the sleeping network of 
systems, mechanisms, and policies related to disaster preparedness and response. The later refers 
to those processes aimed at the provision of basic humanitarian aid and emergency resources to 
their beneficiaries. The humanitarian supply chain benefits the restoration phase of the disaster 
cycle during both sub-phases. At the immediate response sub-phase, the effects of the 
humanitarian supply chain comprise of all the activities revolving around initiating the supply 
routes and processes that aim to awaken dormant humanitarian activities and systems (Maon et 
al. 2009). From the case study of the Wenchuan earthquake, the humanitarian supply chain 
management practices initiated as part of the immediate response included ambulatory services, 
the establishment of transport lines, and alternatives for other infrastructural systems. 
Additionally, the creation of donor and aid partnerships came into play as well as partnerships 
with crucial partners such as the media and military. 
 
 After the immediate response sub-phase, the humanitarian supply chain management process in 
response to the Wenchuan earthquake disaster established supply routes and systems to deliver 
basic humanitarian needs such as food, clothing, shelter, and related basic needs. Afterwards, 
organizations such as the China Red Cross coordinated with the government and other major 
stakeholders to establish alternative means of survival for those affected, while working to re-




 The reconstruction phase –this phase of the disaster cycle includes all the activities that are 
aimed at restoring the social, economic, and natural order of the site of the disaster (Tomasini 
and Van Wassenhove 2009). This phase also aims to rehabilitate the victims as well as their 
survival mechanisms, including the natural environment. During the reconstruction phase of the 
disaster cycle, most organizations and even individuals might undergo modal changes such as 
strengthening their infrastructural resilience and using more stable building materials.  
 
The humanitarian supply chain management practice assists this phase of the disaster 
cycle by providing all those involved with an efficient method of moving the required 
material and manpower to assist in the reconstruction. It also meets these needs in an 
efficient manner to reduce the impact of the huge cost of rehabilitation such as that 
incurred by the Chinese government after the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008. 
Humanitarian supply chain management also extends to clean-up exercises that aim to 
clear debris as well as create continuity in the process of seeking the missing, and 
collecting dead bodies that characterize such devastation (Sheffi 2005). Without the 
efficient supply of materials and the personnel needed in such crucial rehabilitative 
processes, disaster recovery efforts would not be a reality. 
 
Additionally, one should note that the humanitarian supply chain assumes lean and agile 
models like the conventional supply chain. However, humanitarian supply chain 
management models do not use these two aspects of supply chain management in a 
similar manner since their main objective is not profit-oriented. Leanness in 
humanitarian supply chains refers to the ability of the supply chain to achieve more 
without addition, in terms of investment through funds, materials, or manpower (Taylor 
and Pettit 2009). On the other hand, agility within the humanitarian supply chain refers 
to its ability to meet unexpected changes in demand due to, among other things, shorter 




7.4.3.2 Supply chain strategies used during the Wenchuan earthquake at the 
response and recovery stages 
 
Supply chain strategies refer to those strategies that planners use during decision-
making to decide on what type of supply chain to use in specific scenarios, in order to 
achieve predefined objectives (Oloruntoba and Grey 2006). These objectives might be 
related to efficiency, the chain’s ability to respond to changes in the demand and lead 
time, cost management, or a mixture of other reasons. Therefore, the most common 
supply chain strategies are lean, agile, and leagile, the latter being a mixture of the 
earlier two. 
 
Lean supply chain strategies place an increased emphasis on the proper management of 
resources thus reducing the waste of all resources up and down the supply chain, 
including time (Narasimhan et al. 2006). This strategy strives to ensure a level schedule 
that utilizes resources evenly and without variation. Applying this to the humanitarian 
supply chain concept, we see that a lean humanitarian supply chain strategy will strive 
to save on resources by identifying the demands of its beneficiaries correctly the first 
time. Additionally, this strategy places a great emphasis on proper distribution channels 
in order to supply resources in the shortest time possible, achieve the mobilization of 
resources, and logistics selection, albeit there having been a disaster that might have 
destroyed the infrastructure.  
 
Agile supply chain strategies place an emphasis on the ability to respond as best as 
possible to shifts in demands and lead times without disproportionate changes in costs 
and efficiency. Applying this conceptual framework, we find that the agile humanitarian 
supply chain strategy considers factors such as site selection, specificity of deliveries, 




Some humanitarian supply chain management scholars have suggested that a 
combination of these two strategies be applied in order to benefit from both. These 
scholars suggest the adoption of lean supply chain strategies in the upstream supply 
chain movement and agile strategies in the downstream movement (Naylor et al. 1999). 
However, the best practices according to subsequent studies and actual on-site practice 
seems to be an application of these supply chain strategies depending on the phase of 
the disaster cycle. 
 
Considering that the Wenchuan earthquake was a sudden disaster, its disaster cycle had 
four phases that characterize this disaster preparedness and management concept. Here 
we concentrate on the response and recovery/reconstruction phases of the Wenchuan 
earthquake disaster from the supply chain strategy perspective. 
 
 The response phase 
 
Immediate response sub-phase 
 
During the response phase of the Wenchuan earthquake disaster cycle, the government, 
NGOs, military, and other stakeholders in China’s disaster response mechanism 
activated a sleeping network of resources and personnel that were trained to respond. 
Considering the sudden needs for emergency medical attention, rescue services, and the 
supply of basic emergency resources such as food, shelter, clothing, water, and other 
resources, the most applicable supply chain strategy here would have been an agile one 
(Kaatrud et al. 2003). The demands for these resources as well as personnel and 
equipment were shifting at a phenomenal rate, sometimes up to the point of 
overwhelming the disaster response and capability of the emergency rescue operation. 
Additionally, the lead times were changing as the levels of priority kept shifting due to 
discoveries of trapped, destitute, and injured victims. 
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The main type of supply chain movement during the response phase of the Wenchuan 
earthquake disaster was mostly downstream, meaning that the resources and personnel 
were moving from the donors, government, military, and NGOs, downwards to the 
earthquake’s victims. Therefore, an agile supply chain strategy must have come in play 
as these agencies sought to make the right deliveries the first time (Thomas and Fritz 
2006).  
 
Furthermore, these sources were required to make site selections, as well as choosing 
the needs of those most vulnerable such as children and the injured. Therefore, the 
supply chain strategy adopted by NGOs such as the China Red Cross and Global 
Village, as well as other stakeholders such as the military and government must have 
been more of an agile model. 
 
The establishment of donor partnerships as well as efforts to identify the specific needs 
of those affected also demonstrate the implementation of an agile supply chain strategy. 
The stakeholders strove to identify the most efficient methods of delivering the 
emergency resources and personnel they thought would be needed in the disaster hit 
areas. Additionally, these stakeholders identified the best sites for an increasingly 
efficient supply chain, once more demonstrating the characteristics of an agile supply 




This sub-phase of the response phase of a disaster cycle seeks to establish supply chains 
that support all of the activities aimed at supplying those affected and injured with basic 
necessities in large numbers, with the right supplies, and in the most efficient manner. 
This sub-phase assumes an agile supply strategy as demonstrated in the Wenchuan 
earthquake disaster when the China Red Cross, the military, and international donors 
identified the basic needs as medical care and supplies, food, shelter, clean water, warm 
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clothing, and the implementation of emergency personnel. The stakeholders adopted an 
agile supply chain strategy that sought to deliver these basic needs to as many people as 
possible using the most efficient methods (Thomas and Kopczak 2005). One 
demonstration of the government’s efforts to achieve efficiency and a timely delivery 
was the military’s implementation of more than 100 helicopters to complement the 
airlifting operation that was underway. Additionally, the China Red Cross established 
centres in the region where they stocked up on essential resources that they perceived to 
be important. Although there were mismatches with what the beneficiaries eventually 
required due to a redundant supply chain and a lack of adequate research into their 
actual needs, these actions demonstrated an agile supply chain in the disaster’s 
humanitarian efforts. 
 
 The recovery/reconstruction phase 
 
This is the second sub-phase of the reconstruction phase in a disaster cycle. Applying 
this to the Wenchuan earthquake disaster, we see that the recovery phase included all 
efforts aimed at rehabilitating the victims and returning them to a state of life that 
supported their survival. Based on the characteristics of the disaster, the donors strove to 
ensure that all bodies had been recovered, while the victims or beneficiaries of all 
humanitarian supply chains had some form of survival kit in the form of 2,000RMB per 
family to assist them to reconstruct their lives as the government set about 
implementing major reconstruction projects. Additionally, all the survivors who had 
recovered from their injuries were requested to shift to safer areas and were facilitated 
in doing so through transport and fiscal means (Global Humanitarian Reform 2007). 
The donors continued directing resources and manpower towards those still affected by 
the disaster and strove to ensure there was minimal wastage due to the limited resources 
remaining. Additionally, clean-up exercises began. All these steps are in-line with a lean 




These examples are aligned with the objective of creating a supply chain from donor to 
beneficiaries in the most efficient manner and with the least amount of wastage possible. 
By reducing the number of people relying on direct assistance, the donors for the 
Wenchuan earthquake disaster reduced wastage as the remaining resources went to the 
most deserving cases. Additionally, a small stipend of approximately 2,000RMB per 
family affected also demonstrated the donors’ intention of keeping the resources 
allocated to the most sensible minimums possible. Needy cases were then assessed to 
ensure that their allocations were right the first time, especially for expensive and scarce 
resources such as medical supplies, shelter, clothes, and clean water. Additionally, the 
donors established that an increase in airlifting capacity would overcome the logistical 
issues they faced, thus demonstrating a concern for logistics, a major sign of the lean 
supply chain model being utilized (Christopher 2005).  
 
Evaluating the donors’ responses to the Wenchuan earthquake from the perspective of 
supply chain strategy, we find that their initial plans were very good. Even a scholarly 
investigation of the rationale behind applying an agile supply chain during the response, 
and a lean supply chain during the reconstruction/recovery supports that their actions as 
being appropriate. The death toll from the consequences of the earthquake would have 
increased due to injuries and disease had these strategies been mixed up. Additionally, 
limited resources were used appropriately in most cases. However, there were cases of 
misappropriation, especially during the recovery stages as the international community 
complemented the donor capability with resources. 
 
7.5 Discussion of the Key Challenges and Recommendations 
 
The challenges that hinder a government and NGOs in an efficient humanitarian 
response to a disaster are described in Figure 7.6. The next section attempts to provide 





Table 7.6: Key challenges experienced by the Chinese Government  
 
7.5.1 Government Challenges and Recommendations 
 
 Lack of preparedness and practice during the preparedness phase 
 
After the Wenchuan earthquake had stricken Sichuan province, the Central, and the 
local government immediately established an earthquake emergency response 
headquarters (Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs 2008). The main objective of these 
centres was to act as command centres in enhancing a faster and more efficient disaster 
humanitarian response. However, despite their best-dedicated efforts, the working 




Lack of preparedness and planning 
during the preparedness phase 
1. Build capacity by training rescue officials 
2. Conduct emergency drills frequently  
 
Lack of real time humanitarian 
information during the response 
phase 
1. Upgrade mobile satellite systems 
2. Upload and update disaster information on 
government websites promptly 
 
Poor management of donations 1. Supply of donations needs to be on a needs basis 
 
Inevitable delays in response due to 
damaged infrastructure 
1. The government to train and build capacity of 
community members 
 
Poor management of humanitarian 
supplies during the preparedness 
phase 
1. Dynamic procurement department 





undoubtedly less than expected. Examples of situations that support the argument that 
the government lacked preparedness and practice include: 
 
The rescue efforts were not efficient as the number of professional rescuers was not 
sufficient compared to the number of affected people that needed attention (Chinese 
Ministry of Civil Affairs 2008). Medical doctors and rescue officials with skills in 
offering psychological support were supposed to be provided in large numbers. These 
demonstrate a lack of preparedness by the Chinese Government in responding to 
disasters of such magnitude (Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs 2008). 
 
The earthquake affected many people as it had covered a large scale area of 44 
neighbouring counties (Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs 2008). The rescue officials 
were overwhelmed due to divergent humanitarian needs as the victims from different 
counties needed different types of aid. The rescue teams delivered supplies disregarding 
the specific needs of the various areas, which clearly demonstrated a lack of 
preparedness and practice by the rescue officials. 
 
Recommendations: The Chinese government needs to boost the preparedness and 
capacity of their rescue staff through training and implementing emergency drills. These 
will sharpen the skills and practice in readiness for any possible natural disasters. In 
addition, the rescue officials should supply humanitarian aid based on the specific 
requirements of the affected people. 
 
 Lack of real-time Humanitarian Information during the response phase 
 
It is vital for the Chinese Government to provide accurate and real-time information to 
the public and the international community. Destruction of telecommunications and 
power lines during the Wenchuan earthquake affected the communication between the 
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government agencies and the rescue teams (Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs 2008). 
Satellite mobile technology utilized by the military was overused which led to the 
system jamming. In addition, power failures affected the media’s ability to disseminate 
information to the world, such as information on the level of destruction and the 
humanitarian assistance needed. People from all corners of the world depended on real 
time information posted on the websites by international and local NGOs. 
 
Recommendation: The government needs to upgrade its satellite mobile technology to 
avoid the risk of the systems jamming. In addition, the government should establish a 
single information coordination platform that will have the mandate of informing the 
world. To avert the situation of infrastructure damage causing a breakdown, information 




 Poor management of donations 
 
The number of donations from the Chinese citizens and the international community 
was huge (Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs 2008). These supplies were channelled to 
designated locations that were affected by the earthquake for sorting and later release to 
the victims. Regrettably, the relief volunteers and the government aid personnel were 
overwhelmed by the large stock of donations received. The rescue staff from the 
government lacked the necessary donation management skills, leading to the poor 
distribution of humanitarian supplies to the victims (Zheng 2009) 
 
Recommendation: The Chinese Government should advance the management of 
donations to ensure they are needs driven. This will avoid a supply driven approach and 
thus eliminate mismatches between the demand and the actual materials supplied. 
Undoubtedly, proper management will provide a systematic flow in terms of the 
delivery and distribution of humanitarian supplies. Also, it will ensure that the 
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donations received meet the gaps in terms fulfilling demand and thus avoid the 
oversupply of certain materials, while disregarding other materials that are required. 
Such information should be shared with the media, emergency response institutions, 
NGOs, and any other relevant platforms. 
 
 Inevitable delays in response due to damaged infrastructure 
 
The area where Wenchuan earthquake struck was poorly covered by roads as the 
location is mountainous (Chen and Booth 2011). The lack of a road network hampered 
the rescue efforts and there were inevitable delays. In addition, the lack of necessary 
equipment to move debris from the destroyed roads and railways led to physical 
hindrances for the emergency logistics, which resulted in severe limitations on 
movement. These factors contributed to delays in deploying rescue officials to the 
affected areas. 
 
Recommendation: The Chinese Government needs to build the capacity of the 
community search and rescue teams. The search and recuse teams should also train to 
respond to disasters occurring in urban or rural/mountainous areas. This will boost the 
speed at which rescue operations can be implemented, as community members can 
undertake first responder rescue actions. Therefore, the Government should establish 
permanent community-based rescue officials as a strategy for saving lives and avoiding 
the impacts of the inevitable delays that are caused by a damaged infrastructure. 
 
 Poor management of humanitarian supplies during the preparedness phase 
 
Unnecessary purchasing protocols by the Chinese Government led to serious delays in 
the delivery of urgent humanitarian supplies after the Wenchuan earthquake (Miao et al. 
2013). For example, the delivery of medical supplies took a long time as the staff 
involved in the procurement were unfamiliar with such supplies. Which meant they did 
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not know how to obtain such large amounts of medical supplies; thus illustrating the 
lack of skills amongst the staff in the departments that handle procurement for the 
Chinese Government. These issues contributed to delays in providing essential medical 
supplies that were vital to the survival of the victims. It is noted that instances of 
insufficient medical humanitarian supplies being available undoubtedly increased the 
level of the fatalities and injuries.   
 
Recommendation: The demand for humanitarian supplies is difficult to forecast 
because no one can predict the magnitude of a disaster (Kovacs et al. 2007). However, it 
is important for the Chinese Government to implement a dynamic procurement 
department and an efficient supply chain alliance. This supply chain alliance needs to be 
flexible and be able to make deliveries within the shortest time possible. The public-
private partnership (PPP) is the best approach to building such a long term arrangement, 
and boosts the proper integration between the government and private enterprises. When 
a natural disaster like the Wenchuan earthquake occurs, such enterprises form a flexible 
supply chain, where materials are delivered based on demand. This eliminates the risks 
of oversupply or undersupply of humanitarian supplies. The performance of such 













a. Unfriendly policies and 
regulations for registration 
and operations 
 
1. Chinese Government to relax its tough policies and 
regulations on NGOs 
 
b. Inadequate professional 
rescue teams 
 
1. NGOs in China to implement projects that train the 





c. Duplication of roles and 
response 
 
1. NGOs to share responsibilities when responding to 
disasters to avoid duplication 
 
2. Distinguish/agree responsibilities during and post 
disaster 
 
Table 7.7: Key challenges experienced by China NGOs and Recommendations 
 
 Unfriendly Policies and regulations by the Chinese Government: 
 
NGOs were very active in the humanitarian response during the disaster. The grassroots 
NGOs formed alliances in response to the requirements for humanitarian aid and 
disaster recovery. The alliances managed to raise and transport relief materials, provide 
the urgent training of volunteers, and conducting post psychological support. However, 
the operations of NGOs in China are restricted by the policies and regulations of the 
Chinese Government (Saich 2000). These restrictions limit their capabilities, and their 
ability to coordinate with the government in the execution of an efficient emergency 
response. Such policies limited the number of international NGOs that were actively 
involved in the humanitarian response. 
 
Recommendation: There is an urgent need for the Chinese Government to recognize 
the social services provided by NGOs. It is important therefore that the Chinese 
Government relax its tough policies and regulations that discourage the registrations and 
operations of NGOs. 
 
 Inadequate professional rescue teams 
 
The number professionals that provided professional rescue operations such as 
psychological support services was not sufficient compared to the number of affected 
people. Most of the international NGOs provided professional rescue support by 
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offering psychological support services and medical support. However, the number of 
professional rescue teams trained by these NGOs was insufficient: 
 
“The number of affected people was enormous, and professional services 
like medical support and psychological support were not well serviced.” 
 
(Interviewee No. 11 2014) 
 
Recommendation: NGOs in China should implement programs that aim to teach skills 
to people in the community so that they can help provide disaster management and 
response. This will assist in offering professional services and offering timely rescue 
operations. 
 
 Duplication of roles and responses among NGOs 
 
Many NGOs participated in the disaster response after the Wenchuan earthquake. They 
delivered relief materials such as food, water, and clothing. Nevertheless, duplication of 
roles and humanitarian supplies provides evidence that NGOs in China had inadequate 
emergency planning: 
 
“There were many NGOs that travelled to the affected areas, and they 
provided relief supplies and conducted rescue operations. However, 
humanitarian supplies from the NGOs did not exhibit uniqueness as they 
provided the same things. There was no specific NGO that provided unique 
supplies such as medical equipment." 
(Interviewee No. 11 2014) 
 
Recommendation: In order to provide an efficient response to a natural disaster, NGOs 
could share the responsibilities amongst themselves and thereby reduce duplication. 
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Sharing responsibilities will enhance the planning, and thus the emergency response 
will be better implemented. 
 
7.6 Conclusion  
 
The situation calls for attention by all Chinese Government departments to establish 
stable cooperation with international countries, NGOs, and other private enterprises in 
order to execute efficient humanitarian aid. The Wenchuan earthquake revealed that for 
an efficient humanitarian response, the Chinese Government cannot do it alone. 
Collective efforts from the government, private sector, NGOs and the international 
community are important. However, most importantly what contributes to an efficient 
humanitarian response is disaster preparedness by all, including individual citizens at 


















Chapter 8 Taiwan Case study—Typhoon Morakot 
 
8.1 Introduction   
 
Taiwan is an Island (Figure 8.1) that sits between Japan, the Philippines, and the Pacific 
Ocean and is a country that has frequent monsoons (Shea 2001). Taiwan is located in 
the earthquake belt, and the major pathways of typhoons make the country the most 
vulnerable place on earth to natural disasters (Tsai, Hung and Chen 2010).  
 
Typhoons contribute to almost 70% of Taiwan’s natural disasters and these lead to 
human casualties and economic losses (Teng 2006). The occurrence of typhoons in 
Taiwan has increased from an average frequency of 3.3 times annually in the 20th 
century to an average frequency of 5.7 times annually in the 21st century.  
 
The map below Figure 8.2 shows the storm path that originated from the Pacific Ocean 
on the 3rd August 2009. Convective clouds were already formed when it hit Taiwan on 
the 9th August 2009 (Wang 2009). As the typhoon closed in near Taiwan, the 
This material has been removed from this thesis due to Third Party Copyright. The unabridged version of 
the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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strengthened flow of the southward winds passed Taiwan around the Pingtung and 
Kaohsiung areas (Wang 2009). The north and south winds created a convergence zone 
that caused torrential rains in the areas indicated by the green marks on the map below. 
The three-day accumulated rainfall had a severe impact that affected the humanitarian 
relief efforts. The map below shows the path the Typhoon took that originated from the 
Pacific Ocean on the 3rd August and struck Taiwan on the 9th August 2009. The green 
areas represent the areas most affected by heavy rainfall (EU Joint Research 
Commission NOAA 2009). 
 
 
Figure 8.2: The path of Typhoon Morakot and the areas that received heavy rainfall (EU Joint Research 
Commission NOAA 2009) 
 
In three consecutive days, the torrential downpours led to a water level accumulation of 
2,686 millimetres, a record in Taiwanese rainfall history (Wang 2006). The mudslides 
buried several villages located in the mountain area. Floods mainly occurred in counties 
and cities on the west coast such as the Chiayi and Pingtung Counties, and the Tainan 
and Kaohsiung Cities. It affected 510,668 people in 146,739 households. Out of this 
total, 491,477 persons in 140,423 households experienced flooding to a height of more 
than 50cm (Wang 2009). In Kaohsiung County, there were 537 casualties in the Jiaxian, 
Namasia, and Liugui villages located near the mountains. Villages like Xiaolin and 
Xinkai in the Jiaxian Township and Liugui Township were completely destroyed by 
massive landslides (Chang 2012).  
This material has been removed from this thesis due to Third Party 
Copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at the 
Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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Furthermore, the typhoon also damaged the road infrastructure causing traffic 
interruptions on nine main roads. The roads were blocked by rocks from the mountains 
while others had their foundations destroyed (Wang 2009). 196 roads and bridges in 
cities like Kaohsiung and Tainan, and counties such as Pingtung and Taitung were 
completely destroyed. The total damage to the infrastructure, agriculture, and economic 
losses was nearly NT$110 billion (US$3.5 billion) (Cheng 2013). 
 
The tremendous impact of the disaster required a strong emergency/disaster 
management system to respond and recover. Taiwan’s disaster management system had 
been evolved over the previous few years as a result of increasing numbers of 
distressing experiences from several natural disasters (Tsai and Cheryl 2010). In 2000, 
the Taiwanese Government promulgated a disaster management law that was 
implemented during the Ji Ji Earthquake (1999) tragedy. After Typhoon Morakot, the 
Government once again promulgated a new emergency law by enacting the Disaster 
Prevention and Protection Act in the year 2010. The purpose of this Chapter is to 
examine the effectiveness of the disaster response demonstrated by the Taiwanese 
Government and Taiwanese NGOs during the Typhoon Morakot tragedy. This chapter 
will also focus on the emergency plan (Disaster Protection and Response Act) 
implemented during the Typhoon tragedy and evaluate it accordingly. 
 
8.2 National Disaster Prevention and Protection Systems in Taiwan 
 
The Disaster Prevention and Protection Act (DPPA) in Taiwan was established after the 
earthquake in Ji ji 1999. A few subsequent revisions were made before and after 
Morakot. This chapter only concentrates on the DPRA & DPPA of 2000 and 2010 





After the catastrophe known as the Ji ji earthquake, the Taiwan government launched 
the Disaster Prevention and Protection Act 2000 in order to improve the disaster 
management capacity. This Act provided a disaster prevention system and formal legal 
norms. It also laid the foundation for disaster management in Taiwan (Chu 2012), and 
revised the number of response levels from 4 (centre, province, municipal/county/city, 
and township/district) down to 3 (centre, municipal/county/city, and township) (see 
Figure 8.3 below). Taiwan Government subsequently incorporated a military role into 
the DPPA after Typhoone Morakot in (Xiao 2013). As a result of the traumatic 
experiences due to the frequent occurrences of natural disasters, the Taiwan 
Government now has advanced disaster management systems (Xiao 2013). In 2000, the 
Government promulgated the Disaster Prevention and Response Act (DPRA) in 
response to the impacts of earlier devastating natural disasters (Tsai and Cheryl 2010). 
 
The disaster management system is dominated by the Disaster Prevention and 
Protection Act (DPPA). The first DPPA was launched in 2000 in response to the lessons 
learnt from the Ji ji earthquake in 1999. Following typhoon Morakot in 2009, a further 
revision was implemented to further improve the arrangements for the disaster 
management system. 
 
The DPPA 2000 addresses the arrangements for each disaster management phase 
(mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery) (Ma 2010). The disaster management 
system was previously divided into four levels (centre, province, municipal/county/city, 
and township/district), but was revised in 2010 to three levels after the 'provincial level' 
was removed (centre, municipal/county/city, and township). Although the system is 
only divided into three levels, the complexity of each level in the system is rather high 





Figure 8.3: Three levels of Government as per the DPRA Act in 2000 (Tsai and Cheryl 2010) 
 
The top level is led by the president, while the Premier of the Executive Yuan takes the 
lead with decision making. Under the Executive Yuan, the operational departments can 
respond to different type of hazards while the NDPPC is in charge of coordination (Tsai 
and Cheryl 2010). However what makes the system more complex are the parallel 
operation committees. For example, neither EAC nor NCDR play an operational role, 
but providing technical advice (Tsai and Cheryl 2010). It has been argued that these 
committees slow down the effectiveness of a disaster response (Ma 2010). 
 
The 2000 Act according to Tsai and Cheryl (2010) established the Executive Yuan 
headed by the Premier as shown in Figure 15. It supervised the DPRC, Rescue 
Coordination Centre, Ministry of Interior, and the National Disaster Prevention and 
Protection Commission (NDPPC). The purpose of the NDPPC at the central 
government was to facilitate the coordination across the ministries and agencies in the 
government (Tsai and Cheryl 2010). 
This material has been removed from this thesis due to Third Party Copyright. The unabridged version of the 
thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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Upon the occurrence of natural disasters, a specific agency, the Disaster Prevention and 
Response Committee (DPRCM) was established by the Central Government and 
Chaired by the Vice Premier. The DPRC supervised the Committee, and was in charge 
of overseeing the implementation of the disaster management policies and regulations 
(Tsai and Cheryl 2010). 
 
In addition, the 2000 DPRA Act established two agencies that operated under the 
disaster prevention and response committees (Tsai and Cheryl 2010). One was the 
National Disaster Prevention and Protection Experts Advisory Committee (EAC) and 
the other was the National Science and Technology Centre for Disaster Reduction 
(NCDR). The two agencies were involved in giving technical advice on disaster 
management and disaster reduction related affairs (Tsai and Cheryl 2010). 
 
What is notably is that the armed forces and militia were directly under the command of 
the president. According to Tsai and Cheryl (2010), the Act gave specifications at three 
levels of government to create a Disaster Prevention Council and a Disaster Prevention 
Plan. This was to facilitate planning, supervision, and the enforcement of disaster 
response work. 
 
The DPRA 2000 stipulated that the local governments were responsible for providing 
punctual information on any emergency once a disaster had occurred (Tsai and Cheryl 
2010). Moreover, the Disaster Prevention and Response councils at the three levels of 
government were supposed to urgently formulate their own Emergency Operation 
Centres. The purpose of the EOC was mainly to command its quick response teams 






8.2.1 Evaluation of the Taiwan DPRA2000 
 
The response to Morakot demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the arrangements under 
DPRA 2000 (Wang 2013). Taiwanese Government officials also lacked the will to 
implement the emergency law, even though the law faced severe challenges (Tan 2011). 
The following is a summary of the main issues that contributed to the DPRA emergency 
systems not providing a useful response to the Typhoon Morakot tragedy. 
 
 Complicated communication channels between the centre and local areas 
 
The emergency system introduced a complicated communication channel between the 
local and central governments making emergency information flow slowly. 
Communication from the affected areas at the bottom of the hierarchy to the top 
management was evidently slow due to bureaucratic procedures (NCDR). According to 
information sourced from interviewee No. 4: 
 
“….officials from the top of the hierarchy of the emergency system showed 
signs of unfamiliarity with the disaster operations.” 
(Interviewee No. 4 2014) 
 
This was caused by the slow dissemination of emergency information by the 
government officials at the local level. Nevertheless, the problem was caused by the 
emergency systems as government officials at the local level were supposed to gather 
information about the tragedy and forward this to their supervisors (Interviewee, No. 4). 
The process of forwarding information to the hierarchical systems of the emergency 
response contributed to unnecessary delays and a lack of clarity. However, according to 




“…even after the local residents voiced their concerns over the media the, 
information was still ignored by the emergency systems….” 
(Interviewee No. 4 2014) 
 
 
 Ambiguous responsibility across related departments 
 
The existing authority structure was complex, and government officials were confused 
(Tsai and Cheryl 2010). The complexity of the systems led to the duplication of roles 
and thus led to confusion among Government officials contributing to the poor response. 
For example, the affairs and response to a Typhoon according to the DPRA Act were 
the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior. However, Typhoon Morakot caused 
flooding that was managed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs as stipulated by the Act. 
This also resulted in debris which was the responsibility of the Executive Yuan and 
landslides that were under the Council of Agriculture (DPPA 2010).  
 
 Complexity of the organization hierarchy 
 
The levels of command were loosely attached, and they lacked a unified chain of 
command (Maa 2001). The emergency systems depicted the multiple chains of 
command which were derived from the three levels of the government hierarchy. As a 
result, information and command were delivered in a bureaucratic structure thus 
contributing to the slower processing of urgent information. Additionally, government 
officials at the three levels of government followed different rules and commands as 






“…government officials within the jurisdictions of the three levels of the 
emergency response acted in a manner based on their own priorities.”  
 
(Interviewee No. 4 2014) 
 
For example, the Act authorised only the President to mobilise resources and the 
military. The Act did not authorize government officials to mobilize resources outside 
their jurisdictions (Tang and Zhang 2012). The result was a slow response to the 
Typhoon Morakot tragedy. 
 
8. 3 Government Response during Typhoon Morakot  
 
Presidents Ma, coupled with the systems and administration led to challenges in the 
response to Typhoon Morakot (Ou-Yang and Bo 2009). It is argued that the 
dysfunctional and ineffective emergency response system prevented an effective 
response to Morakot (Cheng and Sophy 2013). While a lack of commitment to the 
response tasks by relevant government officials also contributed to the slow response 
(Tan 2011). Moreover, according to interviewee No. 1 “the heavy downpour that 
continued for three days hampered…” the rescue efforts. 
 
However, after three days Presidents Ma’s administration only took initiatives to 
respond to the Typhoon disaster after it became apparent. The President inspected the 
meteorology and water conservancy departments and personally telephoned the Taipei 
City Fire Department to dispatch relief supplies. Also the President held meetings with 
the North County in the hope that the county could assist by providing manpower, 
materials, and equipment to support the south county (Ou-Yang and Bo 2009). The 
central government through the ministry of the interior mobilized the national fire 




“The Ministry of the Interior through the central disaster response centre 
and rescue coordination centre released helicopters to conduct the rescue 
operations and provide supplies of relief aid.”  
(Interviewee No. 3 2014) 
 
The President mobilized more than 182,000 military soldiers who were deployed to the 
affected areas to evacuate thousands of stranded victims (Cheng 2013). The military 
under the command of the President worked closely with the central disaster response 
centre and rescue command centre to execute air rescue operations. 
 
The Premier of the Executive Yuan, Mr. Liu held an emergency meeting at the 
Legislative Yuan to give updates on the relief efforts (Cheng 2013). The administrative 
authorities of the Executive Yuan reached a consensus to create a special budget to 
address the relief activities accordingly. Subsequently, the Executive Yuan established a 
reconstruction committee to coordinate the tasks of repairing the damaged water, road, 
and power infrastructure systems (Interviewee No. 4). 
 
The President reversed an earlier decision by the Ministry of Defence declining aid by 
the International community (Ou-Yang and Bo 2009). Ministry of foreign aid made a 
list of requirements that included heavy lifting helicopters to response to Morakot. 
According to information sourced from Interviewee No. 5, approximately 59 countries 
responded.  
 
“Approximately 59 countries responded to offer humanitarian aid after the 
Taiwanese Government launched an appeal for aid. The U.S. was one of the 
countries that responded positively by giving out heavy lifting helicopters.” 




The central government established a relief fund by creating a special budget of 
NT$100 billion (US$3.5 billion). The fund was to cater for humanitarian relief activities 
and post reconstruction activities. As reported by Interviewee No. 5: 
 
“The Taiwanese Government established a fund to cater for the 
humanitarian rescue activities and post reconstruction activities to the tune 
of NT$100 billion (US$3.5 billion) in response to Typhoon Morakot.” 
 
(Interviewee No. 5 2014) 
 
8. 3.1 Evaluation of the Government Response to Typhoon Morakot  
 
In response to Typhoon Morakot, the Taiwanese Government identified serious 
weaknesses in their disaster response due to the emergency systems and government 
officials (Ou-Yang and Bo 2009). The rescue operations by the three levels of 
Government were ineffective and too slow in responding to the crisis particularly within 
the critical 72 hours of the Typhoon disaster (Ou-Yang and Bo 2009). Most of the key 
leaders in the central government during the first 72 hours were attending to their own 
personal affairs, when the tragedy escalated claiming lives (Ou-Yang and Bo 2009).  
 
The government took the leading role as indicated by the deployment of 182,000 
soldiers to assist in the evacuation of thousands from the worst hit areas. The 
government also invited the international community to provide humanitarian aid, in 
response to which 59 countries donated relief supplies (Tan 2011). 
 
From 7th to 9th August when the typhoon was increasing the wind speed and the level 
of rainfall, most of the central level government teams were unavailable. The Vice 
President Vincent C. Siew, Premier Liu Chao, and the Vice Premier Chiu Cheng the big 




 August for supervision 
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(Ou-Yang and Bo 2009). On 15th August when the tragedy had worsened, the President 
hosted a baseball game opening ceremony instead of taking command of the rescue 
operations (Ou-Yang and Bo 2009). This is definite proof there was a lack of a timely 
commitment especially amongst the top brass of the central government, which 
prevented an effective and efficient response to the typhoon tragedy. Instead, there 
started a blame game by government officials to the elected leaders and lawmakers. The 
following describes the main issues that contributed to the slow response by the 
Government (Tsai and Cheryl 2010). 
 
 Poor Disaster Preparedness and Planning 
 
The Government at all three levels demonstrated a poor and inadequate response due to 
a lack of disaster preparedness and planning. The military that forms an essential organ 
in a disaster response demonstrated they were ill-prepared for handling a disaster like 
Typhoon Morakot. For example, the armed forces hampered the humanitarian assistance 
and disaster relief. They dragged their feet in response to the tragedy as they had to wait 
for orders from their commander instead of quickly attending to the affected areas 
(Cheng 2013). When the President later mobilized them, they demonstrated a lack of 
preparedness in handling and dealing with donations. According to Interviewee No. 6: 
 
“Waterproof plastic clothes were sent from the U.S. to an air base in Tainan, 
the military wrongly delivered them to Kaoshiung where they were not 
needed.”  
(Interviewee No. 6 2014) 
 
This exposed their lack of preparedness and planning on the side of the military as the 
goods were returned with an excuse that the soldiers “Lacked understanding regarding 
the purpose of the waterproof plastic clothes” (Interviewee No. 2 2014).  
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Meanwhile, the central government demonstrated poor planning by sending conflicting 
messages about the international appeal on aid (Cheng 2013). The Vice Foreign 
Minister of Taiwan turned down international aid for relief support. In addition, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs initially refused overseas support in the initial days of the 
Typhoon tragedy. The move by the two government officials contributed to delaying the 
rescue operations and efforts (Cheng 2013). According to Interviewee No. 2: 
 
“The Deputy Minister Andrew Hsia attributed his decision to carelessness 
and offered to resign.”  
(Interviewee No. 2 2014) 
 
Later the President announced an embarrassing U-turn and accepted the foreign aid 
(Ou-Yang and Bo 2009). The ministry of foreign affairs took responsibility but assigned 
the blame of the poor planning to the central EOC. The President corrected the situation 
by claiming that the Taiwan Government had not rejected any foreign aid (Ou-Yang and 
Bo 2009). This scenario demonstrates poor planning and a lack of preparedness on the 
side of the central government in the disaster response. The government ought to have 
prepared policies for an international appeal in the event of a natural disaster. 
 
 Complicated chain of command and authority 
 
The DPRA Act 2000 adopted by the Taiwanese Government in response to the 
Typhoon Morakot disaster contributed to the slow and ineffective response by the 
Government (Tsai and Cheryl 2010). The emergency system was dysfunctional as it 
was coupled by the complicated chain of command and authority, which contributed to 
confusion and the delayed response (Tsai and Cheryl 2010). Government officials at the 
three levels followed a different chain of command and authority within their 
jurisdictions. For example according to interviewee No. 1: 
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“The President and a few government officials had the authority for 
mobilizing resources such as helicopters and the military.”  
 
(Interviewee No. 1 2014) 
 
In addition, Government officials at the regional and local levels had to seek approval 
from the central government. Furthermore, the military, which is the best trained in 
Taiwan to handle natural emergencies and disaster relief, delayed its response as it had 
to wait for orders, while disaster victims continued to suffer (Ou-Yang and Bo 2009). 
Moreover, the emergency system was comprised of elected and appointed officials. 
Elected officials in Taiwan had good knowledge and understanding of the local villages 
and could have aided the Government in the disaster response (Tsai and Cheryl 2010). 
But the challenge was that the appointed officials had more authority in terms of 
resource allocation and mobilization than the elected officials which contributed to 
confusion and the delayed response (Tsai and Cheryl 2010). 
 
 Poor information flow from the local to the central government 
 
Government officials at the local level according to the emergency response Act 2000 
were supposed to collect information and channel it to their supervisors (Tsai and 
Cheryl 2010). The disaster information before being channelled was carefully examined 
and analysed before being directed to decision makers. This contributed to the slow 
response by the central government due to the disjointed flow of disaster information, 
which rendered the response ineffective. The process of analysing and scrutinizing the 
details left out crucial details as noted by Interviewee No. 4:  
 
 
“Government officials at the central level seemed to be unfamiliar with 
what was happening.” 




 Risk Communication between government departments 
 
The Central Weather Bureau (CWB) failed to disseminate accurate early warning 
information to the three levels of government. In the early stages of the disaster, the 
weather-monitoring department gave conflicting information regarding the volume of 
the rainfall in the respective areas (Tsai and Cheryl 2010). As Typhoon Morakot moved 
closer, the risk was not effectively communicated to the government emergency 
management systems. Information from the CWB was misleading as the department 
warned residents in the north about the storm but predicted the south would receive low 
rainfall (Tsai and Cheryl 2010). This information contributed to the residents and local 
government of the South where the Typhoon Morakot hit hard taking the situation more 
lightly. Moreover, the central government did not promptly authorize the southern 
government officials to evacuate residents in time (Tsai and Cheryl 2010). Risk 
communication was poorly implemented, which prevented the damage caused by 
Typhoon Morakot from being minimized. 
 
8. 3.2 Disaster protection and Prevention Act 2010 
 
8.3.2.1 Changes made to the DPRA 2000 Government Levels and Coordination 
 
The Taiwanese Government was influenced to amend DPRA 2000 in response to the 
shortcomings identified during the response to the Typhoon Morakot tragedy. In 
accordance with the DPRA Act 2010, government organisations and operations were 
divided into two levels comprising of the Central and Municipal/city and the 
Township/district levels. The emergency systems had different authority, operations, 
and permissions including pre-disaster prevention, disaster response, and post-disaster 
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recovery and reconstruction (Taiwanese DPPA 2010). Below is a summary of the key 
changes to the emergency management act, from DPRA 2000 to DPPA 2010. 
 
The DPPA 2010 replaced the three levels of government with two levels, these being 
the central and the county levels of government (DPPA 2010). In the event of a disaster, 
these two levels of government are mandated to establish a Disaster Protection and 
Response Council (DPRC) at the central and county levels. Also, at the central level, the 
national disaster prevention agency (ministry of interior), establishes the central 
emergency operation centre. After the formulation of the central emergency operation 
centre, the central government notifies the county government to establish the disaster 
response centre. These two levels of government are supposed to work closely in 
coordinating rescue efforts. 
 
The DPPA 2010 established the central regulating authorities at the central and county 
levels to facilitate disaster management activities. At these levels, the authorities are the 
Ministry of Interior and the Municipality respectively. This law replaces The National 
Disaster Prevention and Protection Commission (NDPPC) that was established at the 
central level by the DPRA 2000. The purpose was to act as a central regulating 
authority by coordinating across multi-ministries and government agencies. 
 
The three levels of government as defined by DPRA 2000 were loosely attached, and in 
response to Typhoon Morakot there was found to be a lack of unity of command (Tsai 
and Cheryl, 2010). And as a result, the information and command was delivered in a 
bureaucratic structure which contributed to a slower processing of urgent information 
(Tsai and Cheryl 2010). Additionally, the government officials at the three levels of 
government followed different rules and commands as directed within their jurisdictions 
(Tsai and Cheryl 2010). The new law establishes two pillars of government, the central 
and local government, which is vital for disaster emergency response. Through this new 
approach the bureaucratic procedures are minimized, making disaster information flow 
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easily between the local and central authorities. In addition, government officials can 
liaise and coordinate in disaster prevention and protection. 
 
Secondly, the National Disaster Prevention and Protection Commission (NDPPC) failed 
in its responsibility for coordinating government ministries and agencies in response to 
Typhoon Morakot (Tsai and Cheryl 2010). There was confusion among Government 
officials which contributed to the poor response. The Ministry of Interior and the 
Municipality at the central and local levels respectively make the emergency response 
more useful. The two emergency regulatory authorities define the disaster guidelines for 
government agencies at the county and central levels. 
 
 A unified search and rescue coordination centre 
 
The Executive Yuan under DPRA 2000 established the National Rescue Coordination 
Centre at the central level of government that was not under the direct command of the 
disaster protection and response council (Tsai and Cheryl 2010). Furthermore, the Act 
established EOCs at the three levels of government. The central EOC would command 
the municipal EOC that in turn commanded the township EOC on issues of rescue 
operations (Tsai and Cheryl 2010). 
 
The new law changed the command structure for rescues. According to the new 
emergency law, DPPA 2010, the National Rescue Command is established under the 
direct command of the Central Disaster Prevention and Protection Council (DPPA 
2010). By doing so, the council was mandated to control and coordinate the centre 
during rescue operations. Furthermore, the Act stipulates that the Central EOC will be 
established, reporting to the Central Disasters Prevention and Protection Council (DPPA 
2010). In addition, the central government will notify the county government to 
establish the county emergency response centre in response to an emergency event or 
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large disasters. Moreover, in order to handle the emergency response efficiently, the 
DPPA 2010, stipulates that emergency response teams will be established at the central 
and local levels in order to enhance emergency response measures (DPPA 2010). This 
makes the entire emergency process efficient compared to DPRA 2000. 
 
The major structural change in rescue coordination centres was reasonable in order to 
make the emergency system more effective. The following reasons support the 
argument that the system is more effective as a result of the enactment of DPPA 2010. 
 
Firstly, the National Rescue Command (NRC) is under the direct control of the Central 
Disaster Prevention and Protection Commission (DPPA 2010). When a natural disasters 
occurs, the NRC can command, supervise, and coordinate emergency personnel both at 
the central and county levels, creating more efficient rescue missions (DPPA 2010). 
 
Secondly, the replacement of the three levels of EOCs at the central, regional, and local 
levels by the new law makes the response to a disaster more efficient. The creation of 
only two centres, the central emergency centre and the county emergency centre, makes 
decision making and coordination faster (DPPA 2010). 
 
Thirdly, the activation of the emergency centres as described by DPRA 2000 was 
required to be initiated from the top of the government by the Cabinet, and it could take 
days to complete this process (Tsai and Cheryl 2010). This contributed to the rescue 
operations being ineffective and too slow in responding to a crisis especially within the 
critical first 72 hours. The DPPA 2010 eliminates such inefficiency by stipulating that 
the convener of the municipal county is mandated to direct a disaster response centre. 





8.3.2.2 Central Disaster Prevention and Protection Organizations and Operations 
 
According to the Taiwanese DPPA Act 2010 Article 6, Chapter 2, the Executive Yuan 
establishes the central disaster prevention and protection council. The council has the 
main role in supervising and evaluating the performance of the central and local 
administration in terms of disaster prevention and protection (DPPA 2010). The council 
is mandated to carry out any other emergency functions as outlined by the DPPA 2010 
Act. Article 7, Chapter 2 of the DPPA Act indicates that the central disaster prevention 
and protection council will have a single convener and deputy convener. The council is 
chaired by the Premier and the Vice Premier of the Executive Yuan and the secretary-
general, and several commissioners will be assigned on a part-time basis (DPPA 2010). 
 
The Premier of the Executive Yuan shall establish the Disaster Prevention and 
Protection Expert Consultation Committee and National Science and Technology 
Centre (Article 7, Chapter 2 of the DPPA 2010 Act). The two will operate under the 
council and will facilitate the research, development, and implementation of the disaster 
technology and prevention. The two will also aid in formulating the disaster prevention 
and protection policies for the Council (DPPA 2010). 
 
Article 7, Chapter 2 of DPPA Act, 2010 stipulates that the Executive Yuan is required 
to establish the central disaster prevention and protection commission, which is 
mandated to be chaired by The Deputy Premier. The commission will implement the 
disaster prevention and protection policy as authorized and mandated by the central 
disaster prevention and protection council. Article 7 indicates that the central disaster 
prevention and protection commission will establish the National Rescue Command and 
the National Disaster Prevention Agency (DPPA 2010). The National Rescue Command 
will coordinate implementation of the disaster prevention and protection and supervise 
disaster rescue missions (DPPA 2010). The National Disaster Prevention and Protection 





8.3.2.3 Local Disaster Prevention and Protection Organizations and Operations 
 
Article 8, Chapter 2 of the DPPA Act 2010, establishes the municipal or county and 
township (city) disaster prevention and protection at the local level of the government. 
The main functions as indicated in Article 8 are to sanction the regional disaster 
prevention and protection plans and rules of the municipality. The municipality will also 
supervise the emergency response within the municipal/county jurisdiction. The 
municipality will also undertake any other function as directed by the law (DPPA 2010). 
 
Article 9, Chapter 2 stipulates that in the event of an emergency, there will be one 
convener and one or two deputy convers to be chaired and deputized by the 
administrator and deputy of the municipality. Several commissioners will be allotted on 
a part-time basis from the military representative, governors, and experts by the 
municipal mayor or disaster prevention and protection council (DPPA 2010). Article 9 
establishes an office of disaster management at the Municipality to deal with the 
disaster affairs of the Municipality. Also, Article 9 stipulates a consultation committee 
will be established in the event of a disaster to provide consultation for disaster 
emergency and protection operations (DPPA 2010). 
 
Article 11, Chapter 2 establishes township disaster prevention and protection 
organization at the local level (DPPA 2010). There will be one convener and a deputy 
convener and some commissioners for the township council. According to Article 11, 
the mayor of the township will be the convener, while the chief secretary of the 
township shall be the deputy convener (DPPA 2010). The council will also have 






8.3.2.4 Central and local level Coordination and system operation in the 2010 Act 
 
Article 13 Chapter 2 of the DPPA Act 2010 stipulates that in the event of a natural 
disaster, the minister of the central regulating authorities shall establish the Central 
Emergency Operation Centre (DPPA 2010). Based on the nature and influential factors 
of the disaster, the convener will appoint the central commander. After the 
establishment of the central EOC, the centre will notify the municipal government to 
establish the disaster response centre. 
 
Article 4 Chapter 1 establishes the following central regulating authorities depending on 
the type of natural disaster: 
 
 Ministry of the Interior to handle disasters like windstorm, earthquake, fire and 
explosions, flooding, drought, public gas leakage under the ministry of 
economic affairs 
 Frost, debris flow, forest fire under the Executive Yuan 
  Air Crash under the Ministry of Transportation 
  Toxic Chemicals under the Executive Yuan 
 
The main role of the authorities above according to Article 4 Chapter 1 is to command, 
supervise, and coordinate the central regulating authorities (DPPA 2010). In case of a 
disaster, the convener of the municipal or township disaster prevention and protection 
council, depending on the severity of the disaster will establish a local emergency 
operation centre. The centre will coordinate with the central emergency operation centre 





8.3.3 Evaluations of the Taiwanese Disaster Prevention Protection Act 2010 
 
The Disaster Prevention and Protection Act of 2010 has two levels of emergency 
response, the central and the local disaster prevention and protection (DPPA 2010). This 
means that the emergency systems will be timelier and useful compared to the 
emergency systems depicted by the DPRA Act of 2000 that had three levels of 
emergency response (Tsai and Cheryl, 2010). The three levels created unnecessary 
delays in mobilizing resources and in executing government disaster rescue operations 
(Tsai and Cheryl 2010). The Taiwanese DPPA 2010 is more useful as it eliminates the 
bureaucratic procedures depicted by DPRA 2000. Article 12 and 13 of the DPPA 2010 
Act establishes central and local emergency operation centres in the event of a natural 
disaster (DPPA 2010). Back in 2000, Taiwanese government officials at the local level 
had to communicate, seeking approval from government officials at the top of the 
hierarchy in case of a disaster (Tsai and Cheryl 2010). The DPPA Act of 2010 stipulates 
the establishment of local emergency operation centres that will work in coordination 
with the central government in the execution of rescue operations (DPPA 2010). 
 
The Taiwanese DPPA Act of 2010 is also useful as it empowers the local government 
by creating regional plans of disaster prevention and protection and rules for the 
municipality (DPPA 2010, Article 8, and Chapter 2). This makes the local government 
semi-autonomous in terms of addressing emergency issues. In the DPRA Act of 2000 
the implementation of emergency systems required the local government to seek 
approval from the central government (Tsai and Cheryl 2010). The decentralization in 
the disaster response brought by the DPPA Act of 2010 is vital because the local 
government will understand the nature and situations of local emergencies better than 
the central government. 
 
The DPPA Act of 2010 is also useful in that Article 23 reinforces the need for 
government officials to conduct disaster monitoring, forecasting, and warning 
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announcements. It is crucial in disaster preparedness and practice to avert problems 
depicted by the DPRA emergency systems of 2000, where government departments like 
the Central Weather Bureau (CWB) gave conflicting information before Typhoon 
Morakot struck (Tsai and Cheryl 2010). The government department had initially 
warned of extensive damage and torrential rains in northern Taiwan and low rainfall for 
the South. The CWB did not know the typhoon would cause rainfall in the south (Tsai 
and Cheryl 2010). To avert such challenges, the DPPA Act of 2010 addresses data 
collection, and the appropriate notification of a disaster situation. 
 
Another issue that makes the DPPA Act of 2010 more useful compared to the DPRA act 
of 2000 is that Article 25 stipulates that government officials will conduct training and 
drills as part of preparedness and practice. Officials from the two levels of government 
and public enterprises will implement disaster training and drills for disaster prevention 
and protection (DPPA 2010). The Act indicates the officials that will be obliged to 
participate or provide assistance. This addresses the lack of familiarity in the emergency 
response by government officials during Typhoon Morakot.  
 
Another factor contributing to the usefulness of the DPPA 2010 Act is that Article 23 
addresses the communication challenges between the central and local governments. It 
indicates that to ensure effective communication efficient wireless transmission shall be 
enacted and publicized by the Ministry of the Interior. The microwave satellite digital 
broadcast transmission will be installed on a building top at the regional level to 
enhance stream communication. The Act indicates that the Ministry of the Interior is 
responsible for compensating the builder accordingly. Stream communication between 
the central and local levels will boost coordination and the emergency response. This is 
a great improvement to the DPRA Act of 2000 where information flow between the 





8.4 NGOs in Taiwan 
 
 
8.4.1 Development of NGOs in Taiwan  
 
According to Wang (2012), the development of NGOs in Taiwan can be summarized 
into the following three stages. The first stage was the germination period that occurred 
from 1949 to 1987. At this stage, NGOs were under strict government control. The 
second stage occurred from 1978 to 1996, at this time, Taiwan experienced a political 
transition from an authoritarian regime to a populist regime, and at this point Grassroots 
NGOs developed faster. The third and current stage started in 1996 and has continued 
up until now, at this stage a lack of public goods and services contributed to the more 
rapid growth rate of NGOs (Wang, 2012).  
 
The social activities of NGOs were limited by the Taiwan Government until the mid-
1980s (Juang, 2015). The government was pressured by the fact that it lacked the 
capacity to improve social security and offer public services (Juang 2015). This 
loophole during this period gave NGOs a platform to develop and grow in Taiwan. 
However, the activities of NGOs were far from active given the strong suppression by 
the Taiwan Government. The development of NGOs in Taiwan can be related to 
democratization, and the need for social services and the growth of business (Wu, Chiu 
and Tsai 1997). This information was supported by the interviewees. First, the 
democratization in the 1990s acted as the turning point, and from then on the activities 
of NGOs were more noticeable, and their participation was more keenly felt. 
 
The need for social services coupled with the increase of natural disasters in Taiwan 
have led to the steady growth in the number of NGOs and voluntary organizations in 
Taiwan (Wu, Chiu and Tsai 1997). And the rise in the national income and the growth 
of businesses in Taiwan have made entrepreneurs more philanthropic (Wu, Chiu and 
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Tsai 1997). And enterprises donate vast amounts of funds to establish NGOs to address 
social services. 
 
8.4.2 The Tzu Chi Foundation and its humanitarian work in Taiwan  
 
There were many local NGOs involved in the response and recovery phase during 
Typhoon Morakot, such as World Vision and the Red Cross. However, Tzu Chi was the 
most significant NGO before and after Morakot (Yu 2005; Wu 2007; Ke and Gao 2010). 
 
This research compares the operations of the largest and most significant NGO during 
the response phase of two cases studies, hence in Taiwan it was Tzu Chi that played a 
major role in the decision making and operations before and post Morakot. This section 
provides the background of Tzu Chi and how its responded to the disaster. 
 
8.4.2.1 Brief Background of the Tzu Chi Foundation  
 
The Tzu Chi Foundation is an international NGO that has an international network of 
volunteers and staff and is bestowed with special consultative status by the UN (O’Neill 
2010). The organization was established as a charity NGO with background in Buddhist 
beliefs and origins by a Buddhist nun Cheng Yen in 1966 (Cheng 2007). She was 
motivated by the late Master Yin Shun an advocate of humanistic Buddhism who urged 
her to work for Buddhism. The Tzu Chi Foundation started with a group of thirty 
housewives who contributed daily to cater for needy families (Cheng 2007). The group 
grew to a civil society with nearly 10 million members in 47 countries (Tzu Chi 
Foundation 2014). The core objectives of the organization are based on charity, 
medicine, education, and humanity (Tzu Chi Foundation 2009). The organization 
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started with donations, and later extended its areas of operations to medicine, education, 
and culture (Tzu Chi Foundation 2009). 
 
Tzu Chi has opened several branches in Taiwan with an aim of expanding its network 
and the efficient delivery of social services. Many other Buddhist NGOs have also been 
registered in Taiwan showing the significant contribution by Tzu Chi in influencing the 
decisions of the citizens of Taiwan (Statistical Yearbook of the Interior 2014). There are 
approximately 38 Buddhist charitable NGOs legally registered with the government. 
Compared to the other Buddhist charitable NGOs, Tzu Chi is still in first in terms of its 
development, membership, and number of donors (Statistical Yearbook of Interior 
2014). 
 
The Tzu Chi Foundation was among the first NGOs to arrive at the ravaged sites during 
the crisis management stage of Typhoon Morakot. With the government response being 
slow and lacking during the first critical 72 hours (Cheng 2013), Tzu Chi assumed a 
decisive and leading role in mitigating the effect of Typhoon Morakot and minimizing 
the number of causalities. 
 
Tzu Chi emphasized the primacy of the supply chain process in managing Typhoon 
Morakot. This is because it is the most expensive part of providing humanitarian aid and 
determines the success in providing prompt relief and rescue to victims (Abidi and 
Klumpp 2013). The supply chain activities by Tzu Chi during Typhoon Morakot can be 
grouped into four major stages: (a) preparedness; (b) resource mobilization; (c) 





8.4.2.2 Response to Typhoon Morakot by the Tzu Chi Foundation  
 
i. Preparedness  
 
The first stage of the Tzu Chi humanitarian supply chain during Typhoon Morakot was 
preparedness. Generally speaking this stage is an ongoing process, involving learning 
from past disaster management activities while preparing for another disaster. 
Preparation is a critical stage of any humanitarian supply chain (Anisya 2005), as it 
provides the basis for conducting the other stages of the humanitarian supply chain. Tzu 
Chi prepared for Typhoon Morakot in two main ways: (a) Procuring non-perishable 
relief supplies such as blankets, clothes, and sanitation equipment; and, (b) developing 
donor networks that were activated when Typhoon Morakot struck. However, many 
humanitarian organizations usually overlook the preparedness stage because of high 
staff and volunteer turnover that considerably undermine learning from previous 
disaster management activities (Cozzolino 2012). 
 
ii. Resource Mobilization 
 
Based on their definition, when Morakot hit, Tzu Chi started the second stage of the 
humanitarian supply chain: the mobilisation of resources in terms of manpower, 
information, and finance. However, Tzu Chi had difficulties in getting reliable 
information during the pre-crisis stage, which would have been important in preparing 
the residents of Southern Taiwan for the ensuing devastation. At the onset of Typhoon 
Morakot, there was conflicting or even misleading information that undermined proper 
preparation and planning. According to Cheng (2013), the Central Weather Bureau, a 
government agency responsible for projecting and issuing warnings of adverse weather 
conditions, issued misleading warnings of adverse weather on the August 6
th
, The CWB 
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weather warnings were exactly the opposite of what transpired. Within three days, 
southern Taiwan had received the equivalent of its average annual rainfall (Wu 2013). 
 
Tzu Chi supply chain stage of resource mobilization began with marshalling human 
resources. Human resources are critical in any supply chain since they facilitate the 
rapid movement of goods and services from donors/source to the victims/destination 
(Walton, Mays and Haselkorn 2011). Tzu Chi used phone calls to reach its branch 
offices, especially those located in southern and central Taiwan to notify and mobilize 
its members into action. Tzu Chi also used social media and mass media 
announcements to reach and request thousands of its volunteers to assemble at 
designated locations in preparation for initial rescue and relief operations. Within the 
first 72 hours, Tzu Chi had mobilized more than 15,000 volunteers in the areas worst 
affected by Typhoon Morakot. Although mobilizing volunteers did not take much effort, 
Tzu Chi experienced considerable logistical difficulties in moving these volunteers to 
areas urgently requiring humanitarian aid because these areas were many and 
geographically scattered over southern Taiwan (Chang, Yang and Chi-duo 2012). In 
addition, Salvado et al., (2015) contends that Tzu Chi also sent a team to the disaster 
sites for assessment. Relief supply needs identified within the first 24 hours would have 
improved the response within the first 72 hours. 
 
Although information plays an important role during disasters, due to the lack of and 
false information provided by the government agencies, it was a challenge for Tzu Chi 
to identify the number of victims and the needs of the affected populations (Chang et al. 
2012). This proved a challenge to Tzu Chi because information from credible sources 
such as government agencies and leaders responsible for disaster management was not 
forthcoming. The DPPA in 2000 not incorporating collaboration between the 
Government and NGOs also prevented effective communication (Cheng 2013). 
However, the use of social media and phone calls by Tzu Chi to reach its volunteers and 
victims and turn them into sources of information was helpful because it provided 
valuable insights into the extent of the damage caused by Typhoon Morakot. Although 
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Tzu chi also utilized social media for communication, this proved to be ineffective due 
to the damage to the infrastructure (electricity). Still, through its volunteers and 
survivors, Tzu Chi gained insights into the status and numbers of victims affected by 
Typhoon Morakot, the status of the buildings, and the status of the transport and 
communication infrastructure, which it used to estimate needs, e.g. food, shelter, and 
medical supplies. Whybark et al., (2010) contends that, during its initial assessment of 
the damages, Tzu Chi should have dispatched experts in disciplines such as health, 
nutrition, and sanitation to provide a rough estimate of the needs of the survivors. 
 
Tzu Chi utilized two approaches to obtain its financial resources (Tzu Chi Foundation 
2010). First of all, the organization has a well-established donor network that makes it 
easy to fund raise. Secondly, internal fundraising is utilized, and hence employees are 
asked to make donations. On top of that, there are well-wishers who know who they are 
and who are doing something to donate money. Tzu Chi also requires financial 
assistance from its employees and volunteers, during Morakot, it raised approximately 
NT$5000 to NT$10,000, within the first 72 hours (Tzu Chi Foundation 2010). 
 
It is argued that Tzu Chi plays a crucial role in humanitarian relief whenever there is a 
natural disaster in Taiwan. Tzu Chi was among the first NGOs to reach the sites of the 
affected areas following Typhoon Morakot. The organization has a policy of providing 
an emergency response and conducting rescue operations within the ‘golden 72 hours’ 
(Interviewee No. 7 2014). Interviewee No.7 also reported that volunteers were 
instrumental in saving lives, and they offered free meals to more than 200,000 affected 
families. They also distributed water, clothes, medical supplies, and other urgent 
necessities. The Tzu Chi Foundation provided various types of support that included 
home visits to the affected families, cleaning, and free clinics in response to the 




With its strong mobilisation networks, Tzu chi successfully delivered key humanitarian 
supplies within three days, including blankets and sanitation materials. In addition its 
warehouses with prepared supplied also played a key role in the effective delivery. The 
organisation keeps stocks of non-perishable humanitarian supplies in its warehouses. 
The organisation also establishes flexible procurement chains, which makes it easier to 
purchase food and other perishable goods (Interviewee 7 2014). Regarding the delivery 
routes, the organisation utilised both road and airdrop approaches to deliver 
humanitarian goods.  
 
Typhoon Morakot damaged the road infrastructure and thus most affected areas were 
inaccessible. According to Interviewee No.7, the organization trucks were loaded with 
supplies and then distributed the humanitarian relief aid to areas where the road 
infrastructure was not damaged. Most of the areas were inaccessible and, therefore, Tzu 
Chi air dropped humanitarian supplies (Interviewee No.7). The unloading and 
distribution of the relief materials were done in collaboration with the Taiwan 
Government. 
 
iii. Operations Planning 
 
In the operations planning stage, Tzu Chi planned and coordinated the distribution relief 
supplies with other relief activities such as the repair of the road infrastructure and 
construction of temporary healthcare facilities. According to the Tzu Chi Foundation 
(2010), in the immediate aftermath of Typhoon Morakot, relief and rescue operations by 
volunteers attached to Tzu Chi were chaotic and uncoordinated. Most volunteers rushed 
to the Kaohsiung and Pingtung counties, which were hardest hit by Typhoon Morakot to 
offer individual and group assistance. A group of 300 volunteers initially assumed they 
would be able to clear at least two villages but they quickly recognized their work force 
had no impact at all. The devastation was way beyond their imagination. According to 
Oloruntoba and Gray (2006), the main problem with the Tzu Chi activities in the 
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operations planning phase was the lack of coordinated functions with other NGOs or 
with government agencies, which potentially caused duplication of services and the 
inefficient distribution of relief supplies. Additionally, no single actor had sufficient 
resources to respond effectively to a major disaster such as Typhoon Morakot (Bui et al. 
2000; Wee et al. 2014). 
 
Tzu Chi procures donations of non-perishable supplies from its network of donors in 
advance of an actual humanitarian crisis and stocks these supplies in its disaster 
response warehouses. Advance procurement of relief supplies is an automated process 
using decentralized stock management software that reconciles stock levels of relief 
supplies in all its warehouses spread across Taiwan. Stock taking tasks are done bi-
monthly and the stock management software flags relief stocks that are below the 
recommended levels for procurement. Tzu Chi only procures perishable relief supplies 
such as food in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. However, Tzu Chi faced some 
difficulties in the procuring of perishable relief supplies and other donations from 
international donors when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declined international support 
during the initial stages of Typhoon Morakot (Cheng 2013). 
 
Once the relief supplies had been dropped to the affected areas, a team of Tzu Chi staff 
worked with the government to unload and distribute the supplies to the affected and 
needy people.  
 
iv. Recovery Operations 
 
The impact of Morakot brought a great challenge for reconstruction. Tzu Chi very 
effectively worked with the government and shared in the decision making and 
operation process. This enlarged the impact of the organisation, which assisted the 
government in the tasks of evacuation, response, and reconstruction (Wu 2013). Indeed, 
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integrating and coordinating the activities of Tzu Chi with those of the Taiwan 
government was one of the factors that improved the response and recovery activities 
(Da Costa et al. 2014). 
 
During the post-Typhoon Morakot reconstruction and recovery operations, Tzu Chi 
collaborated with government agencies to evacuate and resettle displaced families as 
well as assist them to rebuild their lives. The role of Tzu Chi during the recovery stage 
was in carrying out the impact assessment.  
 
Tzu Chi advocated the idea of relocating families from the mountainous villages in safer 
locations. The government accepted and approved the idea. The government identified 
and acquired land belonging to a sugar company in Shanlin, which it gave to Tzu Chi to 
take the leading role in constructing shelter to resettle families from the devastated 
mountain regions. The village was given the name, “Great Love Village”.  
 
Regarding the reconstruction strategy, Tzu Chi advocated a relocation strategy which 
encouraged the affected population to move away from their home land and build new 
communities in a safer area (Maa 2010). The government gave approval for Tzu Chi to 
build the largest reconstruction community in Shanlin (Shea 2010). This community is 
comprised of three tribes and Han people. Whether or not these people should have 
been relocated has raised many debates. Most academics do not agree with Tzu Chi, and 
most of the affected population did not welcome this proposal since most of the affected 
population were from aboriginal tribes, and did not live like the urbanised and 
modernised population. 
 
Whereas the concept of resettling families from the devastated and dangerous mountain 
villages by Tzu Chi was reasonable, the decision was one-sided. Some of the 
communities such as the Rukai Tribe earmarked for resettlement vehemently 
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complained about Tzu Chi and the government side siding with them in the decision to 
resettle them. Rukai Aborigines complained of the requirement to sign an agreement to 
give up their ancestral lands for permanent housing. They also complained that Tzu Chi 
failed to consider their culture and livelihoods such as forbidding them from carving 
totems in their new homes, and including Buddhist slogans and a new set of Ten 
Commandments in the newly constructed Chapel (Presbyterian Church in Taiwan 2010). 
Howden (2009) argues that failing to consider the suggestions and demands by victims 
of a disaster will undermine post-disaster reconstruction activities, whose fundamental 
objective is to facilitate and support the victims to return to their normal lives within 
realistic timelines. 
 
At the time of conducting the interview, the organization was actively involved in post-
reconstruction activities according to interviewee No.7. The organization worked with 
the Taiwan Government in constructing permanent houses for the indigenous 
communities. The management of Tzu Chi determined that “the mountainous villages 
were damaged beyond repair and were dangerous for human habitation” (Interviewee 
No. 7). The management of Tzu Chi approached the Government with an idea of 
rehousing the villagers elsewhere. The idea was approved and the site belonging to the 
Sugar Company, in Shanlin, on the northern side of Kaohsiung was given to Tzu Chi to 
implement the idea. According to Interviewee No.7, the Village was given a name 
“Great Love Village”. At the time of the interview, 600 of the 1500 homes were 
completed for the survivors of Typhoon Morakot. 
 
Interviewee No.7 indicated “Great Love Village” would also have other social amenities. 
There will be “four churches, an arts centre where villagers can sell their traditional 
goods, a medical centre and an office of the local government.” The village is well 
designed to cater for living, work, and socialization. Interviewee No. 7 said, “Tzu Chi is 
dedicated to completing the houses so that every displaced villager will feel comfortable 
living in them, they will be something precious and permanent with donations raised 




8.4.2.3 Distinguishing Tzu Chi Humanitarian Supplies Chain from Other NGOs 
 
 
Figure 8.4: Basic humanitarian supply chain 
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Tzu Chi's supply chain for disaster management seems to be effective, but it is 
debatable whether this is the case for the preparation of the relief goods. 
 
“Tzu Chi has a flexible and the most efficient supply chain to cope with the 
challenges posed by the logistics and distribution of relief supplies. The 
demand for supplies is uncertain; however, Tzu Chi procures or gets 
donations of non-perishable relief supplies before an actual event….” 
 (Interviewee No. 7 2014) 
 
The pre-event planning by Tzu Chi involves a stock analysis of the relief materials in its 
warehouses to establish the supplies that need to be procured. According to Interviewee 
No. 7, the organization has stock software that reconciles the amount of stock in all its 
warehouses distributed around the country (Interviewee No. 7). Stock takes are 
conducted twice monthly, and the information is updated to the stock software that is 
decentralized to all the branches. The software shows the materials that are below stock 
and which the management is required to procure (Lv 2009). According to Interviewee 
No. 7, the organization has some prequalified suppliers who must prove their capability 
before being selected. The relief materials that are purchased and stocked by the 
organization in the warehouses are common humanitarian relief materials that are non-
perishable (Interviewee No. 7). Perishable relief supplies like food are urgently 
procured after natural disasters have occurred. The organization has a big budget to buy 
supplies although the interviewee was reluctant to disclose exact figures. 
 
According to Interviewee No.7, before the procured goods are stored in the warehouses 
the stock software system is updated. Apart from procuring humanitarian supplies, Tzu 
Chi appeals to its donors for donations of humanitarian supplies (Tzu Chi 2009). 
According to Interviewee No. 7, the organization prepares a guide list to its donors of 
the goods and materials that need to be restocked. 
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When disasters occur, deliveries to the disaster spot are done efficiently (Linet, Ediz and 
Beste 2004). The organization has a dedicated team of staff that has experience in 
logistics and coordination. The organization distributes humanitarian materials on a 
demand basis (Stoddard 2003). According to Interviewee No.7, a team is first 
dispatched to the disaster areas to make a record of the supplies that are required by the 
affected people. This list is then sent to the warehouses where the supplies are urgently 
uploaded to the trucks for distribution to the affected areas. If the affected areas are not 
accessible by road, the organization management liaises with the government for easier 
distribution through airdropping (Interviewee No. 7). Once, the supplies are delivered to 
the affected areas, the government rescue operations are involved in the unloading and 
distribution to the affected people. 
 
8.4.3 Response to Typhoon Morakot by International NGOs 
 
International NGOs in Taiwan have cooperated with the government in responding to 
natural disasters. The NGOs participate in relief work and provide supplies that aid in 
disaster response and recovery. In response to Typhoon Morakot, international NGOs 
responded in offering humanitarian support in the wake of huge destruction (Cheng 
2013).  
 
The Red Cross Society of China also played a crucial role in the response to the 
Typhoon Morakot disaster (Tsai and Chieh 2014). The organization on behalf of the 
Fujian branch contributed CNY 1 million to support the relief efforts. The organization, 
dispatched 1,500 family kits that consisted of hygiene items, towels, spoons, etc. to 
affected counties such as Xiapu and Tuorong (Tsai and Chieh 2014). Moreover, the 
organization also allocated water purifiers, cooking oil, and rice and mobilized 




The Taiwan Red Cross was at the forefront of conducting rescue operations (The Red 
Cross Society of The Republic of China Taiwan 2012). Although the organization 
mobilised only 1,500 volunteers, compared to the large number of volunteers from Tzu 
Chi, these volunteers were well trained search and rescue personnel and engaged in the 
S & R operations. Similar to Tzu chi, the organization also delivered non-food supplies, 
and participated in post-disaster reconstruction. The organization collaborated with 
other NGOs in ensuring the effective coordination and dissemination of information to 
avoid the duplication of relief work (Folger 2013). 
 
Another International organization that participated was Taiwan World Vision. They 
recruited 1,000 volunteers to conduct relief operations and distribute humanitarian 
supplies to the affected families (Cheng 2013). The volunteers also assisted in home 
clean-up as the flood waters regressed. Moreover, Taiwan World Vision also 
collaborated with other international organizations in the post-reconstruction activities 
such as rebuilding homes for the indigenous people. 
 
Another international NGO involved in the relief efforts was the Shelter Box Response 
Teams. The organization contributed to the immediate humanitarian needs, for example 
sleeping bags, blankets, and food, etc., and the coordination and dissemination of the 
rescue efforts (Cheng 2013). It also recruited over 1,000 volunteers who supported with 
the supply and distribution of relief materials to the affected families. 
 
8.4.3.1 Evaluation of the NGO response to Typhoon Morakot  
 
In contrast to the slow and ineffective response by the Taiwan Government, the 
timeliness in responding to the crisis by the NGOs was remarkable. Immediately after 
the tragedy struck, Taiwanese NGOs sprang into action providing relief operations and 
visiting the affected areas to conduct humanitarian relief. The NGOs’ response to 
Typhoon Morakot was swift and achieved the following successes: 
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 Faster Response within the Golden 72 Hours 
 
The Tzu Chi Foundation was among the first Buddhist NGOs to reach the affected areas 
within the first 72 hours (Ou-Yang and Bo 2009). This was the shortest time, during 
which the Taiwanese Government had not yet mobilized its rescue efforts. 
 
 NGOs mobilized funds within the shortest time 
 
Within the shortest time, NGOs managed to mobilize funds and distribute them to the 
victims. For example, Tzu Chi distributed NT$5000 to NT$10,000 to approximately 
12,000 victim households (Ou-Yang and Bo 2009). Other NGOs such as The Red Cross 
raised donations to the value of approximately NT$100 million dollars (US$3 million) 
by 15th August barely a week after the tragedy (Ou-Yang and Bo 2009). This response 
was remarkable compared to the Government that failed to launch any international 
relief support on time. Furthermore, NGOs mobilized Taiwanese citizens to donate, and 
the response was positive as citizens took this as their responsibility (Ou-Yang and Bo 
2009) 
 
 Supporting the Government in the Post-Reconstruction Efforts 
 
NGOs both local and international participated in the Typhoon Morakot post-disaster 
recovery. According to the interviewed informants, NGOs like Tzu Chi constructed 
1,500 houses three months post Morakot for the affected victims (Interviewee No. 7 
above). This demonstrated that the response by the NGOs was useful in that the 
homeless victims were not left to desperately seek shelter for themselves. The Tzu Chi 




8.5 Discussion of Possible Recommendations to the Government and NGOs 
 
The previous sections of this chapter have focused on evaluating the response to 
Typhoon Morakot by the Taiwan Government and NGOs. Based on these findings, this 
section provides possible recommendations to both the Taiwanese Government and 
NGOs for future responses to future disasters. 
 
8.5.1 Recommendations for the Government Disaster Preparedness 
 
To respond to the issue of a lack of preparedness and planning to handle a large scale 
disaster (Cheng 2013) it is recommended that the government deliver disaster 
preparedness education and training to decision makers. This disaster preparedness 
training should be carried out periodically in order to sharpen skills in terms of response 
and evacuation operations (Perry and Michael 2003). In addition, disaster preparedness 
training could be introduced into the education curriculum targeting the school-age 
generation. Moreover, the Taiwanese government could provide disaster preparedness 
training to villagers through forums. This will increase the understanding of disaster risk 
and allow the government officials and citizens learn more about emergency response 
measures. 
  
 Provision of Convenient Emergency Shelters 
 
Typhoon Morakot rendered many victims homeless due to landslides and flooding that 
led to houses been swept away, and others were buried, as was the case with Xiaolin 
Village (Tsai and Cheryl 2010). In response to such disasters that cause heavy rainfall 
and disastrous damage, it is wise for the Taiwanese Government to provide convenient 
emergency shelters. The locations of these emergency shelters should be conveniently 
placed avoiding places that are inaccessible by road or areas that are close to disaster 
prone areas like mountains (Tsai and Cheryl 2010). In addition, the shelters should have 
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sufficient space in order to accommodate vast numbers of individuals and families 
(Cecchine 2001). Furthermore, emergency shelters should be equipped with life support 
equipment, medical supplies and communications equipment to facilitate the flow of 
information. Government officials should manage the emergency centres during 
disasters (Cecchine 2001). 
 
 Community Disaster early warning systems 
 
The Taiwanese Government failed to evacuate village residents despite the constant 
warnings signs and alerts communicated by the central weather bureau (Tsai and Cheryl 
2010). To counter this problem, the government needs to adopt an informal 
coordination mechanism that channels early warning signs to the villagers. This can be 
achieved by adopting community disaster early warning systems where village leaders 
can liaise with departments like the central weather bureau (Hay and John 2009). Such 
village leaders will obtain real time information about possible disasters like Typhoon 
Morakot, and such updates can be channelled to the villagers. This will facilitate early 
evacuations and avoid unnecessary deaths as seen with Typhoon Morakot. The village 
leaders will disseminate timely information, enabling communities endangered by the 
hazard to evacuate quickly. 
 
 Settlement and Afforestation Policies 
 
Mudslides caused by Typhoon Morakot greatly affected villages like Xiaolin that was 
entirely buried. The village was located near a mountain and the Nanzixian River (Tsai 
and Cheryl 2010). The Taiwanese Government propose settlement policies limiting 
citizens from residing in disaster prone areas such as near mountains or rivers. This 
would reduce situations where an entire village is buried, and the number of casualties 
would be reduced significantly. Furthermore, the government should have policies 
encouraging the plantation of trees surrounding the villages that are prone to disasters. 
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Trees help in the prevention of landslides as the roots hog and reduce the speed of water 
running down slopes (Chomchalow 2003). 
 
 Establish NGO Alliances and Partnerships 
 
As a result of the lessons from the Ji ji earthquake, NGOs understand the importance of 
coordination and communication, although it took them some time to build a shared 
online platform to exchange information and make decisions (Yang and Zhi 2009). 
However, Tzu chi had not participated in this network. It is advised that a shared 
network such as this could continue to play a role in coordination and information 
sharing during normal and disaster events (Rovegno 2002). Such alliances have a 
significant impact on combining knowledge, technology, resources, and experience in 
executing a disaster response. In addition, collective partnerships and alliances eliminate 
the duplications of rescue efforts as NGOs in the alliances share responsibilities and 
roles. 
 
 Formulate a criterion to examine and hire volunteers 
 
NGOs conduct relief efforts through volunteers who in most cases are mobilized when 
disasters occur, and they are briefly trained to assist with rescue operations (Hui 2013). 
Such volunteers in most cases do not provide professional services, as they are not 
trained in rescue operations. In order to conduct more advanced rescue operations, it is 
important for Taiwanese NGOs to establish a criterion where the volunteers are 
mobilized, evaluated, and trained way before the occurrence of natural disasters takes 
place (Moore et al. 2009). This contributes to convenience and disaster preparedness in 






Typhoon Morakot resulted in severe damage to Taiwan, and it will not vanish quickly in 
the memories of Taiwanese citizens and the world as a whole. Comparing the response 
demonstrated by the NGOs and the Government, there is no doubt that the NGOs 
demonstrated more efficiency and speed. The tragedy, however, acted as a wake-up call 
to the Government that apologized to its citizens and promised more efficiency in any 
future disaster response. The move to replace the dysfunctional emergency laws (the 
DPRA Act 2000) with the DPPA Act 2010 is a notable move by the government in the 
right direction. It is upon the Taiwanese Government to prove its commitment to 




Chapter 9 Comparative analysis: Wenchuan Earthquake 
vs. Typhoon Morakot 
 
9.1. Comparison between Disaster Emergency Plans 
 
 
Table 9.1 Differences of emergency plan between China and Taiwan 
 
Government China Taiwan 
 
Classification of 
scale of emergency 
 
1. Casualties 
2. Disaster scale 












A significant difference between the two case studies is their mode of emergency 
classification. For example Figure 1 on page 98 shows that the Chinese National 
Emergency Management Plan states that disasters are classified according to the 
number deaths and the impact on the country’s economy. The reason for this 
categorisation is that it allows the rescue efforts to focus their resources and align them 
with the level of severity. On the other hand, the example of Taiwan’s Emergency 
Management Plan gives no clear indication about whether the response efforts should 
be affected by the economic impact of a disaster (The Office of Disaster Management 
(ODM), Taiwan 2010). Another example is seen in Figure 7 in page 103 where the 
Chinese Emergency Response Plan classifies emergencies as general, large, significant, 
or major (Li et al. 2014; The National Emergency Plan 2012). Figure 7 further shows 
that a disaster emergency is classified according to its degree, its number of casualties, 
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and the impact on the state’s economy. In the Taiwanese case study, the DPPA 
classifies a disaster according to the type of disaster and the type of response by 
different departments (Vitoriano, Montero & Ruan 2013). However, other than this 
vague classification in the Taiwanese response plan, there is no indication that the plan 
considers the death toll or the economic impact of a disaster. These examples clearly 
show that the Chinese system could be seen as more efficient and practical than the 
Taiwanese system.  
 
According to China’s Emergency Response Plan an earthquake that falls into the major 
category is one that causes less than 300 deaths and missing persons, while large 
earthquakes are those that lead to more than 10 deaths and less than 50 severe economic 
losses (Bissell, Pinet, Nelson & Levy 2004). A general earthquake is one that leads to a 
total of 10 deaths and missing persons. The Emergency Response Plan further stipulates 
that while large and major earthquakes cause severe economic losses, significant 
earthquakes are those that cause a loss of less than 1% of the GDP (The Disaster 
Mitigation Centre of the Ministry of Civil Affairs 2008). The reason for this 
classification is to make disaster preparedness and planning easier since different 
degrees of earthquake will require different responses. 
 
 Content of an Emergency Plan 
 
The contents of emergency plans further differ in terms of their objectives and details. 
For example while the Chinese emergency response plan outlined three components to 
achieving its main goal, its Taiwanese counterpart describes four main objectives (Li et 
al. 2014; Lin 2008). The main goal of the Chinese plan is to assist decision making, 
protect aid workers, and finally provide guidance to the rescue workers (Canton 2007). 
Conversely, the main objective of the Taiwanese Plan is to have the government 
actively advance its systems for managing disasters (BBC News 2009). The first 
response level in the Chinese Plan incorporates the use of risk valuation, describes the 
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arrangements at the institutional level, includes early warning observation, and 
describes the remediation measures to prepare for natural disasters (Li et al. 2014). The 
second component of the Chinese Emergency Response Plan involves the responses of 
the field aid teams, the rescue efforts that involve the active participation of the entire 
society and the military, and disaster alleviation (Li et al. 2014; The National 
Emergency Plan 2012). Lastly, the plan stipulates the recovery and rebuilding efforts by 
providing the action plans before, during, and after a disaster with careful consideration 
of the factors that influence the process (Vitoriano, Montero & Ruan 2013). However, 
the Taiwanese plan is briefer in its description of the actions that should follow an 
emergency. The plan indicates that disaster alleviation should be the main goal. After 
alleviation, preparedness should follow, and then response and finally recovery. The 
two emergency plans include the response phases which provide guidance for disaster 
mitigation (Vitoriano, Montero & Ruan 2013). 
 
The content of their emergency plans also differ significantly. For example while the 
Chinese plan is rather general and has fewer pages, the Taiwanese plan is more detailed. 
This difference is seen in the classification of disasters since the latter classifies 
emergencies according to the different types of disaster and the type of response by 
different departments. However, when an actual disaster occurs, the Chinese response 
system is more involved than its Taiwanese counterpart (Li et al 2014). Although the 
Taiwanese response plan explicitly details the system of response, during emergencies 
the responsible parties tend play the blame game, as no one is willing to take 
responsibility (Lin 2008). 
 
The revision of the plans was another important point of comparison. While the 
Taiwanese Emergency Response Plan had been revised through the promulgation of the 
Disaster Prevention and Prevention (DPP) Act in 2010, the Chinese Plan has had no 
such revisions. The revision of the DPR (2000) was in response to the impacts of 
previous devastating natural disasters and signified an impressive improvement in the 
management of disasters and the formalisation of the Taiwanese government’s disaster 
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management system. The presence of a revised version of DPRA (2000) was a result of 
the identified shortcomings in the original version. 
 
Another difference in the two emergency plans is the involvement of the government in 
emergencies. The Chinese government selects the disaster response team and directs all 
efforts to support the activities of such a team (Vitoriano, Montero & Ruan 2013). This 
involvement of the government makes the Chinese disaster response more efficient than 
Taiwan’s. For example in the aftermath of the Wenchuan earthquake, the Chinese state 
council was in charge of the response efforts (Bo & Walle 2010; Bissell et al. 2004). 
The Chinese emergency plan dictates that the state council is only responsible for 
providing aid when there is a significant earthquake (Bissell et al. 2004). The provincial 
and city headquarters deal with major and large earthquakes respectively, while the state 
council ensures there is coordination and supports the efforts of both headquarters. The 
disaster relief headquarters at the city level is in charge of large earthquakes. The city 
headquarters enjoy the support of the provincial headquarters while the country’s 
earthquake administration supports the relief work. The county headquarters for disaster 
relief in turn take care of emergencies resulting from general earthquakes (fig. 1). The 
headquarters at the provincial level as well as at the city level, and the state’s earthquake 










9.2 Comparison between the local government responses during disasters 
 
 
Table 9.2: Local government response during disasters 
 
Government China Taiwan 
Local government 
response during disaster 
1. Send Chinese armed force 
to carry out rescue task; 
2. Establish Disaster Relief 
Headquarters; 
3. Mobilize resources; 
4. Repair infrastructure; 
5. Evacuate victims and 
provide shelter; 
Security patrol; 
1. Establish Disaster Relief 
Headquarters; 
2. Mobilize resources; 
3. Repair infrastructure; 
Evacuate victims and provide 
shelter; 
 
It is also necessary to make a comparison between the levels of involvement by other 
national agencies. For example, while the Chinese government involved its police force 
and other agencies, its Taiwanese counterpart utilized its armed forces and military 
under the direct of the President. However, the Taiwanese plan also included the use of 
technology to aid in the management and reduction of disasters. In relying on lower 
levels of administration to provide information on disaster management, the Taiwanese 
emergency plan was more efficient than the Chinese plan (Kuhlicke 2013). The Chinese 
state council worked in close collaboration with the local governments in the affected 
regions to facilitate relief and recovery. This difference between the two is the policies 
that are in place in each country and the rules that are set for the individual emergency 
plans. 
 
The second factor for comparison in the local government response during disasters is 
the establishment of disaster relief headquarters. For example, the Chinese government 
established headquarters at the State Council, the city relief centres, at the county level, 
and the provincial level (Chen 2009; Chen & Booth 2011; Xu et al 2009; National 
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Emergency Plan 2012). Figure 1 on page 43 shows that Taiwan also established 
headquarters at the central, regional, and local levels (Tsai and Cheryl 2010). The 
establishment of these headquarters was meant to devolve the responsibilities for the 
disaster response and thus reduce over-reliance on the central government. 
 
The third point of comparison in the local government response system is the 
mobilisation of resources. For example in the aftermath of the Wenchuan earthquake, 
the Chinese government mobilised resources in the form of donations, the army, 
rescuers and fire fighters (Tsai & Chen 2010). The Chinese and Taiwanese governments 
also mobilised humanitarian aid resources after the disasters (Boon 2012). In contrast, 
the Taiwanese local government acted by mobilising the armed forces and rescuers to 
deliver relief aid and funds to the affected areas. The role of resource mobilisation often 
falls on the government since the state is capable of funding disaster relief. 
 
Another difference in the local governments’ responses is in terms of their 
reconstruction efforts. For example after the Morakot typhoon, the government worked 
with Tzu Chi Foundation to carry out post-reconstruction activities (BBC News 2009; 
Chang et al. 2012). These activities included the construction of permanent houses for 
Taiwanese communities and the rehousing of the people living in the mountainous 
villages. Similarly, the Taiwan Red Cross and Taiwan World Vision also undertook 
reconstruction by rebuilding homes (Alexander & Davis 2012; Canton 2007). On the 
other hand, China has a disaster recovery and rebuilding plan which outlines the actions 
to be taken before, during, and after a disaster (Benedikter & Nowotny 2013; Bo & 
Walle 2010; China 2009). There is also an important comparison point in terms of the 
local governments’ evacuation efforts. For example the Taiwanese government 
mobilised 182,000 military soldiers to evacuate thousands of victims (Chang et al. 2012; 
Cheng 2013). The Chinese government conducted evacuations through the local 
government which reports to the national headquarters (Zhang, Rezaee & Zhu 2010). 
The Chinese local government used security personnel to safely deliver humanitarian 
aid and evacuate the victims. And given that the road to recovery after a disaster begins 
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with the reconstruction and rebuilding of homes and infrastructure (Cozzolino 2012), 
the governments’ efforts at reconstructing infrastructure, rebuilding homes, and 
resettling the victims all served to aid recovery.   
 
9.3 Comparison of NGOs activities and the NGO registration process 
 
 
Table 9.3 NGOs difference between China and Taiwan 







NGOs’ situation (do they 
have a common standard; 
have they effectively been 
monitored or supervised, and 
so on) 
1. Organization quality is 
uneven 
2. Too many grass root 
(unregistered) NGOs  
3. No unified regulatory 
oversight system  
Considerably better because of 
the regulatory oversight system 
Funder Government Master Shi Zhengyan 
(She is a nun) 
Recruitment Government staff and 
volunteers 
Volunteers 
Source of funds 1. Government grants 
 




Political affiliation Communism Buddhism 
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Firstly, in the comparison between the activities of the NGOs during the two disasters, 
China used the Chinese Red Cross, and Taiwan used the Tzu Chi Foundation. Secondly, 
the process of registering NGOs is easier in Taiwan than in China. This process was 
difficult in China’s case because the country’s management system is dual in nature, 
making it hard to register NGOs with the relevant government department (Bissell et al. 
2004; Kovács 2012; Zhang, Yi & Zhao 2013). On the other hand, the Taiwanese 
management system is less strict and the process of registering NGOs is much easier. 
According to Boon (2012), NGOs are instrumental in delivering humanitarian aid 
during disasters. 
 
There is a significant difference in the standards of the humanitarian supply chain in the 
two countries. For instance, China has a pronounced unevenness in determining the 
quality of organisations (Boon 2012; Cozzolino 2012; Li, Chen, Lee & Rao 2013). 
Secondly, there are too many unregistered grass root NGOs in China (Bissell et al. 2004; 
Zhao 2012). Thus, unlike China with its less unified regulatory system, Taiwan has an 
impressive regulatory oversight system. 
 
There is a significant difference in the manner in which NGOs are funded in the two 
countries. In the case of China, the Chinese government funds the NGOs in China while 
a nun by the name Zhengyan Shi who was the founder of the Tzu Chi Foundation in 
Taiwan (Tzu Chi 2009). 
 
The difference in the type of recruitment is also a crucial point of comparison. For 
instance the Chinese government recruited their employees and volunteers into the relief 
effort (Bissell et al. 2004). In contrast, Taiwan mainly enlisted volunteers in the rescue 





Another important contrast between the two countries is their political systems. China is 
a communistic society, while Taiwan places high value on religion especially Buddhism. 
Secondly there is a difference in the sources of funds used in providing humanitarian 
aid. Whereas both countries obtain donations from the public, the Chinese government 
additionally funded relief efforts (Boon 2012). In Taiwan’s case, funding came from the 
donations from members of the Tzu Chi Foundation and recycling of the available 
resources (Wang et al. 2012). 
 
9.4 Comparison between the NGOs Humanitarian Supply Chain Systems 
 
Table 9.4 compare humanitarian supply chain between China Red Cross and Tzu Chi 
 
The first point of comparison is the differences in the local humanitarian supply 
procurement. For example, in response to the Morakot Typhoon, the Taiwanese 
humanitarian aid materials were either bought in advance or acquired from donations 
  NGOs’ Humanitarian 
supply chain 
China Red Cross Taiwan Tzu Chi 
Procurement  Donations 
 Urgent procurement 
Donations 
Warehouse recording Software Software 
Delivery to disaster Spots  Subordinate units 
 Government departments 
Member’s company 
Unloading of supplies Signature required Signature required 
Distribution Needs to be signed for and 
allocated according to the 
category group 




from the public (Interviewer No. 7 on page 64). On the other hand, following the 
Wenchuan earthquake the China Red Cross appealed to local and international well-
wishers to provide relief (Boon 2012). Additionally, the China Red Cross urgently 
bought supplies to meet the needs of the victims. However, the earthquake affected 
many people over a wide area (Boon 2012). The pressure to deliver relief aid made it 
necessary for the Chinese government to purchase supplies indiscriminately and these 
supplies did not meet the needs of diverse groups of people who were victims 
(Cozzolino 2012). 
 
The second point of comparison is the methods used to record the humanitarian aid 
stock in the warehouses (Li et al. 2013). The research here shows that the warehouses 
belonging to the Tzu Chi Foundation in Taiwan had stock software for recording the 
level of humanitarian aid stock (Tzu Chi 2009). This software merges the amount of 
stock in all their warehouses (Interviewee No.7). Similarly, the China Red Cross also 
used stock software to document its humanitarian stock. 
 
The differences between the delivery system is an important comparison point. While 
the China Red Cross used subordinates to deliver the humanitarian materials with large 
vehicles (Boon 2012; Wang et al. 2012); In contrast, Tzu Chi delivered humanitarian 
supplies through a well-developed international shipping company owned by one of Tzu 
Chi’s members (Interviewee No. 9). It is a huge advantage for NGOs to have free 
support in a crucial operation chain. 
 
Another comparison point is in the unloading and distribution of humanitarian aid 
supplies in emergency regions. In the cases of both disasters the rescue workers had to 
sign to unload the relief products released to them during the Wenchuan earthquake and 
the Morakot typhoon (Boon 2012; Hung & Chen 2013). The distribution of 
humanitarian aid supplies in the emergency region is also a point of comparison (Li et al. 
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2013). In both Wenchuan and Morakot the rescue workers had to sign a distribution 




Chapter 10 Recommendations 
 
In order to improve and enhance the effectiveness of the humanitarian relief work by 
NGOs under the emergency plans of China and Taiwan, this author proposes the 
following points.  
 
10.1 Inclusion of an Activity Guide for NGOs in the Emergency Plans 
 
An NGO activity guide is crucial since it serves to direct a disaster response (Vitoriano, 
Montero & Ruan 2013). The inclusion of such a guide in an emergency plan would 
allow the Taiwanese and Chinese governments to collaboratively mitigate the effects of 
disasters (Tsai & Cheryl 2010). The Asian Pacific region is prone to natural disasters 
which have led to the increased demand for social services (Brenner, Bush & Moses 
2010; Parsons et al. 2015). Brenner, Bush and Moses (2010) further explain that NGOs 
are better equipped to meet the need for social services, and the inclusion of an NGO 
activity guide in the national emergency plans would allow the governments to mitigate 
the effects of natural disasters with ease. Cozzolino (2012) explains that a government 
is responsible for funding and overseeing disaster rescue efforts as well as providing 
humanitarian aid in case of an emergency. On the other hand NGOs can provide crucial 
relief and social services especially during a disaster (Brenner, Bush & Moses 2010; Li 
et al. 2013). Since the government cannot singly carry out rescue efforts and provide 
humanitarian aid, stable cooperation between the government and NGOs as well as 
other private companies allows the efficient execution of humanitarian aid (Cozzolino 
2012; Martin, Weerasinghe & Taylor 2014). This need raises the question of whether 




Currently, strict government policies and regulations hamper the registration and 
functionality of NGOs particularly in China (Edele 2009). For example the Chinese 
Emergency response plan contains strict laws that govern NGO registration with the 
Civil Affairs Ministry (Li et al. 2014; The National Emergency Plan 2012). The 
findings on page 24 show that Chinese NGOs are required to obtain government 
sponsorships to qualify for subsidies. Instead, it would be better for the Chinese 
government to recognise the social role of NGOs during disasters and relax its tough 
regulations and policies to include provide roles for NGOs during emergencies (Brenner, 
Bush & Moses 2010). 
 
Secondly, emergency plans should indicate the need for alliances and partnerships 
among local NGOs (Ashley & He 2008). Such an inclusion would obligate NGOs to 
perform certain roles that the government does not have time or the capacity to perform. 
The implementation of a disaster response on an individual organisational level is often 
inefficient and restrictive (Tsai & Chen 2010). As seen in the case of China’s 
emergency response during Wenchuan, the local NGOs cooperated in the provision of 
humanitarian aid (Edele 2009; Li et al. 2013). This cooperation evidently led to better 
services (Cozzolino 2012). On the other hand, the NGOs that responded to Morakot did 
not work together which led to a less efficient disaster response (Hung & Chen 2013). 
Instead, the NGOs responded as single entities that slowed down rescue efforts and led 
to the duplication of activities. Alliances among NGOs often result in the combination 
of the information, technology, experiences and resources that are needed in the 
execution of a disaster response (Ashley & He 2008). Such partnerships also prevent the 
duplication of rescue efforts as there is efficient information sharing describing the roles 
of each organisation. Therefore, if the Chinese National Emergency Response and the 
Disaster Prevention and Protection act (2010) includes an activity guide for partnerships 
between NGOs, these would be easier to implement and would in turn improve an 




A comparison between the NGOs’ and governments’ responses shows that NGOs are 
more efficient and swift in their responses. The integration of the efforts by NGOs in 
the disaster management plans in Taiwan and China would greatly enhance the efforts 
when dealing with disasters in the future (Kuhlicke 2013; Lin 2008). These 
organizations work within the community and can explicitly determine the needs of the 
communities (Glyn, Stoddard, Harmer, Haver, & Harvey 2012). NGOs can often 
promote better organisation at the community level during disasters, and such 
cooperation results in a faster and more effective response. Additionally, NGOs are 
autonomous organisations which mean they can coordinate their disaster preparedness 
and planning in the absence of bureaucratic challenges (Parsons et al. 2015; Vitoriano, 
Montero & Ruan 2013). For example the chain of command and the unclear channels of 
communication indicated in DPPA (2000) led to the inefficient response during the 
Morakot typhoon (Buck, Trainor & Aguirre 2006). This shortcoming can be mitigated 
by collaborative efforts between NGOs and the government, where such collaborations 
will ensure that the collection and dissemination of information is efficient (Tsai and 
Chen 2010). 
 
The Chinese and Taiwanese Emergency Response Plans stipulate the hierarchical 
disaster response levels needed in order to coordinate their efforts when dealing with 
disasters. However, the orders of authority in both cases are ambiguous which resulted 
in delays (Xing & Haibo 2010). Had the NGOs been included in these emergency plans, 
they would have played an essential role, since their organisational structures were 
much simpler than the government’s (Edele 2009). For example soon after the Morakot 
typhoon struck, the NGOs in Taiwan were quick to respond (Hung & Chen 2013; Lin 
2008). According to Tzu Chi (2009), the foundation sent rescuers to the affected areas 
to deliver humanitarian aid. This response was swift and this efficiency led to better 
outcomes than those achieved by the Taiwanese government (Martin, Weerasinghe & 




International NGOs have a higher capacity of dealing with rescue and humanitarian aid 
regardless of the magnitude of a disaster (Cozzolino 2012; Li et al. 2013). On the 
contrary, the capacity of governments to provide relief aid during high magnitude 
disasters remains limited (Martin, Weerasinghe & Taylor 2014). For example the Tzu 
Chi Foundation has an international network of employees and volunteers (Tzu Chi 
2009), with a membership of over 10 million people in 47 countries. During the 
Morakot typhoon, the foundation mobilised 15,000 volunteers to aid in the rescue 
efforts (Glyn et al. 2012; Hung & Chen 2013). Additionally, the foundation has UN 
consultants within its ranks which make it better equipped to handle high magnitude 
disasters. It thus goes without saying that by including an activity guideline for Tzu Chi 
in DPPA (2010), the Taiwanese government would be better placed in its preparation 
for disasters and thus could provide the much needed humanitarian aid (Tzu Chi 2009). 
 
When emergency response plans include an NGO activity guideline, it would then be 
easy to mobilise and distribute the funds needed by the victims (Glyn et al. 2012). 
Evidence shows that when it comes to raising funds for humanitarian purposes, NGOs 
attract more donors than governments. Cozzolino (2012) explains that the involvement 
of NGOs through the documentation of their expected roles would boost the quality of 
humanitarian aid and result in better outcomes including recovery and reconstruction. 
Moreover, the presence of an NGO activity guide in the emergency plans would 
encourage alliances among NGOs (Ashley & He 2008). Such collaborations would 
improve the efficiency of the humanitarian aid (Li et al. 2013). For example if the Tzu 
Chi Foundation, Red Cross and World Vision, and the Taiwanese conducted 
humanitarian work collaboratively, then a disaster response would be faster (Martin, 
Weerasinghe & Taylor 2014). Such alliances would facilitate information sharing to 
further boost the coordination of the activities leading to better outcomes (Ashley & He 
2008). A clear guide on the activity of NGOs would also minimise the duplication of 
efforts during a disaster. Evidently, the documentation of the roles to be played by each 
partner would clearly direct their efforts and actions. Such clarity would reduce 




10.1.1 Contents of the NGO Activity Guide 
 
An NGO activity guide should contain sufficient details to guide the rescue and 
humanitarian work (Cozzolino 2012). The different components that should be 
incorporated into an NGO activity guide are described below. 
 
 Set this guide as an agenda 
 
The first element in such a guide should be the agenda of NGO operations during a 
disaster. According to Kuhlicke (2013), an agenda identifies the needs and expectations 
of the authorities and the public and victims from disaster management. The agenda 
would provide a general statement of the purpose of NGOs’ and would allow the 
government to rank its disaster response priorities. For example such an activity guide 
would stipulate that the NGO should first save lives and then conduct its reconstruction 
and rebuilding efforts. 
 
 Objective of activity guide 
 
Secondly, the activity guide should indicate the disaster management objectives (Edele 
2009). These objectives would guide all the efforts when responding to disasters. These 
management objectives would be expressed through the purpose, the list of expected 
disasters, and the response priorities (Lei, Zhou & Yin 2014). The activity guide 
objectives should also clearly indicate the expectations in terms of the NGO 
performance, which should reflect the country’s culture and its political mandate. The 
inclusion of objective statements in the Chinese and Taiwanese emergency plans would 
guide the development of strategies and ideas to tackle different types of disaster at 
different levels (Glyn et al. 2012). One such objective is to ensure that there are 
measures in place to enhance disaster preparedness (Edele 2009). Thus the DPPA (2010) 
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and China’s emergency management plans should also include the steps necessary for 
ensuring disaster preparedness. It is important to estimate the magnitude of each natural 
disaster to get an approximation for the number of lives at risk. The NGO guide should 
indicate the expected injuries by their level of severity, damages and economic loss. 
These estimates would allow the emergency plans to indicate the level of NGO 
involvement according to the magnitude of each disaster. 
 
 Add indication the level of collaboration 
 
The NGO activity guide in the emergency plans should also indicate the level of 
collaboration between the government and NGOs and among the different NGOs. Such 
details would serve to ensure that there is a high level of coordination and in turn the 
rescue efforts are efficient. The main challenge with the two emergency plans during the 
Morakot and Wenchuan was that there were significant delays in the delivery of the 
humanitarian aid (Glyn et al. 2012; Hung & Chen 2013). These delays were as a result 
of disorganised emergency systems at the state and local levels. As noted by Buck, 
Trainor and Aguirre (2006) emergency plans should indicate the chain of command, 
such that what is expected is clear to all the rescue parties. The inclusion of this guide 
would ascribe specific roles to each partner (Eriksen 2003). A clear description of each 
player’s role during disasters would ensure that the level of efficiency is higher (Tseng 
& Chen 2012). This guide should clearly state the expected actions from the NGOs and 
from the government during different types of disasters. 
 
 Gather the information of each NGOs main activity area 
 
This activity guideline shall also contain details of the major area of involvement of the 
NGOs during the process of disaster management (Kuhlicke 2013). Thus, it should 
contain details on formal consultation, ideas on strategic collaboration to deliver 
interventions, and resource mobilisation. This guide should clearly define the extent of 
241 
 
NGO involvement during each phase of disaster management together with the roles of 
these NGOs (Glyn et al. 2012; Lei, Yue, Zhou & Yin 2014). The guide shall indicate 
that NGOs shall be involved in the establishment of effective systems to analyse risks. 
The emergency plans should indicate that NGOs are also responsible for providing early 
warning systems that would lead to prompt action against anticipated disasters (Chou & 
Chen 2012). The guidelines will indicate the specific activities that NGOs will facilitate 
such as the gathering and maintenance of supplies, planning for contingencies, 
coordination with other agencies, evacuations, as well as the creation of public 
awareness (Tseng & Chen 2012). 
 
 Include the community based NGOs 
 
The NGO activity guide should include the role of the representatives of community 
based voluntary organisations. These organisations are involved in planning for 
disasters and a guide that involves them would provide greater insight into the capacity 
and commitment of communities. The identification of the community profile would 
guide the activities of the NGOs. The activity guide should also indicate the 
involvement of the NGOs in the assessment of risk and the management of knowledge 
(Blaikie et al. 2014; Chou & Wu 2014). Stipulated advocacy initiatives can set the 
precedence for formulating good policies to enhance disaster preparedness. The barriers 
that exist in the current plans can be amended and the opinions of NGO members taken 
into account. Creating a mutually beneficial relationship with the government through 
information sharing shall ensure a comprehensive outlook towards a disaster (Chou & 
Chen 2013). The coordination platforms should be based on the central and local levels 
which will ensure good coverage of the geographical area (Chu, Tsai and Liu 2015). 
Central level administrative levels of NGOs will work with the national government 
while the local level will operate at the grassroots, community jurisdictions. Activities 
may include local communities being supported by local governments to develop 
procedures for operating in disasters. NGOs shall then create awareness of the standard 
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operating procedures and facilitate the transfer of knowledge from the households 
within the local community to the state (Tseng and Chen 2012). 
 
Communication plays a significant role in the coordination and delivery of humanitarian 
aid. Therefore, the activity guide shall indicate the most efficient communication 
channel to this end. Currently, governments and NGOs act alone, especially in Taiwan 
(Lin 2008). Thus an NGO guideline that stipulates the chain of command in emergency 
plans would outline the manner in which communication would be relayed (Buck, 
Trainor & Aguirre 2006). Disaster mitigation activities shall be included in the NGO 
activity guide in the emergency plans. These activities are meant to reduce the effect of 
disasters and they include the analysis and reduction of risk. The inclusion of disaster 
mitigation has gained popularity as a major facet of the management of disasters (Lei, 
Yue, Zhou & Yin 2014). NGOs play a crucial role in reducing the impact of disasters 
(Hsiung et al. 2010). As such emergency plans can include mitigation initiatives and the 
objectives of these initiatives. The guide should indicate construction improvements, 
environmental control, etc., as the activities that NGOs and the government will engage 
in to mitigate a disaster (Alexander and Davis 2012). 
 
 Flexible policies 
 
The NGO activities advocated for should include the implementation of good policies 
through NGOs. These policies and the collaboration between the governments and 
NGOs shall result in more resilient emergency response systems (Hsu et al. 2013; 
McDaniels et al. 2015). Documentation by the government describing the issues related 
to a disaster can be wholly comprehended and achieved through the use of data 
collected from NGOs. The NGOs shall collect information regarding disastrous events, 
thereby acting as a tool for monitoring and evaluation, and in addition, provide 
evaluation of vulnerable communities in need of social protection and create awareness 
through advocacy efforts (Blaikie et al. 2014). This information is essential for 
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government agencies in improving the helping process in addition to learning from 
disasters (Glyn et al. 2012). 
 
The details of the steps to be taken to prevent the escalation of disasters shall be included 
in the activity guides. These shall include the process of controlling the devastating 
effects of disasters, the restoration of order after a disaster, recovery, rehabilitation, and 
reconstruction (Alexander 2014). Activities aimed at disaster response shall allow the 
NGO-government partnerships to mitigate its effects (Hung & Chen 2013). The 
activities to be undertaken as a response to a disaster are meant to minimise the loss of 
human life and suffering. This process requires a lot of coordination and cooperation 
(Hung & Chen 2013). NGOs play a central role in the process through strategic 








Figure 10.1: Summarized recommendations 
 
The restructuring of the disaster management in both China and Taiwan to incorporate 
NGOs would improve disaster preparedness and planning in each country and this 
would result in a more efficient emergency response (Kuhlicke 2013). The findings here 
show that China is heavily cautious about working with international NGOs (Edele 
2009), and because of this aversion, the establishment of a cooperation structure 
between NGOs and the government would require the inclusion of NGOs in the 
emergency response plans. Although the Taiwanese government shows greater 
commitment to working with NGOs than its Chinese counterpart, there is no clear 
guidelines for this partnership (Tsai & Cheryl 2010). NGO activities can be classified at 
the central and local levels (Li et al. 2014), each of which are considered below. 
 
10.1.2.1 Central Level 
 
The central level involves NGOs that operate on a large scale and that have huge 
financial requirements. NGOs at this level would have presence throughout the country. 
Categories NGOs into two levels 
Central: 
 Information sharing 
 Coordination between local NGOs and government 
 Supervise local level NGOs with government 
 Responsible for humanitarian relief headquarters during disaster 
response 
 Carry out the relief work 
 
Local: 
 Carry out relief work 





Centre level NGOs would best correspond to the disaster mitigation initiatives at the 
state level. The revised Chinese National Emergency plan should thus indicate that for 
NGOs to be categorised as at the central level, they should have a membership of at 
least 300,000 people. The Taiwanese emergency response plan should indicate that for 
NGOs to be considered as at the central level, they should have at least 50,000 members. 
 
The Taiwanese NGOs at the central level will be required to establish strategic 
partnerships with the Yuan administrative systems which include the executive, the 
control, judicial, and legislative departments (Tseng & Chen 2012) Although the 
administrative system in China is better structured than that of Taiwan, it lacks the 
coordination with NGOs (The Control Yuan Republic of China 2011). Central level 
NGOs will play the following roles: 
 
 Information Sharing 
 
Central level NGOS will pioneer information sharing by first establishing online 
information sharing platforms (Chu 2015). Throughout the two case studies, it was 
evident that information is a powerful tool for disaster preparedness, planning, response 
and recovery. For example in Taiwan, the Morakot typhoon resulted in unnecessary 
deaths mainly due to the delays caused by inefficiently relayed information (Hung & 
Chen 2013). In a similar manner, the delays in communication caused by the 
bureaucratic system led to an inefficient disaster response system. The establishment of 
central level NGOs would facilitate the efficient collection and sharing of information 
through the network of 300,000 members in China and 50,000 members in Taiwan. 
 
The central level NGOs shall utilize technological development to enhance 
communication and coordination before, during, and after disasters. These technological 
developments will include the use of the internet through social media platforms like 
Twitter, Facebook and Instagram as well as through satellite communications (Tsai and 
Liu 2015). The mode of communication will be through the organizational local area 
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network and virtual private networks which shall provide access to real-time 
information. These central level NGOs can then share information with government 
agencies and other NGOs. Such arrangements would improve the communication 
process and promote better coordination between the government and NGOs (Zschau 
and Kuppers 2013).  
 
The online dissemination of information shall play a crucial role in the development and 
implementation of disaster preparedness programs that rely on early warning systems 
(Glyn et al. 2012). Additionally, when there is a distress call, these online platforms will 
have the capability to integrate location systems to create the profile of a disaster. The 
information provided by central level NGOs will be useful for the armed forces and 
registered rescuers during a disaster. 
 
Another crucial aspect of the proposed communication process among central level 
NGOs would be the use of social media to conduct data mining (Wattegama 2014). The 
data obtained from social media platforms would be critical as it would represent the 
voice of the public and thus convey public knowledge. The popularity of social media in 
conveying breaking news has become very popular in the 21st century. These online 
platforms established by central level NGOs will utilize the relevant data from these 
websites to improve their disaster management efforts (Kuhlicke 2013). 
 
 Coordination between NGOs and the Government 
 
These central level NGOs will serve as connectors between local NGOs and the 
government. These local level NGOs work in close contact with community members 
by identifying their needs and engaging in participatory development. While the 
Chinese and Taiwanese government agencies have administrative chains of command 
and standards of operations, the organisational structures of NGOs are loosely organised 
thereby allowing a more efficient disaster response (Eriksen 2003). In coordinating the 
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operations of NGOs and the government, central level organisations will allow capacity 
building, advocacy and the distribution of resources to the affected areas. 
 
Advocacy will involve the creation of awareness about major legislative issues as well 
as the strategies that should be improved to ensure better disaster management (Lei, Yue, 
Zhou & Yin 2014; Wenger 2014). The local level NGOs will convey information about 
critical policy issues to the central level NGOs thus promoting better advocacy in 
government policy. Additionally, these centre level NGOs will consult with the 
Taiwanese and Chinese governments in the development of clear guidelines (Tsai & 
Cheryl 2010). These guidelines will serve as clear procedures for relief operations to 
guide the relationship between the governments and NGOs and prevent conflict. 
 
The NGOs will be involved in capacity building initiatives that supplement government 
efforts. The national government works in collaboration with the disaster response 
teams to facilitate the knowledge transfer to the community members (Edele 2009). The 
central level NGOs will initiate education programs that local NGOs can implement to 
improve the communities’ disaster response skills. The facilitation of NGOs will 
streamline the unstructured administrative channels in Taiwan by creating a focal point 
for organising a disaster response (Tsai & Cheryl 2010). These NGOs will determine 
the skill profile of the communities and create a common platform for planning capacity 
building initiatives (Tseng & Chen 2012). This coordination will allow the local NGOs 
to facilitate the communities’ access to education materials, to offer guidance, and 
monitor and evaluate their capacity relative to their vulnerabilities.  
 
The facilitation of the coordination between the government and NGOs in the 
framework shall be implemented through the mobilisation and distribution of aid 
resources. The Taiwanese and Chinese Emergency Response Plans stipulate the 
importance of providing humanitarian aid to the vulnerable and the victims of disasters 
(Blaikie et al. 2014; Li et al. 2014). However, these resources are scarce and these 
NGOs could play a crucial role in coordinating the acquisition of supplies and 
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facilitating needs based distribution within communities. Therefore, the incorporation of 
these NGOs’ efforts in the current response plans would improve efficiency and prevent 
the duplication of efforts (Edele 2009). The coordination of the efforts between the 
central government and the NGOs will thus ensure that the scarce resources are well 
utilised throughout the wider society. 
 
 Supervision of Local Level NGOs 
 
The local level NGOs will serve the purpose of providing information and support to 
the centre level NGOs which work in partnership with government agencies in 
providing humanitarian aid. However, these local NGOs need to be accountable in their 
activities. For example the communist and Buddhist systems in China and Taiwan 
respectively oversee NGO activities. In China, there are very strict registration policies 
that limit the inflow of local NGOs and regulate their operations (Edele 2009). Centre 
level NGOs should thus monitor and evaluate the activities of local level NGOs through 
the establishment of standard codes of operations. 
 
Additionally, the creation of open forums for consultation between the centre and local 
level NGOs will help serve as a gateway for ensuring that local level NGOs comply 
with the government’s regulations. These forums would facilitate the implementation of 
regulations that compel all local NGOs to forward their operations’ progress reports and 
audits when called upon to do so. 
 
 Serve as Humanitarian Relief Headquarters 
 
The central NGOs will serve as the headquarters for humanitarian support which will 
enhance disaster preparedness and planning. Through their ability to maintain a profile 
of all disaster response activities, these NGOs are better placed to coordinate 
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humanitarian relief (Li & Feng-Tyan 2008). For example, the central NGOs in Taiwan 
will effectively gather information related to the Yuan and determine the regions that 
require more humanitarian aid than the others. This information shall be useful in the 
equal distribution of relief to the victims (Day et al. 2012).  
 
Central level NGOs would work collaboratively with the government and this structure 
would in turn improve the accountability for the available resources. A common chain 
of command would serve to coordinate a disaster response (Buck, Trainor & Aguirre 
2006). The establishment of headquarters at the central level would ensure that aid is 
dispatched and distributed in a manner that prevents the duplication of efforts (Martin et 
al. 2014). With the central level NGOs as headquarters, the control systems would be 
unified and consultative to allow the monitoring of the progress of the community 
response and relief programs. According to Day et al (2012), these NGOs will be 
wholly responsible for coordinating the networks and the humanitarian activities to 
ensure they are run effectively. 
 
 
 Performing the Relief Work 
 
Despite heavily relying on local NGOs in the implementation of community relief work, 
the central NGOs will directly provide communities with humanitarian assistance (Day 
et al. 2012). The organizations shall provide aid supplies, support evacuation efforts, 
and facilitate psychological and emotional support in addition to post-disaster 
reconstruction (Edele 2009). The many organizations under the unified central level 
NGO administration would possess different skills and resources. In the community 
area of their operations, these institutions shall offer a response to disasters within their 
areas of jurisdiction (Day et al. 2012; Li et al. 2013). In addition, they shall also access 





Furthermore, the central NGOs within the communities shall work collaboratively with 
the government authorities in disaster management (Kuhlicke 2013). Duplications of 
activities can be averted when these organizations work together with the government in 
the planning and implementation of disaster management (Cozzolino 2012). In Taiwan, 
NGOs like Tzu Chi can work with the provincial, municipality, City and county, 
Township or Village administrative units in offering the affected communities relief 
(Tzu Chi 2011). In China, the central NGOs shall work with the already unified; State 
Councils, Provincial, City and County level relief centres. With the establishment of 
working relationships and networks among community members, the government and 
NGOs, the efficiency of relief activities will be optimized. 
 
10.1.2.2 Local Level 
 
Local organizations will supplement the work of central NGOs and implement their 
programmes at the community level. They will serve as an important link between the 
community, the central NGOs, and the government. These local level NGOs will have 
two main functions: 
 
 
 Carry out relief work 
 
The primary responsibility of local NGOs will be the implementation of the relief work 
in the community. The current NGO budget is limited but these NGOs shall operate 
efficiently to establish the needs of the communities (Day et al. 2012). Due to budgetary 
constraints these NGOs will focus on priority issues like preparedness, response, 
recovery, and reconstruction according to their organisational capacity. These NGOs 
provide a good base for conducting community risk and post disaster assessments 
(Blaikie et al. 2014; Duran, Ergun, Keskinocak &Swann 2013). The information 
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derived from these initiatives will significantly guide the implementation of disaster 
planning. 
 
These local level NGOs shall also be involved in community capacity building and 
empowerment. Through community based organizations the dissemination of 
information, skills development and community organizing can be achieved. The local 
NGOs foster participatory development and empower community members and leaders 
to establish more resilient societies (Duran et al. 2013; McDaniels et al. 2015). The 
relief work provided by the Local NGOs fosters greater community involvement in 
responding and recovering from disasters. 
 
 
 The Work of Support Centre NGOs 
 
In the integrated NGOs framework for disaster management in Taiwan and China, the 
local NGOs shall provide strategic support to the central NGOs (Zhou and Yin 2014). 
The scope covered by the central NGOs will be wide and will involve comprehensive 
coordination among governmental and non-governmental agencies (Day et al. 2012). 
Working with community based organizations will seek to create a strategic platform 
for sharing information. Central organizations shall rely on the local organizations for 
information on the implementation of humanitarian aid in addition to the monitoring 
and evaluation of the impacts of community response initiatives (Day et al. 2012). 
 
Local NGOs shall also support centre NGOs in establishing grassroots advocacy 
initiatives geared towards policy improvements and the creation of community 
awareness (Duran et al. 2013). As a result, they will contribute towards the important 
disaster related agendas in government policies. The combination of community 
resources would allow the local NGOs to ensure that the government and central NGOs 
jointly implement these improved resource mobilization initiatives (Glyn et al. 2012). 
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The locating of personnel and the coordination of the logistics of supplies by the central 
NGOs will be substantially simplified with the aid of the local NGOs. 
 




Figure 10.2: Summarized recommendations 
 
The two governments of China and Taiwan should include the humanitarian supply 
chain in their emergency plans because such a supply chain is crucial to the successful 
implementation of a disaster response plan (Cozzolino 2012). The presence of a 
humanitarian supply chain in the emergency plan will reduce the inefficiencies 
experienced in the distribution of supplies in the areas affected by disasters (Duran et al. 
2013; Kovács 2012). Essentially, both Taiwan and China rely on public donations and 
government appropriation to procure supplies for community assistance. However, 
these procurements may at times be inefficient or inconsistent making the process 
complicated. As a remedy to the current situation, establishing a humanitarian supply 
chain will ensure a more systematic approach to the delivery of supplies (Cozzolino 
2012).  
 
For example, the China Red Cross uses an official supply chain coordinated by the 
government and the NGO itself (Kovács 2012). However, the organization lacks 
autonomy from the state agencies making it reliant on the government’s consent in 
Inclusion of humanitarian supply chain cycle into emergency plan 
 
1. Add humanitarian supply chain cycle (basic 5) into emergency plan 
2. Set up regulations which requires the leading NGOs use the same information sharing system 
when disaster occur (Cluster Coordination) 




some phases such as the unloading and distribution of supplies. Conversely, the 
Taiwanese supply chain is more disorganized and only involves voluntary agencies and 
individuals who provide assistance. In the case of Tzu Chi in Taiwan, the community 
relies on the philanthropy of the members and volunteers to facilitate the delivery and 
distribution of supplies to the community. 
 
Therefore, radical improvements are required in restructuring the management of the 
humanitarian supply chain in these countries (Day et al. 2012). Day et al. (2012) further 
explain that the organization of the supply chain should be based on the administrative 
structures of the central and local level NGOs in collaboration with the government. 
Community based organisations and national level NGOs enjoy a higher degree of 
impartiality and acceptability in the community. Structuring humanitarian supply chain 
management that is based on the structure would ease the process of dispatching 
supplies to the many affected areas (Day et al. 2012; Duran et al. 2013). The 
procurement of supplies should be conducted by the central level NGOs who mobilise 
resources from the communities, and government appropriation as in the case of the 
China Red Cross (Zhang et al. 2014). The organization should organize their activities 
independent of government efforts for the sole purpose of accountability. However, 
consultations with the governments should be facilitated to avoid the duplication of 
efforts. 
 
Concerted efforts should be made to ensure that the central level NGOs mobilise 
resources, procure and deliver supplies to the appropriate areas based on their 
established networks (Duran et al. 2013). Local level NGOs can participate in the 
unloading and distribution of the resources from the drop off points. These efforts shall 
be directed towards supplementing but not substituting government supply chains 
(Natarajarathinam, Capar and Narayanan 2009). Where appropriate, the government can 
outsource its distribution to the central level NGOs based of clearly stipulated 
guidelines and accountability procedures. With the incorporation of efforts from both 
the local and central level NGOs and the government, a reliable and seamless 
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humanitarian supply chain will be established (Kovács 2012). In addition, measures of 
accountability will be created to ensure that the distributed supplies are well utilized. 
Establishing an oversight body to monitor and evaluate the supply chain activities will 
be key to promoting transparency and accountability (Day et al. 2012; Kovács 2012). 
The relationship between the government and the NGOs should also be checked to 
ensure that the government does not interfere with the impartiality of the non-profit 
organisations (Duran et al. 2013). These efforts can only be achieved by integrating the 
policies in the legislative provisions through advocacy and strategic lobbying (Glyn et 
al. 2012). 
 
According to these recommendations, emergency planning and the emergency plan, the 
humanitarian supply chain and disaster response will all be improved, and the 
government and NGO cooperation will be relatively improved. Thus, the government 
and NGOs could carry out disaster relief more efficiently and effectively. Moreover, 






















This study has focussed on how to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of a disaster 
response. It has examined in detail how an emergency plan is implemented in a disaster 
response, and the response by the governments and NGOs to a disaster in China and 
Taiwan. This chapter details the main contributions of this research, provides a 




This research makes several claims for contributions to knowledge. First, in most of the 
research focused on improvements to the humanitarian supply chain in order to enhance 
disaster response, the majority of researchers (Wassenhove 2006; Oloruntoba and Gary 
2006; Balcik 2015 and 2017; Christopher, Martin and Tatham 2014; Tomath 2014) have 
had a supply chain management background. However, this thesis will examine disaster 
response from both the emergency planning and humanitarian supply chain perspectives. 
Due to the uncertainty and unpredictability of disasters, improving the humanitarian 
supply chain alone will cause the theory and practice to not match. Thus, it is necessary 
to improve and enhance the humanitarian supply chain, taking into consideration the 
uncertainty and unpredictability of disasters, while also improving emergency planning. 
Moreover, none of the previous studies on this topic so far have recognized or 
acknowledged the importance of emergency planning. 
 
Secondly, this study contributes to knowledge in terms of both the literature and the 
practice of disaster management. This research is the only academic resource that has 
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addressed the disaster response, emergency planning, and the humanitarian supply chain 
at the same time. This study uses the qualitative approach to examine DM, particularly 
emphasising the new trend to study the disaster response combining both emergency 
planning and humanitarian logistics. It is unique and creates a new direction for future 
research. 
 
The third contribution of this study is that it guides new directions for future research. 
This is not the end of research in this area and a number of new research questions are 
proposed based on the findings of this study. 
 
11.3 Review of the research aim and objectives 
 
Before entering into a discussion of the main conclusions drawn from the findings of 
this thesis, it is timely to recall the original research aims and objectives that were set 
out at the beginning. In Chapter 1, it was stated that the primary aim of the research was 
to examine how to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of a response by 
governments and NGOs to a disaster and thus the research objectives were proposed as 
follows: 
 
 Critically examine the disaster management framework and emergency planning 
 Explore the key factors and challenges in humanitarian supply chain 
management 
 Examine and evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of government 
emergency planning and humanitarian supply chain management in the case 
studies of the Wenchuan Earthquake (China) and Typhoon Morakot (Taiwan), 
and use a comparative approach to evaluate both case studies 




The research objectives were focussed on guiding the research, closely linked to what 
has been discussed throughout the thesis. First, Chapter 2 examined the disaster 
management framework and emergency planning. Chapter 3 explored the key factors 
and challenges in humanitarian supply chain management. Chapters 7 and 8 examined 
and evaluated the effectiveness and efficiency of government emergency planning and 
humanitarian supply chain management in the case studies of the Wenchuan Earthquake 
(China) and Typhoon Morakot (Taiwan), and used the comparison approach to evaluate 
both case studies. Finally, Chapter 10 provided recommendations to enhance future 
disaster responses. 
 
11.4 Suggestions for future research 
 
In terms of disaster management, due to the limitations of the research method used in 
this study, a large-scale survey on disaster responses by governments and NGOs was 
not conducted. This might be helpful for breaking down the barriers in the 
collaborations between governments in terms of disaster response. 
 
Moreover, standardizing the humanitarian supply chain process could become a very 
big issue in future emergency planning. Currently, scholars with a supply chain 
background are not very much involved in emergency planning, thus this might be a 
new area for research in the future. 
 
Finally, an information and resources sharing platform between a government and 
NGOs in the emergency planning context is crucial during a disaster response. The 
United Nations currently uses a cluster as a sharing platform to help eliminate 
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Appendix 1: Emergency Planning principles 
 
In General principles (13) 
● Emergency planning is an important activity for many kinds of organization and 
many different areas of jurisdiction; 
● Emergency planning is a multidisciplinary process that cuts across the 
boundaries of professions and disciplines; 
● Emergency planning should strike a balance between providing detail and 
ensuring that its structure is clear to the users; 
● Emergency planning focuses on what to do during the emergency period of a 
disaster/crisis, it has a role to play in all the other phases; 
● Emergency planning is about helping to create a common language and culture, 
and common objectives, for the organizations and people who respond to 
emergencies; 
● Information technology increases the opportunities for collaboration and 
reduces the need for a hierarchy. It therefore tends to flatten the chain of 
command; 
● Higher levels of government should co-ordinate and harmonize the role of local 
civil protection authorities;  
● Emergency planning should focus primarily on satisfying the urgent needs of 
the plan’s beneficiaries; 
● The process of emergency planning is as important as the end product; 
● Emergency planning should be one approach among a series of structure and 
non-structure measures designed to reduce the impact of disasters. It should 
be integrated with the other approaches; 
● Emergency planning should seek to ensure that local communities affected by 
crisis or disaster are able to regain their autonomy. It should seek to discourage 
dependency on outside assistance; 
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● Emergency planning should be a participatory process that positively involves, 
not excludes, the organizations it refers to; 
● Emergency planning must be an inclusive process that does not omit or ignore 
any group which might require special assistance; 
Emergency planning process (15) 
● An emergency plan should be a ‘living document’ that is kept up to data and is 
familiar to its users; 
● Emergency plan should be written to cope with both known and unknown 
hazards; 
● Emergency plan are part of the process of creating resilience and must 
therefore promote both robustness and the adaptability of society in the face 
of hazard; 
● Emergency planned to be acceptable to all their users to function well; 
● An emergency plan is the instrument by which urgent needs are matched with 
the resources available to satisfy them; 
● The purpose of an emergency plan is not to provide basic procedures but to co-
ordinate the activities of the forces that have their own emergency response 
procedures to follow; 
● Emergency planning should not be restricted to the formulation of a 
permanent plan, but should also be conducted on a forward basis during an 
emergency situation by planning the imminent strategic, tactical and 
operational responses; 
● All hazard’ emergency planning is the most efficient kind. A plan should include 
detailed provisions for hazards that are common in the area of its jurisdiction 
and generic ones to cover unexpected threats; 
● Emergency plan should be formulated by people who have both theoretical 
training in disaster management and practical experience of dealing with crises; 
● A single agency, and its head, must take responsibility for the emergency plan 
on behalf of all people and organizations that will use it. 
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● Because emergencies (of any scale) are essentially local problems, the 
municipality is the basic, or ‘bedrock’ level of emergency planning; 
● Emergency plan should be create a clear, unambiguous structure of decision-
making, command, operations and the division of responsibility; 
● Emergency plan should help create a common operating picture of conditions 
on the ground. It should do so by ensuring that emergency managers 
constantly acquire, evaluate and share information from the field; 
● Emergency plan should encourage interoperability between different services 
and response organizations that must work together in crisis situation; 
● A good emergency plan will include provisions to keep the general public 
properly informed of developments in the emergency and response, and of any 
actions that the authorities require of citizens; 
 
Scenario building (5) 
 
● The scenario is a useful tool for investigating what might in an emergency and 
what responses might therefore be needed. 
● Lessons are learned when they result directly in measurable changes for the 
better. Registering and recording experience does not necessarily result in 
lessons learned unless the lesson is enacted in the form of some positive 
change in working practices. 
● The scenario is a model of reality and, like all good models, it should elegantly 
simplify a complex situation to the ingredients that are most important for the 
uses to which the scenario will be put. 
● Scenario are only appropriate where enough data exist for a creditable account 
of the risk situation to be prepared. 
● The scenario methodology should produce a range of outcomes, representing 
the envelope of possibilities for the impact of a hazard under the range of 




Third step: From scenario to actions (5) 
 
● The emergency plan should help created a common operating picture of 
conditions on the ground. It should do so by ensuring that emergency 
managers constantly acquire, evaluate and share information from the field. 
● The emergency operation centre (EOC) is the ‘nature home’ of the emergency 
plan, where is can most easily be formulated, maintained, disseminated and 
utilized. 
● Emergency plan should encourage interoperability between different services 
and response organizations that must work together in crisis situations. 
● A good emergency plan will include provision to keep the general public 
properly informed of developments in the emergency and response, and of an 
actions that the authorities require of citizens. 
● Messages to the public and mass media need to be clear, concise and univocal. 
 
Fourth steps:  using the plan (8) 
 
● No participant who works under the jurisdiction of the emergency plan should 
be without a role to play in the response to a crisis or disaster. 
● Some of previsions of an emergency plan should be tested periodically using 
crisis simulation exercises. Improvements to the plan should be derived from 
the results of these. 
● In exercise design there is a trade-off between realism and pragmatism. No 
field exercise is likely to be fully realistic, but should provide a good simulation 
of the urgency and demands of the emergency environment. 
● During field exercise, any significant threat to health and safety should be taken 
seriously and should lead to an appropriate response, which could be to halt 
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the exercise. It is permissible to make mistakes in an exercise providing there is 
no threat to health and safety and the appropriate lessons are learned. 
● Exercises should always be carefully and objectively evaluated so as to produce 
a final report that details the lessons derived from the simulation. 
●  Planning does not end with the compilation of the permanent emergency plan. 
Instead, it should continue during emergencies, when it involves adapting the 
provisions of  the plan to the requirements posed by the on-going situation. 
● State of emergency should be declared as soon as the developing situation can 
no longer be managed adequately with normal resources (or preventatively in 
anticipation of this). At this point the emergency plan should be activated and 
all participating organizations should simultaneously switch to emergency 
mode. 
● ‘Stand-down’ should be declared as soon as emergency response objectives 
have been met or are no longer appropriate and conditions are no longer 
threatening. This should automatically deactivate the emergency plan. 















Appendix 2: Criteria for Emergency Planning Standards 
 
i. The basic, or reference, level of emergency planning is that of municipal 
government. 
ii. The plan should be prepared by, or under the direction of, a qualified 
emergency planner. 
iii. There should be only one plan, not several, and it should be cover all likely 
hazards. 
iv. The plan should be written in clear, simple, unambiguous language. 
v. The plan should conform to the laws on emergency and disaster management 
that are in force in the country and region it pertains to. 
vi. The plan must be specific about the extent, limits and limitations of its 
jurisdiction. 
vii. The plan should seek to be fully compatible with plans and planning 
requirements at other levels of government and in neighbouring jurisdictions. 
viii. The first objective of the plan is to ensure that lives are not lost unnecessarily. 
ix. The second objective of the plan is to match urgent needs with appropriate 
resources in the most efficient and timely manner. 
x. The plan should be based on a careful and, as far as possible exhaustive, 
assessment of what is likely to happen when an emergency occurs in its 
geographical area of jurisdiction. It must be based on adequate basic research. 
xi. The emergency plan should take account of urban and regional planning 
provisions in effect in the area under its jurisdiction, especially regarding the 
hazardousness of place and the siting of critical facilities. 
xii. The plan should conduct and present the results of a full audit of the resources 
that will be used during emergency operations. 
xiii. Emergency planning should deal with processes, not merely quantities. 
xiv. The plan should adequately specify the roles and activities of each and every 




xv. Whether or not an emergency plan concentrates on the early post-impact 
phase, it should take account in an integrated manner of all the phases of the 
“disaster cycle”. 
xvi. Activities described in the plan that are designed to combat disaster should 
include or at least facilitate sustainable measures for disaster prevention. 
xvii. The plan should seek to integrate and embrace provisions for the private 
sector, hospitals, industries, airports, etc. 
xviii. The plan should constantly be revised and circulated among its participants, 
































Nature of research and how will be used 
 Research study aims to to investigate the 
methods to enhance the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the response by the government 
and NGOs to a disaster, by using the case 
studies of the Wenchuan Earthquake and 
Typhoon Morakot 
 Used in academic and publications, conference 
papers and a funders’ report. 
 Recording for recollection purposes / quotes; 
 Anything said will be treated as confidential 
and anonymous/ your personal data will not 
be passed on to anyone else; 
 I’ll nod a lot because I want to hear you, not 
me… 
 Think of this as an informal chat. I’m 
interested in your own reflections on your 
career. We want honest views and opinions 
about the topic. 
 So, before we start, please fill in the 
participant information sheet and consent 
form. 
 
‘Warm up’ with basic 
personal information 
( 10 mins) 
 
 
 What is your title 
 How many years you involved in this 
humanitarian relief area 
 How many event you involved before and list 
the event 
 
Starting with current 




 How do you criticise current emergency plan? 
How does it affect deliver aid (positive or 
negative and why)? 
 Frame the structure of the existing 
humanitarian relief aid and humanitarian 
supply management in China; 
 
Discussing about supply 
chain operation 
 During the disasters response, how did the 
humanitarian supply chain system operate and 
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(20 mins) why? 
 How is humanitarian supply management 
organized? And what part is played by the 







( 15 minutes) 
 
 How can the humanitarian supplies chain 
become more effective and efficient? And how 




NGOs and government 
during disaster response 
(20) 
 In what ways do the authorities coordinate 
their efforts at the local and national levels? 
And are they really satisfied by the roles 







 What was the biggest challenge or challenges 
during the time of the disasters? Why? And 
how can these challenges be solved? 
 
Any other relevant 
aspects not discussed 
(2 min) 
 
The discussion is coming to an end now, so: 
 Is there anything we haven’t talked about 
that you think we should discuss? 
Finalise interview 
(5 min) 
Thank and close: 
 
 Indicate whether they would like to receive 
preliminary report draft in order to provide 
feedback 
 















Appendix 4: Participant Information Sheet 
 
Project title:  
 
Enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of government and NGOs disaster response 
—case studies of Wenchuan Earthquake and Typhoon Morakot 
 
1. Information about the project/Purpose of the project 
 
The aim of this research is to investigate the methods to enhance the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the response by the government and NGOs to a disaster, by using the 
case studies of the Wenchuan Earthquake and Typhoon Morakot.  
This research has several objectives: firstly, provide definitions and critically examine 
the DM framework, emergency planning, and emergency plan; secondly, explore the 
key factors and challenges in humanitarian supply chain management; thirdly, 
compare the government emergency planning, the government’s and NGOs’ 
humanitarian supply chain management between the cases of the Wenchuan 
earthquake (China) and typhoon Morakot (Taiwan); and finally, to provide 
recommendations to enhance the effectiveness and the efficiency of a disaster 
response. 
 
2. Why have I been chosen? 
 
You have been chosen because you play/have played one of the following role: (1) 
Central government officer who has been involved in the humanitarian relief aid and 
humanitarian supply chain management; (2) Local government officer who has been 
involved in the humanitarian relief aid and humanitarian supply chain management; (3) 
NGO worker officer who has been involved in the humanitarian relief aid and 




3. Do I have to take part? 
 
You do not have to take part in the project. However, your participation will help the 
research team to gain the first insight on the reconstruction programme and help use 
to achieve our research aims. 
 
4. What do I have to do? 
 
You will participate in a semi-structured interview which will last about 1 hour. You can 
choose to answer my questions or not. You can stop the interview at any time you like. 
If you feel that you don’t like us to reveal the contents of the interview, you can tell us 
any time before we complete the research (the end of April 2016). 
 
5. What are the risks associated with this project? 
 
Although we will use anonymous to refer to our data collected from interviews, so 
your name will not be displayed in any of our future publications, for example, book 
chapters, conference papers, and journal articles, however as we will reveal the name 
of your organisation, if readers of the research are familiar with the work of the 
organisation, they might be able to recognise the view of individual interviewees. If 
you prefer not to take the risk, please let us know, we will make sure that the contents 
of the interview will not be used in our publication. If your role is at the national 
government, you might be identified, although p pseudonym will be used. 
 
6. What are the benefits of taking part? 
 
No benefit at all. However we appreciate your time and enthusiasm to help us to 





7. Withdrawal options 
 
You can withdraw the interview at any time, starting from the time when I contact you, 
till I finished the interview. However, please let us know your intention before the end 
of August 2014, when we will submit the first report of the research. You could 
withdraw the interview, or let us know that you do not want us to publish the contents 
of the interview by emailing me 
 
8. Data protection & confidentiality 
 
All my participants are anonymous, that the participant can be identified by the 
researcher but access to this information will not go beyond the researcher.  I will 
store your information, interview records in my phone, laptop and hard-drive with 
encryption. All records will be destroyed after we finish writing up. 
 
9. What if things go wrong?  Who to complain to 
 
 
10. What will happen with the results of the study? 
 
I will use the results of the interviews in my PhD dissertations; I will also write up to 
publish in academic journals. I will make presentations in conferences. 
 
11. Who has reviewed this study? 
 
Coventry University only. 
 
Content removed on data protection grounds
Content removed on data protection grounds
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12. Further information/Key contact details 
 


















Appendix 5: Interview consent form 
 
 
 PROJECT TITLE: 
Enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of government and NGOs disaster 
response—case studies of Wenchuan Earthquake and Typhoon Morakot 
 STATEMENT: 
The undersigned hereby consent to participate in an electronic recorded 
interview for the express purpose of contributing to the research programme of 
the interviewer listed below.  This statement confirms that the interview will 
adopt an ethically appropriate manner that will do no harm to the participant, 
the respective organisations, society or the interviewer and will conform to the 
Coventry University ethics statements listed below. 
Please Tick 
 
1. I confirm that I have read & understood the participant 
information sheet for the above study and have had the 
opportunity to ask questions. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary &that I 
am free to withdraw at anytime without giving a reason. 
 
3. I understand that all the information I provide will be 
treated in confidence 
 
4. I understand that I also have the right to change my mind 
about participating in the study for a short period after 
the study has concluded (31st July 2015). 
 
5. I agree to be recorded as part of the research project   
 









































Wenchuan County (31.0 degrees north latitude, 103.4 degrees east longitude) 
experiences a strong earthquake. Chinese Earthquake Networks Centre initially 








The Sichuan Seismological Bureau sends a working group to the first scene, 








Hu Jintao provides important instructions requiring the rescue of the wounded 
as soon as possible to ensure the safety of people in disaster areas. The local 
military and armed forces carry out the rescue task, becoming the first team to 







Prime Minister Wen Jiabao takes a helicopter and rushes to the disaster area to 







The State Seismological Bureau launches The A Level Plan that assembles a 







Prime Minister Wen Jiabao as commander of the earthquake relief 














Two air force il-76 military transport planes take off from Beijing Nanyuan 







Prime Minister Wen Jiabao arrives in the earthquake-stricken city of Dujiangyan 
to begin directing the relief work. This requires PLA officers to overcome all the 
problems of the quake-hit roads, telecommunications, power outages, and 




















Chengdu Military urgently dispatches more than 6,100 soldiers to the disaster 


























Prime Minister Wen Jiabao holds the Earthquake Relief State Council meeting in 
a makeshift tent in Dujiangyan to analyse the current situation of the 








General Secretary Hu Jintao chairs the evening Politburo Standing Committee 













Four military helicopters sent by the Chengdu military air force to the quake-hit 
Wenchuan county in Sichuan province forced to return to sea due to severe 







The third military medical university emergency medical team sent to Sichuan. 








Following the temporary closure of Chengdu Shuangliu International Airport, it 







The first contact is made through satellite phone. The county Party Secretary 
Wang Bin told that there are more than 30,000 people living in shelters and 
afraid to go home. From the epicentre of Yingxiu, Xuankou, Wolong there is still 
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07:00 Prime Minister Wen Jiabao holds a meeting of the State Council earthquake 
relief headquarters again, and emphasizes that the roads leading to the 















People's Liberation Army General Staff Department order the Jinan military 
region of the mechanized infantry division, consisting of 10,000 troops, to 


















Earthquake Relief Headquarters of the State Council hold a meeting on a train. 






200 people from a division of Sichuan Armed Police, undertake a forced march 
90 km from Lixian County to Wenchuan County. They become the first of the 






In the morning, the Remote Sensing Centre of the National Ministry of Science 






The day after the full repair of the railway sector, apart from the Baocheng line, 


















Premier Wen Jiabao goes to the scene of Beichuan Secondary School. He 
emphasizes the most important task is to try to rescue the survivors as best they 






















Premier Wen Jiabao rides a military helicopter to observe the destruction in 











Premier Wen Jiabao holds a meeting on the train heading from Chengdu to 







The people's Liberation Army General Staff Mapping Agency organizes relief 
mapping support operations, preparing publication of the "special relief map" 










Air Force Il-76 transport aircraft drop 5 tons of food, medicine and other relief 
supplies to the people in the disaster areas. This is the first successful 























Ministry of Civil Affairs allocates a total of 127,580 earthquake disaster relief 
















With the success of previous blasting, construction workers fight more than 70 
hours to completely reopen State Road 317 which was at the direct epicentre of 











CPC Central Committee General Secretary and State President and CMC 
Chairman Hu Jintao arrives in Mianyang. Encourages cadres and the masses to 
visit the earthquake relief frontline troops and medical staff. Premier Wen 
















Japanese rescue team arrives in Qingchuan County and start rescue work 
immediately. This is the first time that the Chinese Government has accepted 






also send professional rescue teams on the same day in the afternoon, and in 
the evening arrive in Sichuan, and immediately rush to Mianzhu, Shifang City 





Hu Jintao arrived at the Beichuan Middle relief scene. In front of his People's 
Liberation Army, police officers, firefighters, rescue workers and other militia, 







The Railway Department opens the 230 ‘relief supplies train’ line, to transport 
rescue machinery, food and medicine, and other military and civilian emergency 
relief supplies over 2,400 times, have received 837 time so far. Currently, a large 











President Hu Jintao arrives in Wenchuan County, checks the disaster situation 







State Road 213 and province highway 302 are opened up, indicating that the 












 May 2008 are special 
national days of mourning. The Chinese Seismological Bureau revises the 



























Appendix 7: Government response in first 15 days in 
Taiwan 
2009  
04/08 Taiwan's Central Weather Bureau forecasts the formation of typhoon Morakot, and 
predicts that in Taiwan north and east there will be a few showers (United Evening 
News, 2009). 
05/08 Taiwan's Central Weather Bureau issues a typhoon warning, the level is a medium-
strength typhoon, emphasizing that Morakot is the biggest threat from a Taiwan 
typhoon this year (United Evening News 2009). 
06/08 Taiwan's central weather bureau predicts super heavy rain (United Evening News 
2009); The Central Emergency Operation Centre issues an alert, upgrading to Level 1 
(United Evening News 2009);  
The Head of the Executive Yuan, Mr Liu gives instructions to the relevant 
government departments, emphasizing that special attention be given to floods 
(United Evening News, 2009). 
07/08 The Central Disaster Response Centre reports that rain and storms will turn big in 
the southern area that night, the highest rainfall will be 1400 mm and it alerts the 
five Heads of Counties in central and southern areas to evacuate the residents who 
live in mudslide warning areas immediately. The Response Centre notes that the 
withdrawal rights are reserved by local governments, not the central government 
(United Evening News, 2009). 
08/08 The Soil and Water Conservation Bureau, Council of Agriculture, announces a 
mudslides Red Alert, for a total of 11 counties including 37 towns, 131 villages, and 
297 rivers (United Evening News 2009);  
The Water Resources Agency, Ministry of Economic Affairs considers requesting 
more pump support (United Evening News, 2009); 
The Central Disaster Response Centre of Executive Yuan, reports that the Defence 
Department has instructed and deployed Eighth Army troops to go to the 
Kaohsiung-Pingtung area for support. The Department of Defence stresses that 
regional grouping garrison support units are also on standby, if necessary, they can 
dispatch the relief ordered within 10 minutes (United Evening News 2009);  





09/08 The Central Disaster Response Centre announces casualties: 3 dead, 31 missing, 19 
injured, and 6,301 people evacuated (United Evening News, 2009). After one night, 
the disaster situation in Nantou County becomes serious. President Ma Ying-Jeou 
instructs Taipei City Fire Department to request rescue rubber dinghies to support 
the South;  
President Ma Ying-Jeou also indicates that the Centre Government is going to 
establish Disaster Response Centres in the southern areas in order to conduct 
rescue and relief work (United Evening News, 2009). 
Head of Executive Yuan Mr Liu goes to the south disaster site Pingtung and takes 
command of the relief in the Kaohsiung and Pingtung areas (United Evening News, 
2009). 
10/08 Military helicopters enter the Kaohsiung County disaster site (United Evening News, 
2009); 
In the afternoon, military Special Operations Forces enter the Xiaolin village by 
helicopter to rescue the surviving villagers. Kaohsiung City Disaster Prevention 
Centre is renamed Disaster Support Centre in order to utilise human resources, and 
supply assistance to neighbouring counties (United Evening News, 2009);  
During the coordination in the response and relief work, the information does not 
flow well between the local and central government. The Ministry of Interior sets up 
Relief Centres in the southern Pingtung Police Department, as a support window 
(United Evening News, 2009);  
Military amphibious vehicles cannot enter the Jiadong Township in the Pingtung 
area, because the rubber boats are often punctured by fishing gear which cause the 
evacuation to be extremely slow (United Evening News, 2009); 
President Ma Ying-Jeou visits the disaster area in Taitung and instructs on the relief 
pattern which was "response by local, support by central" in order to allocate 
resources reasonably and equally (United Evening News, 2009); 
President Ma Ying-Jeou indicates that rescue and relief is the most important task, 
stressing that the Government will do its best to do the response and relief work; 
Government staff claim the response and relief work still belongs to the government 
disaster level, but they also do not have to start the national security mechanism 
(United Evening News, 2009); 
Steps for Disaster: 1. the establishment of the Central Disaster Response Centre; 2. 
Repair utilities, bridges, roads, and telecommunications; 3. Evacuation, relocation of 
the villages, changed into a kind of relief aid. After the Centre disaster prevention 
conference on disaster judgment, inform the local standard operating procedures to 
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undertake no practical work (United Evening News, 2009). 
11/08 The Central Disaster Response Centre state that the Executive Yuan has drawn up a 
"Post-disaster Recovery Typhoon Morakot Reconstruction Relief Plan," the decision 
refers to 921 earthquake victims, relief aid to dying or missing people - $1 million 
New Taiwan Dollar (NT), 250,000 for the injured (United Evening News 2009); 
The Army Force rescues 10 people and identifies 150 stranded people, also airdrops 
1,300 kg of supplies which includes delivery of a variety of materials (United Evening 
News, 2009); 
Disaster relief command system scheduling-Mr Liu Xuanan the vice president of 
administration in the north area, instructs the Head of the Ministry of the Interior 
Mr Liao and the response for the south area. This requires various intelligence units 
to report any information to him straight away, in order to facilitate the latest 
disaster information and progress, such as scheduling and processing in accordance 
with subsequent relief matters (United Evening News, 2009); 
Presidential Office reports that the existing relief mechanism can be implemented 
first and does not consider activating the National Security Mechanism or 
Emergency Command (United Evening News, 2009). 
12/08 President Ma Ying-Jeou undertakes an in-depth exploration of the disaster stricken 
areas, it is the first time that President Ma has visited the disaster area in Pingtung 
(United Evening News, 2009); 
In response to the disaster relief, the Executive Yuan Spokesman reports that it does 
not exclude issuing the Emergency Orders (Ji Jing Daily, 2009.08.12, A4 version); 
President Ma Ying-Jeou visits Jiadong Township in Pingtung County, he says, do not 
repeat the promulgation of the emergency orders, because the 921 Earthquake 
promulgated 11 earthquake emergency commands in the Disaster Prevention and 
Relief Act. If enacted again, the flexibilities and ranges would all be smaller than for 
the Disaster Prevention and Relief Act (United Evening News, 2009); 
There are many victims that are homeless even up until now, Premier Liu today 
instructs the counties report within 48 hours of the resettlement plan, and the 
central government will give the necessary support and assistance; for disaster 
rescue, Premier Liu authorizes Minister of the Interior, Mr Liao, that for some rescue 
equipment shortages he can mobilize requisitions (United Evening News, 2009); 
Ongoing search and rescue operations continue following Typhoon Morakot, with 
people trapped in Kaohsiung County. Kaohsiung County Fire Department takes a 




13/08 The military army force sends out the seagull helicopter to conduct rescue and relief 
work; 
The military army force sends reinforcements of four thousand soldiers (United 
Evening News, 2009); 
Military receive orders to proceed in 10 minutes: Eighth Relief Corps responsible for 
operations in southern area; Tenth Relief Corps responsible for central area; Sixth 
Relief Corps responsible for the north (United Evening News, 2009). 
14/08 President Ma Ying-Jeou convenes the National Security Council, the President 
proposes nine points, requires that the central and local reconstruction committees 
should be set, and the military should boost its relief efforts (United Evening News, 
2009); 
President Ma Ying-Jeou holds the National Security Council Meeting today --disaster 
reconstruction mobilization meeting 7 days after Morakot has occurred (United 
Evening News, 2009). 
15/08 Mr Liu held a news conference yesterday afternoon at the Central Disaster Response 
Centre and said that next Monday (the 17th) he will establish the Morakot disaster 
reconstruction committee, serve as chairman, and hold its first meeting. Next 
Thursday (the 20th) the Executive Yuan will send ‘Morakot Reconstruction Special 
Regulations’ to the legislative department as soon as possible (United Evening News, 
2009); 
President Ma Ying-Jeou states there is the need to set up a reconstruction 
committee at this stage (United Evening News 2009); 
After the National Security Council Meeting, the Disaster Resettlement, 
Reconstruction and Recovery Plan is started today (United Evening News, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
